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Preface 
In a highly urbanized future, it will be critical to know how to make high density 
housing in condominium ownership sustainable and resilient. With this in mind, it has 
been a privilege to be able to dedicate these years of PhD research to understanding 
collective ownership in condominiums. This thesis is just a starting point; there is 
still plenty of research to be done and comparisons to be made about condominium 
housing in cities around the world. 
I am grateful that I found OTB at TU Delft, where I was able to realize this project, and 
my promotors Prof. Marja Elsinga and Prof. Peter Boelhouwer, who supervised and 
guided my research, helping me to be able to stress the importance of this topic. The 
condominium is a form of ownership that can be found in many countries around 
the world. While this research is specifically about affordable condominiums in Quito 
and Bogota, I wanted to bring this research to a place like TU Delft, where world-wide 
problems on the built environment are studied, to emphasize the more general nature 
of research on this topic across different societies. 
I was awarded with the Netherlands Fellowship to pursue my research project in 2011. 
With this funding, I was not only able to support my PhD research position at OTB 
during that period, but also fund both my field trips and survey. The fellowship also 
gave me the opportunity to live in The Netherlands, one of the most beautiful countries 
in the world, and one where I had always wanted to live because of both its urban and 
rural landscapes, and especially because of its social housing system whose history is 
fascinating for an urban planner. 
A research project like this one cannot be achieved alone. As a thesis that uses the 
theory of collective action and that looks at the importance of trust and cooperation 
for achieving better collective goods, I cannot finish this project without expressing my 
gratitude to all the different people that believed this is an important phenomenon to 
research and thanking those that stayed close to me during these years. 
I want express my gratitude to NUFFIC for funding my research project, and to thank 
Veronique van der Vast from the Valorization Center of TU Delft who assisted me by 
managing the fellowship grant.
Special thanks to my promotors Marja Elsinga and Peter Boelhouwer. Marja, you always 
provided me with the freedom and trust necessary to develop my research, and gave 
me the sharpest comments when necessary to keep my research concise and on track. 
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It has been a pleasure to have an inspiring supervisor like you. To both of you, many 
thanks for supporting my extra-curricular activities such as with my founding role in 
A+BE PhD council, while representing the student council at the Research Council of 
BK, while teaching in Quito, or while I was organizing academic side events. You also 
supported me when I decided to accept the job at the municipality of Quito when I 
moved back to Ecuador even though we knew it might delay finishing this thesis. 
Thanks to my colleagues of the Housing Systems research group at OTB: Marietta 
Haffner, Kees Dol, Joris Hoekstra, Harry Boumeester and Harry van der Heijden, for 
sharing with me interesting conversations about housing market problems in Europe. 
To my office mates, Christian Lennartz and to Wenjing Deng, thanks for your friendship 
and support. Thanks to Sylvia Janssen for supervising my survey sample design and 
analysis. Thanks also to Henny Coolen, and to PhD colleagues Sanne Boschmam and 
Jaume Tessera who took the time to understand the complexity of the research and 
gave me key advice about the statistical analysis and the use of STATA.  
Thanks to my PhD colleagues and the other researchers at OTB who became my friends 
during these years: Flavia, Dasa, Sanne, Fanny, Kees, Nurul, Igor, Luz Maria. It is great 
when it is possible to share life with people that like doing scientific research and to 
have fun at the same time. I am grateful for having a group of Latin American and 
Spanish friends; Bea, Daniel, Teo, Hugo, Flavia, Camilo, Toño, you guys became my 
Delft family. To Isadora Espinosa, Pedro Calle, and Simon, and to Dasa Majcen and 
Pedro Inacio and Tera, there are not enough words to express how grateful I am to have 
shared precious moments with you. To my friends in Nijmegen and Delft, especially to 
my Dutch housemates Carla, Renate and Marloes, I was lucky to find such great friends 
to introduce me to Dutch life. To Sarah Chebaro, an architect housemate who thought 
it was fun to draw my condominium case studies for me. And to my Ecuadorian friends, 
Vanessa Rodriguez and Adrian Jaramillo, I was lucky to have you around and close by 
during those times. 
In Quito and Bogota, I would like to thank all the residents that allowed me to enter into 
their common properties, and to the presidents or managers of the buildings. Their 
insights on problems with managing their common property helped me when defining 
the research design and planning the comparative research. Also, there are many other 
actors that I would like to thank, and I am sure it is not possible to name them all. In 
Quito thanks to Jenny Diaz, Alexandra Mina, Alexandra Jaramillo, Silvana Ruiz, Lucia 
Ruiz, Eduardo Castro, Maria Elena Acosta, Pablo Valencia, Mario Burbano de Lara and 
to colleagues at FLACSO, Marco Cordova and Ramiro Rojas, who permitted me hold 
the focus group event at FLACSO in Quito, and to all that came and participated and 
volunteered in the workshop. In Bogota thanks to Alejandro Florian, Germán Molano, 
Laura Salamanca, Jorge Enrique Torres and Elizabeth Perez, Alejandro Peláez, Valentina 
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Peláez, to Delly Betin Aguas, Monica Aldana, Sergio Ballen, Juan Yunda, Ricardo Ortiz, 
Carolina Pardo. To Maria Mercedes Maldonado, who permitted me to hold the focus 
group event at the Secretaría de Habitat auditorium.To my host family in Bogota, my 
friend Lorena Avella, her mother Lilia and the rest of the family, thank you all! 
After discovering that Bogota had interesting arrangements in which social managers 
work with social housing projects, I invited some of these professionals to come 
to Quito in January of 2013, to meet their Ecuadorian counterparts doing social 
management, or acompañamiento social as it called in Latin America. Together with 
Fundación Bien Estar, one of the few organizations with experience in condominium 
social management in Ecuador, we organized an event which people from both the 
Municipality and the Housing Ministry attended. We shared the different approaches to 
social management from the two countries. Thanks to Mutualista Pichincha and their 
directive board, to Pablo Valencia for organizing this event together with me. Thanks 
to Laura Salamanca and Pilar Leguísamo from Responder Corporation for coming to 
Ecuador to share their extensive experience helping communities to self-organize and 
take responsibility of their common property. 
My oldest friends know about the ups and downs during all these years. To my 
friends Maria Augusta Almeida, Paola Silva, Nathalie Alvarez, Cristina Pazmiño, Sofia 
Valdiviezo, Carolina Proaño, and Jonathan Villacis, thank you all for keeping me close to 
you even though I have been abroad for too long and missed so many life-events with 
you and your families. 
Many thanks to my coworkers and friends at Municipality of Quito, and to Jacobo 
Herdoiza, a friend and colleague that believed in my PhD project from the starting 
point; thank you for always supporting my academic activities and perspectives in 
housing policy and urban development. 
And last but not least, I am grateful of my family who accepted my life abroad and 
kept me always connected to my country. Thanks to Lucila, Teo, Nino, Patriciño, 
Juancar, Mom and Dad for always being there supporting both my academic and travel 
ambitions. I love my country but I love living abroad too. Thanks to technology I was 
able to remain as close as possible to you. And to Simeon, my love and life partner 
who patiently encouraged me to finish the thesis as we welcomed a new member to 
our family. Emilio, you became my true inspiration to send the final draft of this thesis 
before your arrival; I love you. 
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Summary
Introduction
Both the general public and policy makers see home ownership as a major life goal. 
Owning a home is a form of capital that creates a social safety net (Elsinga, 2005; 
Moser, 2009). Home ownership can also help boost self-esteem and contribute to 
housing satisfaction (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005; Marcuse, 1972). In South America, 
owning your own home is a way to ensure basic economic security and is a dream 
shared by everyone. For this reason, large-scale investments are needed in owner-
occupied homes for low-income buyers. A different light is shed on this dream however 
when it becomes clear that the quality of subsidized property for low-income groups is 
subpar due to poor maintenance and buildings quickly deteriorate. This occurs in Chile, 
Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador (Paquette-Vasalli & Sanchez, 2009; Rodriguez & 
Sugranyes, 2005; Rojas, 2010).
Most studies into housing quality and poor maintenance have been conducted among 
single-family homes owned by individuals. In South America, especially in cities, 
low-income homes are usually apartments. This means ownership is shared with 
other building residents. Most maintenance-related issues occur in joint ownership 
properties and there is little literature available on this topic.
The aim of this study is to gain more insight into how homeowner’s associations work 
in low-income owner-occupied apartments. When parts of the residential buildings 
such as the ground on which they are built and the infrastructure are joint property, 
then a homeowner´s association is necessary to keep maintenance of the common 
property parts. The lack of maintenance of these communal areas is a problem of 
increasing proportions, which has prompted this research. Which factors play a decisive 
role in how homeowner’s associations function and how building maintenance is 
organized, how important is the horizontal property law and how does this affect low-
income housing policy in Colombia and Ecuador?
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This PhD dissertation consists of three components: Part 1 presents the research 
question, the theoretical framework and the research methods. Part 2 discusses the 
formal institutions (the rules of the game) involved: housing policy and the property 
law. Part 3 discusses the informal rules which include the cooperation between 
professionals and the interaction with residents (the play of the game). The summary 
includes conclusions and implications for follow-up research and policy.
Theory and research methods
Comparative housing research can serve multiple purposes; for example to evaluate 
policy and perhaps implement policy that has been successful in other countries. 
This dissertation is based on a comparative study of two countries and uses the 
“middle range approach” as discussed in Haffner et al. (2010). With this approach, 
the assumption is that institutional differences between countries are of crucial 
importance, but that a comparison is worthwhile and may prove beneficial. This 
dissertation has a comparative structure that takes institutional differences that are 
important to home ownership of low-income families into account (Elsinga, 1998; 
Oxley, 2001; Ruonavaara, 1993; Stephens, 2011). The central hypothesis is that 
the design of the horizontal property law is of great importance to the effectiveness 
of homeowner’s associations and maintenance levels of buildings and homes. A 
comparison of Colombia and Ecuador, neighboring countries with similar housing 
systems and cultures but different horizontal property law, is a good way to test this 
hypothesis. 
The horizontal property law or law for condominium form of ownership is a formal 
institution. Formal institutions, together with the informal institutions such as values, 
determine the rules of the game for actors. (North, 1994:360). This institutional 
approach is beneficial to studying the functioning of homeowner’s associations. In the 
further elaboration of the research framework, Ostrom´s (1990, 2005) institutional 
analysis and development framework (IAD) was used as a starting point. 
The Institutional Analysis & Development (IAD) framework makes it possible to 
analyze the actions in a complex situation and to map the multiple positions of actors. 
The IAD framework distinguishes three groups of important factors: characteristics 
of the community, the rules used and the physical characteristics of the common 
property (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). An important assumption is that actors are not 
necessarily selfish and rational. Another assumption is that people are not by definition 
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helpless and unable to work together. The Ostrom approach provides researchers 
with a framework for mapping out the potential contributions of a community. 
This framework provides good leads for the analysis of the central problem in this 
dissertation: poor maintenance in collective homeownership.
• Housing policy
• Horizontal property
 
Rules of the game:
Outcomes:
Play of the game:
• Game players
• Formal and informal rules
• Perceived maintenance level
Governance and maintenance 
of common property
• Describing housing policies and property laws
• Comparing Ecuador and Colombia
 
Methods:
Methods:
• Focus groups with professionals
• Survey to 414 residens
• Comparing Quito and Bogota
Implications for policy
Figure 1. Comparative institutional approach
Figure 1 explains the comparative institutional approach. The first part of the analysis 
focuses on the formal institutions: the housing policy and horizontal property law 
(Rules of the game). Policy documents and available statistics were studied in the 
analysis of housing policy. Subsequently, the property law in Colombia and Ecuador 
were subjected to a thorough analysis of the law. The focus was on the regulations in 
the law that support self-government or instead stipulate the role of a professional to 
be in charge of management and maintenance
A network analysis was then applied to study cooperation among the professionals 
involved in the provision of low-income housing in condominium. This analysis 
involved professionals from the municipality, developers, property managers, banks 
and social workers in Quito and then Bogota. These analyses were conducted using 
focus groups. The main focus during the discussion was the recognition of the problem 
of poor maintenance, an analysis of the possible causes and an exploration of possible 
solutions. The network approach appears to be useful because it shows that there is 
complexity and a large degree of interdependence among actors. 
TOC
 20 Affordable Condominium Housing
The analysis of the role of the residents was identified with a survey among 414 
residents of 8 different housing complexes with low-income condominium housing. It 
involved 4 blocks from different construction years in Quito and 4 blocks from different 
construction years in Bogota. The questionnaire distributed among residents was 
inspired by Ostrom’s IAD framework.
The “mixed method” approach was necessary to map the interaction between formal 
and informal institutions. This approach is the result of the choice for a “middle range” 
approach that distills the similarities and differences between two cities/countries 
with different institutions. The aim is to learn lessons that can lead to improvements in 
the maintenance in homeowner’s associations for low-income households.
“Rules of the game”
In both Bogota and Quito, the majority of households live in owner-occupied dwellings, 
mostly apartments in condominium. The government housing policy in both countries 
mainly consists of subsidizing owner-occupied homes for low-income households. 
The description of the housing policy shows that building homes is a complex affair 
that requires a great deal of cooperation between parties including local governments, 
developers, the land registry, funding bodies and the national government as the 
subsidy provider. Finally it appears that the registration of the policy outcome gives 
incomplete information for policy evaluation. In practice, homes that are built 
are registered as single units when they are actually part of housing complex in 
condominium. 
The horizontal property law plays a key role in how homeowner’s associations function. 
The law defines which actors are responsible for the management and maintenance 
of the shared property. Research has revealed that there are key differences between 
the laws in the two countries. In Colombia the law stipulates that the first assembly 
meeting of the homeowner’s association must be called by the builder. In Ostrom’s 
words: Colombia has embedded a collective choice-rule in a constitutional one. This 
concerns a clear and unambiguous anchoring of the body most important to how a 
homeowner’s association functions. In Ecuador, the law does not provide a definitive 
answer on when a homeowner’s association should be established. In practice, it 
turns out that it’s usually up to the project developer to make this decision. Another 
important difference between the two laws is the responsibility for the management 
of the homeowner’s association. In Colombia, the law stipulates that this must be 
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organized by a professional and paid manager of the homeowner’s association, 
whereas the law in Ecuador is more flexible and it allows for the position to be filled by a 
volunteer or paid position if the association can afford it.
“Play of the game” 
In both Bogota and in Quito, professionals have indicated that in the realization 
of owner-occupied apartments for low-income families, they depend on the local 
government and funding bodies. In both cities a link was found between maintenance 
issues related to homeowner’s associations and the contents of the horizontal property 
law specifically lack of clarity about the rights and obligations of the joint owners. The 
law is not clear to everyone and not everyone is aware of the law. The analysis shows 
that all participants acknowledge the problem, can identify various causes and agree 
that it is unclear who the responsible party or problem owner is.
For Bogota, research showed that overdue maintenance problems are usually due to 
poor management decisions by the professional responsible for the homeowner’s 
association. Research in Quito yields other explanations: a lack of community spirit, 
lack of respect for rules and standards and different ideas about the use of common 
spaces. From this it can be concluded that there is a connection between how 
homeowner’s associations in Bogota and Quito function and the property laws in 
Colombia and Ecuador. In the words of Ostrom: “the activities and policies of external 
political regimes can affect the level and type of self-organization to achieve collective 
benefits” (Ostrom, 1990: 190). The professionals recognize and emphasize that their 
role and interpretation affects how homeowner’s associations function in the long 
term.
The perception and opinion of the residents about maintenance problems was mapped 
out on the basis of a survey that was carried out in 2014. The survey included questions 
about the composition and characteristics of the households, their awareness of their 
position in the homeowner’s association, their behavior and their relationship with the 
condominium regulations. The results are in line with Ostrom’s framework. It appears 
that: (1) trust in leaders of the community, (2) agreement about who is responsible 
for maintenance, (3) participation in assembly meetings, and (4) adequate physical 
conditions of the building, are conditions for adequate maintenance outcomes. 
Owners collectively need information, as well as knowledge about rules, to be able to 
manage the condominium. 
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Conclusions
The results show that legal obligations can have a counterproductive effect on the 
involvement and self-organization of homeowners. The property law in Colombia 
stipulates that a professional administrator must be appointed to manage the 
homeowner’s association. The result is that residents feel less personal responsibility 
and attend fewer meetings of the homeowner’s association.
In Ecuador, the rules for maintenance are much more flexible and the chairman of the 
homeowner’s association can assume the role of manager. As a result, the residents 
appear to be more involved in the homeowner’s association’s decision-making 
processes, but are generally less satisfied with the outcome.
The horizontal property law plays a key role in achieving better maintenance results 
in Bogota. The project developer is responsible for ensuring the legal requirement to 
appoint a professional homeowner’s association administrator. The law stipulates that 
a maintenance plan must be drawn up before building materials in the residences start 
showing signs of deterioration. A maintenance plan and a detailed payment plan for 
contributions to the homeowner’s association must be ready by the time the homes are 
completed and residents move in. This is in line with Ostrom’s IAD framework, when 
she says that when rules of the game are known, specifically the benefits and costs, the 
outcomes are more satisfactory (Ostrom, 1990). 
Most studies into maintenance by homeowner’s associations research the relationship 
between maintenance and the characteristics of households and homes (Orban, 
2006; Alterman, 2010; Hastings et al., 2006). This study also included these variables 
in addition to the formal rules and the ability to self-organize in homeowner’s 
associations. By using the IAD framework, it became possible to investigate the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions (play of the game). A comparison 
of the “play of the game” in Bogota and Quito allowed for conclusions to be drawn 
about the influence of the differences in both countries’ property laws. 
Uncovering the relationship between the horizontal property law and its effect on 
the functioning of a homeowner’s association through a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative research is an added value of this research. The significance of these 
outcomes goes beyond Bogota and Quito and contributes to insight into mechanisms 
in the functioning of home owner’s associations in general (Bengtsson & Hertting, 
2014). 
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Implications for future research
This research provides input for the research questions of the future. A first follow-up 
line of inquiry is the impact of the functioning of homeowner’s associations and the 
maintenance results on the increasing value of homes. Further studies are required 
into the functioning of the owner-occupied apartment market and specifically the 
role of collectivity in housing preferences, how maintenance fees are set and how the 
organization of a homeowner’s association influences the value of apartments.
Dilapidated homes have a major impact on the quality of life in neighborhoods. 
Urbanization, densification and promoting homeownership go hand in hand. The 
share of owner-occupied apartments is raising rapidly and with it the risk of poorly 
functioning homeowner’s associations. The management of collective homeownership 
is part of the research agenda of sustainable, resilient and smart cities.
This dissertation presents a framework for international comparative research into the 
functioning of homeowner’s associations. Insight into the interaction between formal 
and informal institutions is crucial in a world in which citizens have to take personal 
responsibility, governments have ambitious goals and quality of housing and life is at 
risk.
This dissertation shows that the number of homeowners’ associations is greater 
than official records indicate. There is room for improvement when it comes 
to the registration of property because this is essential to good housing policy 
implementation and evaluation.
Policy implications
As cities grow, densification and the continued construction of apartment buildings 
require policy for owner-occupied apartments that is featured prominently in housing 
policy. Poor maintenance of common property parts is a collective issue that has 
major implications for the quality of life in urban areas and the asset of individual 
homeowners. National policy for the construction of subsidized owner-occupied homes 
must be accompanied by local policies for the proper management of homeowner’s 
associations. 
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The quality and sustainability of low-income housing should be part of housing policy 
monitoring and evaluation. Shared spaces and common land with facilities deserve 
special attention. The joint ownership of land and facilities can also be a source of 
income and joy.
Climate change has implications for the quality and sustainability requirements of 
homes, which will inevitably lead to large-scale renovations. Renovation requires 
collective decision-making for façades and other parts of the building that are viewed 
as the collective property of the homeowner’s association. The availability of funding 
options is also extremely important for these types of renovations and this is a 
responsibility for the government and for profit and non-profit financial institutions to 
facilitate access to financing that can be paid off by the homeowner´s association.
Natural disasters such as earthquakes occur frequently in Bogota and Quito. 
Joint ownership requires joint insurance for earthquake damage. The 2016 Quito 
earthquake may serve as a wake-up call in this respect. If there are collective action 
dilemmas and apartment buildings do not comply with the law regarding the obligatory 
requirement to have insurance for all kinds of damages, the government can play a 
role in overcoming these dilemmas by offering guarantees. Policy for condominium 
ownership in growing cities is essential to creating resilient cities. 
The old adage ‘my home is my castle’ is in dire need of adaptation in the case of 
condominiums, as “our castle” would be more appropriate here. 
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Samenvatting
Introductie
Een eigen huis wordt zowel door veel huishoudens als door beleidsmakers gezien als 
cruciaal. Een eigen huis is een vorm van vermogen en daarmee een sociaal vangnet 
(Elsinga, 2005; Moser, 2009), bovendien kan het bijdragen aan de eigenwaarde en 
tevredenheid met de woonsituatie (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005; Marcuse, 1972). In 
Latijns America wordt de eigen woning beschouwd als basiszekerheid en droom voor 
een ieder. Er wordt daarom op grote schaal en voor grote bedragen geïnvesteerd in 
koopwoningen voor mensen met een laag inkomen. Deze droom komt echter in een 
ander daglicht te staan als blijkt dat gesubsidieerde koopappartementen voor lage 
inkomensgroepen snel verloederen door slecht onderhoud zoals blijkt in Chili, Mexico, 
Brazilië en ook Colombia en Ecuador (Paquette-Vasalli & Sanchez, 2009; Rodriguez & 
Sugranyes, 2005; Rojas, 2010).
Het meeste onderzoek naar woningkwaliteit en gebrekkig onderhoud van woningen 
is uitgevoerd onder huishoudens die individueel eigenaar zijn van een woning. In 
Latijns Amerika, met name de grote steden, zijn woningen voor lage inkomens 
doorgaans appartementen en dus is er sprake van gezamenlijk eigendom. Juist in dat 
gemeenschappelijke eigendom komen veel problemen voor en daar is nog weinig 
onderzoek naar gedaan.
Het doel van dit onderzoek is het verkrijgen van meer inzicht in het functioneren van 
verenigingen van eigenaren (VVE) bij koopappartementen voor lage inkomens. Bij een 
VVE zijn delen van woongebouwen zoals de grond en de infrastructuur van het gebouw 
gezamenlijk eigendom. Het gebrek aan onderhoud van deze gemeenschappelijke 
woningdelen is een probleem dat steeds grotere vormen aanneemt en vormde daarom 
aanleiding voor dit proefschrift. Welke factoren spelen een doorslaggevende rol voor 
het functioneren van VVE’s en daarmee voor onderhoud van woningen, hoe belangrijk 
is de appartementswet en wat betekent dit voor woonbeleid voor lage inkomens in 
Colombia en Ecuador?
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Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen. Deel 1 presenteert de onderzoeksvraag, 
het theoretisch raamwerk en de onderzoeksmethoden. Deel 2 gaat in op de 
formele instituties (the rules of the game) die van belang zijn: woonbeleid en 
appartementsrecht. Deel 3 gaat in op de informele instituties: de samenwerking tussen 
professionals en interactie met bewoners (the play of the game). De samenvatting sluit 
af met de conclusies en implicaties voor vervolgonderzoek en beleid.
Theorie en onderzoeksmethoden
Vergelijkend woononderzoek kan verschillende doelen dienen; bijvoorbeeld om beleid 
te evalueren en eventueel om succesvol beleid in het ene land te implementeren in 
een ander land. Dit proefschrift kiest voor een vergelijking van twee landen en hanteert 
de zogenaamde “middle range approach” (Haffner et al., 2010). De veronderstelling 
bij deze benadering is dat institutionele verschillen tussen landen cruciaal zijn, maar 
dat een vergelijking de moeite waard is. Dit proefschrift kent een vergelijkende opzet 
die rekening houdt met de institutionele verschillen die van belang zijn bij eigen 
woningbezit voor lage inkomens (Elsinga, 1998; Oxley, 2001; Ruonavaara, 1993; 
Stephens, 2011). De centrale hypothese is dat de inrichting van de appartementswet 
van groot belang is voor het functioneren van verenigingen eigenaren en daarmee op 
het onderhoudsniveau van de woningen. Een vergelijking van Colombia en Ecuador, 
buurlanden met vergelijkbare huisvestingssystemen en cultuur, maar verschillende 
appartementswetten is een goede manier om deze hypothese te testen. 
De appartementswet is een formele institutie. Formele instituties bepalen samen met 
de informele instituties zoals normen, waarden en codes, de regels van het spel voor 
actoren. (North, 1994:360). Deze institutionele benadering blijkt vruchtbaar voor 
het bestuderen van het functioneren van verenigingen van eigenaren. Bij het verder 
uitwerken van het onderzoekskader werd het institutionele raamwerk van Ostrom 
(1990, 2005) als vertrekpunt genomen. 
Het Institutional Analysis & Development (IAD) raamwerk maakt het mogelijk om de 
acties in een complexe situatie te analyseren en de meervoudige posities van actoren 
in kaart te brengen. Het AID raamwerk maakt daarbij onderscheid in drie groepen 
van belangrijke factoren: kenmerken van de community, de gehanteerde regels en de 
fysieke kenmerken (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Een belangrijke aanname is dat actoren 
niet per definitie egoïstisch en rationeel zijn. Een andere aanname is dat mensen niet 
per definitie hulpeloos zijn en niet in staat om samen te werken. De benadering van 
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Ostrom geeft onderzoekers een kader om de potentiele bijdrage van de community 
in kaart te brengen. Dit raamwerk biedt goede aanknopingspunten voor de analyse 
van het centrale probleem in dit proefschrift: gebrekkig onderhoud bij collectief 
woningbezit.
• Woonbeleid
• Appartementswet
 
“Rules of the game”:
Uitkomsten:
“Play of the game”:
• Betrokkenen
• Formele en informele regels
• Waargenomen onderhoudsniveau
Beheer en onderhoud van
het gemeenschappelijk eigendom Implicaties voor beleid
• Beschrijving woonbeleid en appartementswet
• Vergelijking Ecuador en Colombia
 
Methoden:
Methoden:
• Focusgroepen met professionals
• Survey onder 414 bewoners
• Vergelijking Quito en Bogota
Figuur 1. Comparatieve institutionele benadering 
In figuur 1 wordt de comparative institutitionele benadering uitgewerkt. Het 
eerste deel van de analyse focust op de formele instituties: het woonbeleid en de 
appartementswet. Bij de analyse van het woonbeleid werden beleidsdocumenten en 
beschikbare statistieken bestudeerd. Vervolgens zijn de appartementenwetten in de 
Colombia en Ecuador aan een grondige wetsanalyse onderworpen. Hierbij werd met 
name gefocussed op de voorschriften in appartementswetten zijn die zelfbestuur 
ondersteunen of juist de rol van een professional voorschrijven.
Vervolgens is een netwerkanalyse toegepast op de samenwerking tussen de betrokken 
professionals. Het ging om professionals bij de gemeente, bij ontwikkelaars, 
vastgoedbeheerders, banken en sociaal werkers in Quito en daarna in Bogota. 
Deze analyses zijn uitgevoerd in een focusgroep setting. Centraal hierbij stond de 
herkenning van het probleem gebrekkig onderhoud, een analyse van de oorzaken 
en een verkenning van mogelijke oplossingen. De netwerkbenadering blijkt nuttig 
omdat daarmee duidelijk werd dat er sprake is van complexiteit en grote onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid. 
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De analyse van de rol van de bewoners werd in beeld gebracht met een enquête onder 
414 bewoners van 8 verschillende wooncomplexen met koopwoningen voor lage 
inkomens. Het ging om 4 woningcomplexen uit verschillende bouwjaren in Quito en 
4 complexen uit verschillende bouwjaren in Bogota. De vragenlijst die verspreid werd 
onder bewoners, was geïnspireerd op het IAD-raamwerk van Ostrom.
De “mixed method” benadering was noodzakelijk om de interactie tussen formele en 
informele instituties in kaart te brengen. Deze aanpak vloeit voort uit de keuze voor een 
“middle range” benadering waarin overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen twee steden/
landen met verschillende instituties worden gedestilleerd. Het doel daarbij is lessen 
te leren die kunnen leiden tot verbetering van het onderhoud in verenigingen van 
eigenaren voor lage inkomens.
“Rules of the game”
In zowel Bogota als Quito heeft het merendeel van de huishoudens een koophuis 
en in veel gevallen gaat het om een appartement. Het woonbeleid van de overheden 
in beide landen bestaat vooral uit het subsidiëren van koopwoningen voor lage 
inkomens. De beschrijving van het woonbeleid laat zien dat het realiseren van de 
woningen een complexe aangelegenheid is die samenwerking vergt van vele partijen 
zoals lokale overheid, ontwikkelaars, kadaster, financiers en de landelijke overheid als 
subsidieverstrekker. Ten slotte blijkt dat de registratie een probleem is: woningen die 
geregistreerd staan als individueel eigendom, blijken in de praktijk deel uit te maken 
van verenigingen van eigenaren. 
De appartementswet speelt een belangrijke rol in het functioneren van verenigingen 
van eigenaren. De wet omschrijft welke actoren verantwoordelijk zijn voor beheer 
en onderhoud van het gemeenschappelijk eigendom. Er blijkt sprake van cruciale 
verschillen tussen de wetten in de twee landen. In Colombia schrijft de wet voor 
wanneer een vereniging van eigenaren in het leven moet worden geroepen. In 
woorden van Ostrom: Colombia heeft een collectieve keuze regel ingebed in een 
grondrechtelijke. Het gaat om een heldere en duidelijke verankering van het 
belangrijkste orgaan voor het functioneren van een VVE. In Ecuador geeft de wet 
geen uitsluitsel over wanneer precies een VVE in het leven moet worden geroepen. 
In de praktijk blijkt het aan de projectontwikkelaar om te beslissen wanneer een 
vve wordt opgericht. Een ander belangrijk verschil tussen de twee wetten is de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor het beheer van de VVE. In Colombia is wettelijk geregeld dat 
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dit moet worden uitgevoerd door een professionele betaalde VVE beheerder, terwijl de 
wet in Ecuador ruimte laat voor invulling door een vrijwilliger. 
“Play of the game” 
In zowel Bogota als in Quito gaven professionals aan dat zij bij het realiseren van 
koopappartementen voor lage inkomens afhankelijk zijn van de gemeenten en van 
financiers. In beide steden werd de link gelegd tussen problemen met het onderhoud 
bij vereniging van eigenaren en de inhoud van de appartementswet, met name 
onduidelijkheid over de rechten en plichten van de gezamenlijke eigenaren. De wet 
is niet voor iedereen duidelijk en ook niet bij iedereen bekend. De analyse maakte 
duidelijk dat alle participanten het probleem herkennen, verschillende oorzaken zien 
en het er over eens zijn dat het niet duidelijk is wie de eigenaar is van het probleem.
In Bogota kwam naar voren dat het probleem van achterstallig onderhoud vooral is 
te wijten aan slecht management van professionele VVE beheerders. In Quito komen 
andere verklaringen naar voren: gebrek aan gemeenschapszin, gebrek aan respect voor 
regels en normen en verschillende ideeën over het gebruik van gemeenschappelijke 
ruimten. Hieruit kan de conclusie worden getrokken dat er een verband bestaat tussen 
het functioneren van VVEs in Bogota en Quito en de appartementswetten in Colombia 
en Ecuador. In de woorden van Ostrom: “The activities and policies of external 
political regimes can affect the level and type of self-organization to achieve collective 
benefits” (Ostrom, 1990: 190). De professionals herkennen en benadrukken dat hun 
rol en invulling daarvan effect heeft op het latere functioneren van verenigingen van 
eigenaren.
De perceptie en mening van de bewoners over het onderhoud werd in kaart gebracht 
aan de hand van een enquête die in 2014 werd uitgevoerd. In de enquête werd 
gevraagd naar de kenmerken van de huishoudens, hun kennis van hun positie 
in de vereniging van eigenaren, hun gedrag en hun analyse van de problemen. 
De uitkomsten zijn in lijn met Ostroms IAD framework: Wanneer er sprake is 
van 1) vertrouwen in de leiders van de community, 2) overeenstemming over de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor onderhoud, 3) deelname aan de VVE vergaderingen 4) een 
adequate fysieke conditie, blijken voorwaarden voor een positieve evaluatie van de 
onderhoudssituatie. Voor het adequaat functioneren van een VVE is het noodzakelijk 
dat bewoners kennis hebben van de onderhoudssituatie en -planning en van de regels.
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Conclusies
De resultaten laten zien dat wettelijke verplichtingen een contraproductief 
effect kunnen hebben op de betrokkenheid en zelforganisatie van eigenaren. De 
appartementswet in Colombia schrijft voor dat er een professionele VVE-beheerder 
moet worden aangesteld, dit leidde tot minder verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel bij 
bewoners en beperkte deelname aan vergaderingen van de VVE.
In Ecuador zijn de regels voor onderhoud veel flexibeler en kan de voorzitter van de VVE 
de rol van beheerder op zich nemen. De bewoners blijken daardoor meer betrokken bij 
de besluitvorming in de VVE, echter ze zijn minder tevreden met de uitkomst.
De appartementswet speelt een belangrijke rol in het realiseren van beter 
onderhoudsresultaten in Bogota. De wettelijke verplichting tot een professionele 
VVE-beheerder wordt uitgevoerd door de projectontwikkelaar als eerste eigenaar. De 
wet schrijft voor dat er een onderhoudsplan is voordat de materialen in de woningen 
verslechtering vertonen. Dus als de woningen worden overgedragen aan de bewoners 
ligt er een onderhoudsplan en is ook helder wat de eigenaren moeten betalen aan de 
VVE. Dit is in overeenstemming met het IAD raamwerk van Ostrom: “when the rules 
of the game are known, specifically the benefits and costs, the outcomes are more 
satisfactory” (Ostrom, 1990). 
De meeste studies naar onderhoud van VVEs onderzoeken de relatie tussen onderhoud 
en de kenmerken van huishoudens en woningen (Orban, 2006; Alterman, 2010; 
Hastings et al., 2006). Ook in dit onderzoek zijn deze variabelen betrokken, maar 
daarnaast zijn ook de formele regels en de zelforganisatie in het onderzoek betrokken. 
Door gebruik van het IAD raamwerk werd het mogelijk de interactie tussen formele en 
informele instituties (“play of the game”) te onderzoeken. Door een vergelijking van 
de “play of the game” in Bogota en Quito konden conclusies worden getrokken over de 
invloed van de verschillen in de appartementswetten tussen de twee landen. 
Het analyseren van de relatie tussen de appartementswet en het effect daarvan op het 
functioneren van een VVE door middel van combinaties van kwantitatief en kwalitatief 
onderzoek is een meerwaarde van dit onderzoek. De betekenis van deze uitkomsten 
gaat verder dan Bogota en Quito en draagt bij aan inzicht in mechanismes bij het 
functioneren van VVEs in het algemeen (Bengtsson & Hertting, 2014). 
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Implicatie voor toekomstig onderzoek
Dit onderzoek geeft stof tot onderzoeksvragen voor de toekomst. Een eerste 
vervolgvraag is de impact van het functioneren van VVEs en de onderhoudsuitkomsten 
op de waardeontwikkeling van de woningen. Het is belangrijk dat onderzoek wordt 
gedaan naar het functioneren van de markt voor appartementen en in het bijzonder 
hoe collectiviteit een rol speelt in de woonvoorkeuren, hoe prijzen voor onderhoud 
worden bepaald en hoe de organisatie van de VVE van invloed is op de waarde van de 
appartementen.
Verwaarlozing van woningen heeft een grote impact op de leefbaarheid van buurten. 
Urbanisatie, verdichting en stimulering van het eigen woningbezit gaan hand in 
hand. Het aandeel koopappartementen stijgt snel en daarmee ook het risico op slecht 
functionerende verenigingen van eigenaren. Het beheer van collectief woningeigendom 
hoort op de onderzoeksagenda van duurzame, veerkrachtige en slimme steden.
Dit proefschrift presenteert een raamwerk voor internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek 
naar het functioneren van verenigingen van eigenaren. Kennis van de interactie 
tussen formele en informele instituties is cruciaal in een wereld waarin burgers eigen 
verantwoordelijkheid moeten nemen, overheden ambitieuze doelen hebben en de 
leefbaarheid onder druk staat.
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat het aantal verenigingen van eigenaren groter is dan blijkt 
uit de officiële registratie. Registratie van eigendom is voor verbetering vatbaar en 
cruciaal voor goed beleid.
Implicaties voor beleid
Aangezien steden groeien verdichten en steeds meer appartementen bouwen verdient 
beleid voor koopappartementen een prominente plek in het woonbeleid. Gebrekkig 
onderhoud van appartementen is een collectief probleem met grote consequenties 
voor de leefbaarheid van steden en het vermogen van individuele eigenaren. Nationaal 
beleid voor de productie van gesubsidieerde koopwoningen dient vergezeld te gaan van 
lokaal beleid voor goed beheer van verenigingen van eigenaren. 
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De kwaliteit en duurzaamheid van woningen voor lage inkomens zou 
onderdeel moeten uitmaken van evaluaties van woonbeleid. Hierbij verdienen 
gemeenschappelijke ruimten, gemeenschappelijke grond met faciliteiten bijzondere 
aandacht. Het gemeenschappelijk eigendom zeker van grond en faciliteiten kan ook 
een bron van inkomsten en vreugde zijn.
Klimaatverandering impliceert hogere kwaliteits- en duurzaamheidseisen aan 
woningen en resulteert in een enorme renovatieopgave. Renovatie vergt even 
als onderhoud collectieve besluitvorming voor bijvoorbeeld gevels als collectief 
eigendom van de vereniging. Bovendien is het van groot belang dat er ook 
financieringsmogelijkheden zijn voor deze renovaties; een zorg van overheid en (non) 
profit financiële instellingen.
Natuurrampen zoals aardbevingen zijn een bekend fenomeen in Bogota en Quito. 
Gezamenlijk eigendom vergt een gezamenlijke verzekering voor aardbevingsschade. De 
aardbeving in Quito in 2016 kan in dat opzicht worden beschouwd als een wake up call. 
Indien er sprake is van collectieve actie dilemma’s, kan de overheid een rol nemen om 
het dilemma te doorbreken met een garantie. Beleid voor collectief woningeigendom in 
groeiende steden is cruciaal in het streven naar veerkrachtige steden. 
Het aloude adagium ‘my home is my castle’ is aan aanpassing toe wat betreft 
koopappartementen, het zou “our castle” moeten zijn. 
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Part I
Research problem, theories, and methods 
The first part of this thesis comprises the introduction, the conceptual approach, the 
research design, and the research questions and methods. 
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1 Introduction to affordable 
condominium housing
Condominium (n) / kɑndə’mɪniəm/1
From Latin com (cun)- “together” + dominum “right of ownership” 
The aim of this thesis is to help policymakers better understand why low- and middle-
income homeowners have difficulties with the maintenance of common property parts 
of the buildings they occupy. Homeowners are expected to be in control of their units, 
but why are some of them not taking care of their properties? What is the problem in 
the context of Latin American housing policy? Which factors play a distinctive role, and 
what does this means for Colombian and Ecuadorian policies on affordable housing? 
Low- and middle-income households in Latin America can achieve the dream of 
homeownership by buying an affordable unit with the assistance of subsidy to make 
the down-payment. Both subsidization programs and affordable housing provision are 
regulated by government. The urban property system to which these housing solutions 
are directed is the condominium regime. By comparing cases from two capital cities 
of Latin America, namely Bogota, Colombia and Quito, Ecuador, this thesis seeks 
to unravel the institutional complexity of the policy system and homeownership in 
condominium. 
As cities grow and communities are built in greater density, the meaning of 
homeownership changes. In an urbanized world, homeownership occurs in multifamily 
and collective arrangements of land and architecture (Robertson, 2012). That 
description points to the kind of homeownership that is the focus of this study: low-
income families in dwellings in horizontal property. Horizontal property is the term 
used in property law to refer to the ownership of air space within a collective structure, 
which is also called condominium (Lujanen, 2010). To gain a better understanding of 
the maintenance of horizontal property, it is necessary to understand the bundle of 
rights and the collective action dilemmas existing in a common property such as the 
condominium. In the context of condominium housing, owning a home of one’s own 
implies a more complex configuration of rights than just the possession of a single unit. 
1 Online etymology dictionary. http://www.etymonline.com/
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§  1.1 The research problem: Housing policy and deteriorated units 
FIGURE 1.1 Mid-rise buildings built in 2010-2012 in Bogota, Colombia. (Photo credit: Rosa E. Donoso)
The picture above illustrates two of the main social housing sectors in Latin America. 
Ascending towards the top of the hills is a typical informal settlement, where each 
dwelling was incrementally self-built by their occupants. Whether attached or 
detached, each household is responsible for their own self-built house. The importance 
of squatter settlements, their formative processes, and the habitat conditions in this 
sector have dominated housing policy research in developing countries. However, as 
cities shift towards more formal and dense housing solutions, other housing conditions 
and problems come to the fore that warrant observation and study. 
Since the mid-twentieth century, Latin America’s national governments have built 
mid-rise apartments for owner-occupation in an effort to address the housing needs of 
low-income families in cities. Nowadays, under a new policy network, these dwellings 
continue to be produced but now in conjunction with the private sector. The formal 
market for affordable housing comprises dwellings that are generally mass-produced 
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and that have building permits and property titles. The informal market operates 
outside the bounds of prescribed legal systems and modern urban development 
patterns. Informal housing includes dwellings that are self-built over time without 
participation of the construction companies and investors that are typically involved in 
the formal housing market.
However, apart from the process of housing provision, the key difference between the 
squatter houses on the hills and the mid-rise buildings pictured above lies in the form 
of tenure. First of all, self-built houses are owner-occupied dwellings on individual 
plots of land. In contrast, apartments are individually owned but at the same time 
are partly common property with respect to both the building and the land. In short, 
these apartments fall under the condominium regime. Owing a single-family house is 
very different than owning an apartment or a unit in condominium. In a single-family 
house the burden of maintenance weighs on the household; in condominium, both the 
decision-making about and the costs of maintenance are shared with co-owners and 
other occupants. 
‘A home of one’s own’ is perceived by families and policymakers as a fact of life. 
Homeownership is the preferred form of tenure in housing policies. Over the last 
few decades the growth of homeownership has been remarkable around the world 
(Piketty, 2014). From a social policy perspective, homeownership is considered an 
important economic asset for low-income families (Elsinga, 2005; Moser, 2009), as 
well as a source of self-esteem and satisfaction (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005; Marcuse, 
1972). “Owning rather than renting is thought to foster higher levels of perceived 
control over life events” (Rohe & Basolo, 1997:797). However, other investigators have 
demonstrated that homeownership is highly affected by location and neighborhoods 
effects, implying that there are other factors besides the individual control over 
the dwelling to consider in housing research (Galster, 1987). It is assumed that 
owner-occupiers will maintain their properties better than tenants or landlords 
(owner-investors). And likewise, several claims have been made about the benefits of 
homeownership for low-income families. 
Besides the benefits that homeownership presumably bring to low-income families, 
the literature describes some risks and reveals how certain assumptions about the 
benefits of homeownership fall short when low-income families become owner-
occupiers (Galster, 1983; Littlewood & Munro, 1996). Failure to maintain the 
dwellings is one effect that may actually create more problems for a low-income 
family. The literature warns about the potential for a low return on investment and 
negative equity when the unit deteriorates, which can make homeownership more of 
a problem than a solution (Scanlon, 1998). Low-income homeowners often neglect 
the maintenance of their properties for social and economic reasons, but possibly also 
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because of the poor quality of the structure, which makes maintenance of a dwelling 
more costly (Galster, 1983; Scanlon, 1998). 
Recent studies in Latin American consolidated self-help neighborhoods2 have 
documented a need for better upkeep and housing rehabilitation policies (Ward, 
Jiménez & Virgilio, 2014).3 Within the formal sector in Chile, Mexico, and Brazil there 
is evidence that subsidized dwellings in ownership start to deteriorate prematurely, 
just a few years after the new homeowners move into the dwelling (Paquette-Vasalli 
& Sanchez, 2009; Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2005; Rojas, 2010). Similar problems are 
observed in Colombia and Ecuador, as will be elaborated in this thesis. 
Under the right to housing, different housing policies have been applied in Latin 
American countries. As set forth above, two housing sectors have been targeted by 
housing policy programs seeking to guarantee that the population lives in adequate 
homes (UN-HABITAT, 2011). Policies focusing on informal settlements pursue 
regularization and improvement of facilities in the public domain such as streets 
and public services. Within the formal sector, government incentives promote the 
production of new dwellings for affordable ownership (Donoso & Elsinga, 2016; 
Ferguson & Navarrete, 2003; Zanetta, 2001). The right to an adequate home is not 
necessarily a right to own a home (Florian, 2012; Rolnik, 2013). However, owning a 
home is an important social aspiration and a dream providing direction in people’s 
lives (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005; Ronald, 2008). 
A market-oriented, subsidized mechanism for low-income homeownership was first 
adopted in Chile in 1977; today the policy is commonplace in Latin America (Ferguson, 
Rubinstein & Vial, 1996; Gilbert, 2004). It has been adopted as a successful strategy 
to increase the provision of affordable dwellings and homeownership (Rojas, 2001). 
However, after more than three decades of implementation some problems have come 
to light, including the lack of maintenance (Rojas, 2010). 
2 I prefer to call them self-help neighborhoods instead of slum areas or informal settlements because most of 
them today have had urban improvements programs.
3 Rehabilitation is needed in particular in those settlements that are thirty to forty years old, located in the in-
ner-suburban areas of Latin American cities, and currently owned by low- and middle-income families. To read 
more about this research, see Ward et al., 2014.  
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Research focusing on housing quality or lack of maintenance, in either formal or 
informal4 situations, is generally focused on individual households owning a single-
family house or an individual flat.5 In Latin America, particularly in big cities, low-
income homeownership exists under multifamily and shared ownership regimes, 
which implies different institutional arrangements than would pertain to a single-
family house. How might our understanding of the deterioration of dwellings change 
when these are under a condominium regime? 
The body of literature about condominiums rarely distinguishes those that are 
produced and inhabited by lower-income groups, but there are some exceptions 
(Esquivel, 2008; Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2005; Werczberger & Ginsberg, 1987). 
However, since management problems have become more common, housing scholars 
have started to investigate the challenges of condominium maintenance in different 
parts of the world. For example, privatization of the state housing stock in Eastern 
Europe raised awareness of the need to address the repair and management problems 
that came to light when social housing was converted to condominiums (Grover, 
Munro-Faure & Solviev, 2002; Orban, 2006; Rabenhorst & Ignatova, 2009; Soaita, 
2012). 
In the last decade, research coming from Latin America – notably Chile (Rodriguez 
& Sugranyes, 2005), Mexico (Esquivel, 2008; Paquette-Vasalli & Sanchez, 2009), 
Colombia (Mejia, 2006), and Brazil (Paz, 2014; Rolnik & Royer, 2014) -- has 
demonstrated that the lack of maintenance of dwellings built with the help of 
subsidy policies for low-income homeownership is a common problem in affordable 
condominium housing. In this context comparisons would yield particularly useful 
insights, allowing the policymakers to better understand the problems and to 
find policy solutions. Considering that the subsidy policy approach to low-income 
homeownership has been transferred to many countries in the Latin American region 
(Ferguson et al., 1996; Gilbert, 2004), it is surprising that cross-national comparisons 
have not yet been made to study deterioration in the condominium housing stock of 
low-income homeowners.
4 Informal housing is a term used within the Latin American research community to refer to the self-help process-
es of housing provision without building permits and formal registration at the city level. In these settlements 
land ownership is sometimes legal or in the processes of land titling.
5 The literature of maintenance practices of European social housing is not necessarily similar to the Latin Ameri-
can cases since the institutions and people in charge of maintenance are different.
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§  1.2 Research approach 
Buildings under a condominium regime can be considered as communities, albeit 
‘loose’ or hybrid ones, since the institutional structure is prescribed or already defined 
during the housing provision process (Ball & Harloe, 1992) and established in the 
property model implied in horizontal property law (Lujanen, 2010; Merwe, van de, 
2015; Orban, 2006). Houses in condominiums are private goods, although their main 
characteristic is the common property of the land, structure, and infrastructure of the 
buildings. Common property elements need to be maintained collectively. Therefore, 
this thesis assumes that condominiums can be studied as common property resources 
(Ostrom, 1990). 
The research approach uses Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework. Its starting point is the observation of how rules, governance practices, 
and physical characteristics of a common property resource influence collective action. 
Since the ‘resource’ is the outcome of a housing policy, concretely people’s homes, 
the research approach is aligned with comparative housing research theories as used 
in housing systems studies (Haffner, Hoekstra, Oxley & van der Heijden, 2010; Oxley, 
2001; Toussaint, 2011). By comparing two systems, drawing cases from two countries, 
it is possible to test whether the law and context, including each network of actors, are 
significant variables and have an influence on the policy outcome. 
The main pillar of affordable condominium housing is a formal institution: the law 
of horizontal property or condominium law (Blandy & Hunter, 2012; Lujanen, 2010; 
Orban, 2006). Nonetheless, “as expressed in forms of life, institutions are analysed 
only in so far as they form a consensual backdrop against which action is negotiated 
and its meanings formed” (Giddens, 1979:50). Therefore, even though the law is a key 
variable in this research, the goal of this thesis is to observe how it is interpreted and 
ascertain whether maintenance practices are actually influenced by laws. 
The institutional approach applied in this thesis is explained in more detail in chapter 
2. At this point, however, a brief introduction is necessary to frame the scope of the 
research and its main questions.
Institutions are the underlying rules of the game, as North (1994) explained. 
Institutions “are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (e.g. norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics” (North, 1994:360). In affordable 
condominium housing both formal and informal institutions can be observed, 
especially where the economic and sociological meanings of housing and communities 
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merge (Ostrom, 1990; Ronald, 2005; Toussaint, 2011). This thesis is about people’s 
homes and their collective maintenance practices, so the meanings of housing 
institutions are of particular importance (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2011; Elsinga, 
1998; Ronald, 2008; Ronald & Hirayama, 2006). 
The notion of governance often “emphasizes that policies are formulated and 
implemented in multi-actor, networked environments, in which actors pursue different 
goals” (Rhodes, 1997 in Bueren & Heuvelhof, 2005:47). Governance is about the 
cooperative process, “about organizing, about running organizations, about steering” 
(Bortel, van, 2012:93). Governance occurs in horizontal arenas of policymaking, 
where public, private, and self-governed actors contribute to the formation of the 
different governance arrangements that are generally involved in the production and 
implementation of public policy (SØrensen & Torfing, 2007). 
Governance of the condominium occurs in different but coexisting arenas, such as 
during the production of condominium housing, and afterwards when homeowners 
move into the new dwellings and live there as co-owners. The main assumption of 
this thesis is that condominium property law brings structure to the governance 
arrangements that are necessary to produce, own, and live in condominium property. 
Actors involved in housing provision, including the professionals, are regulated by 
this law; it also stipulates the homeowners’ rights and obligations. As explained by 
the theory of governance and institutions, formal institutions bring some order into 
chaos, but “they do not determine the course and outcomes of the game” (Bueren 
& Heuvelhof, 2005:48). Moreover, in comparative housing research, not only formal 
but also informal institutions matter when observing housing systems’ structures and 
outcomes (Toussaint, 2011; Heijden, van der, 2013).
The main outcome under scrutiny here is the maintenance level of condominium 
housing. There are several factors that may influence the perception of maintenance 
levels, and this thesis makes a diagnosis of these factors, as set forth in Ostrom’s IAD 
framework. Two types of factors are subjected to analysis. First, this thesis evaluates 
the opinions and positions of the policymakers and professionals involved in the 
production of affordable housing in condominium. And second, this thesis considers 
the factors or variables that take into account the characteristics of the community 
of homeowners, their perceptions regarding the rule of law, and their opinions about 
the physical characteristics of the resource. Chapter 6 deals with the governance 
of both policy actors and housing development processes as they are perceived by 
the professionals involved in the provision process. Then, chapter 7 deals with the 
characteristics of low- and middle-income owners in condominium. 
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To what extent do both formal and informal institutions affect the maintenance 
outcome? This thesis advances the comparative housing approach by bringing 
Ostrom’s (1990) scholarly position to bear on the role of the institutions in the 
condominium tenure. Condominium tenure is a form of co-ownership with ancient 
institutional roots but taking specific forms in different parts of the world. In Latin 
America, modern condominium laws regulate individual and collective rights and 
obligations and also regulate the homeowners associations (Merwe, van de, 2008). 
This is a study about how human beings interact when involved in a common property 
resource such as housing in condominium (Orban, 2006; Ostrom, 1990, 2009a). As 
Ostrom mentioned in her lecture when receiving the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009, 
citing Douglas North (1990): 
"The humans we study have complex motivational structures and establish 
diverse private-for-profit, governmental, and community institutional 
arrangements that operate at multiple scales to generate productive and 
innovative as well as destructive and perverse outcomes (North 1990, 2005)." 
(Ostrom, 2009a:408)
Ostrom’s framework envisions human beings not only as rational and egoistic, or as 
helpless and trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma, incapable of cooperating to manage 
and maintain their common property. In fact, and in real life, humans communicate 
and interact:
"When boundedly rational individuals do interact over time, it is reasonable to 
assume that they learn more accurate information about the actions they can take 
and the likely actions of other individuals…" (Ostrom, 2009a:430)
Therefore, in this research the starting point regarding the behavior of actors in the 
system is aligned with Ostrom’s position. Rather than looking at communities of low-
income homeowners as inevitably problematic or helpless, taking Ostrom’s approach 
we observe their potential, their internal resourcefulness, and the mechanisms 
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through which satisfactory outcomes are to some extent achieved as perceived by the 
households themselves. 
This research is not just about co-owners; it is also about their relationship with actors 
in the housing system. Professionals and developers are part of a network in which they 
often interact, developing common ideas and strategies to build affordable housing. 
The provision process leading to low-income homeownership in condominium creates 
a complex system among users (owners and tenants) and developers, together with the 
lending sector and the state. 
If the goal is to understand, and then compare, which factors are associated with 
perceived maintenance levels of common property elements, it is necessary to unravel 
the meanings of homeownership in the condominium tenure and the housing system 
for low-income homeownership. As Stephens explains, housing tenure is an important 
institution in the system and goes to the heart of the ‘distinctive’ nature of housing in 
both comparative research and welfare policy (2011:345). To perform an institutional 
analysis of low-income homeownership policy in Latin America, a conceptual approach 
was chosen that foregrounds the institutions of condominium tenure and therefore 
brings the latent collective action dilemmas to light (Orban, 2006; Ostrom, 1990). 
§  1.2.1 Comparing Bogota, Colombia and Quito, Ecuador: Hypothesis 
The literature generally discusses problems with condominium maintenance within 
a single institutional context. In contrast, this thesis discusses data from Bogota, 
Colombia and Quito, Ecuador. These two Latin American capitals have different 
property laws but similar subsidy policies for promoting low-income homeownership 
in condominiums. The underlying hypothesis is that this difference in property law 
impacts on the functioning of condominium development and management and in 
turn on maintenance outcomes as perceived by the residents themselves. Chapter 2 
explains the comparative approach taken here and chapter 3 presents the research 
design, which was systematically applied in both contexts to permit comparison of the 
condominium situations. 
Colombia and Ecuador have very similar policies for promoting low-income and 
middle-income owner-occupation. The policy regulates both the subsidy allocation 
process and the affordable housing market. Chapter 4 expands on this regulatory 
framework and gives information about the respective housing markets. 
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What distinguishes the housing systems of these two countries is their horizontal 
property law. It was updated in 2001 in Colombia, which at that point had the newest 
revised law on this kind of property of any country in Latin America. In Ecuador, the 
law dates back to the 1960s, though it was not codified until the 1990s, and some of 
its articles were most recently amended in 2011 in 2015. Colombia was chosen as 
the setting for a case study because its law is the most up to date. Since this formal 
institution was designed to make the property regime work, it can be assumed that the 
owners perceive its outcomes as optimal. The best way to know whether outcomes are 
in fact optimal is to compare them with outcomes in a similar affordable condominium 
housing system. Ecuador was chosen as the other setting for a case study because it has 
an older version of the property law, but also because it is the country of origin of the 
author of this thesis, which would makes the research environment more accessible. 
Condominium tenure does not exist in a vacuum; it is influenced by the urban history 
of multi-family buildings in these capital cities, and by the social and the economic 
conditions of the context of study. I propose a framework to compare and analyze 
the different systems while taking into account specific institutions implied in the 
provision process of affordable condominiums. Scholars have been involved in long 
debates about what it really means to do comparative housing research that considers 
tenure as a key variable in the comparison of different systems (Elsinga, 1998; Oxley, 
2001; Ruonavaara, 1993; Stephens, 2011). The recommendation is to focus on the 
legal aspects that make a tenure form internationally comparable and ‘conceptually 
equivalent’ across different national contexts (Pickvance, 2001).
§  1.2.2 Condominium ownership and collective action 
The literature on meanings of homeownership, such as the study by Saunders (1990), 
takes the position that although some of the benefits of homeownership do not 
necessarily derive from the tenure form, there are some advantages that come “directly 
from rights established through title to property” (1990:97). One of these is the ‘right 
to modify’, or the right to do as one pleases with the property (Saunders, 1990). As 
said before, homeownership in a single-family house is different than in a multi-family 
building. In multi-family buildings, one cannot do what one pleases with elements that 
belong to common property.
By law, the right to modify the property is constrained or enhanced by the collective 
property rights. For instance, it is possible to modify parts of the common property 
such as the facades if it is agreed to do so by majority rule in the assembly of owners 
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meeting, under which some of the costs can be collectively assumed. Taking into 
account the bundle of rights and the physical qualities of the resource, the common 
property can be a rival and non-excludable good. It is rivalrous because the use 
and over-use of the common property can reduce the availability of the resource to 
other co-owners. And it is non-excludable because co-owners that do not pay the 
maintenance fee, or that do not attend the assembly meeting, cannot be excluded from 
entering and using some of the basic common areas such as the stairs or elevators. 
Owners can be sanctioned when they do not collaborate but cannot be excluded from 
entering into their common property. But how easy or how difficult is it to sanction your 
next-door neighbor? Situations like these illustrate the ambiguous boundary between 
the formal rule and the informal one and influence decision-making and collective 
action (Orban, 2006). 
§  1.3 Thesis outline 
The thesis is organized in three parts: (I) housing theory and methods, (II) 
condominium formal institutions, and (III) condominium informal institutions, 
followed by the conclusion. 
Part I presents both the conceptual approach and the methods applied to understand 
low-income maintenance problems. Chapter 2 introduces theories of comparative 
housing research, revising the convergence and divergence comparative systems 
approach, and explains the middle-range approach, an approach in which both 
formal and informal institutions matter. Going deeper into the institutional debate 
in housing research, this chapter then examines the role of homeownership 
institutions and expands on how that role might change in reference to collective 
ownership in condominium. The second part of this chapter treats individual and 
collective ownership in condominium, including the bundle of rights, the collective 
action dilemmas, and their possible solutions. Finally, the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework of Ostrom (1990) is presented as the main conceptual 
approach that guides this research.
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Chapter 3 discusses the research design and the methods that were applied to answer 
the research questions posed in this thesis. It includes the methodological sections 
of the consecutive chapters, namely the process of data collection, methods for the 
analysis of property law, focus groups, and case-study selection for the quantitative 
survey. The sample design as well as the multiple variables and statistical methods 
applied are explained in this chapter. 
After part I of the book, each subsequent chapter addresses a specific research question 
using either qualitative or quantitative data (see Table 1.1). 
Part II turns to the formal institutions in condominium, first in light of policy and 
market data and second in terms of the property law. Chapter 4 gives some historical 
background on the changing role of government in housing policy, taking a path-
dependence policy approach towards homeownership. The chapter explains the 
constitutional housing rights in both Colombia and Ecuador, and outlines the current 
subsidy policy for homeownership. Then the housing markets of Bogota and Quito are 
analyzed using census and cadaster data. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the property law of condominium, which is the main formal 
institution of interest in this study and the one on which the main hypothesis of this 
thesis is based. This analysis takes a socio-legal perspective, explaining the structure 
of the law by showing who and what are regulated by it. The results of the comparative 
analysis advance our understanding of how this formal institution differs between the 
case-study cities. The identified differences and similarities form the basis for part III of 
the research. 
Part III takes a broader view and introduces the informal institutions. It starts with 
two chapters on how condominium rules and maintenance problems are perceived 
by different actors. Chapter 6 uses information from the analysis of property law by 
looking into how professionals and government agencies perceive the maintenance 
problems of low-income condominiums. Then the external network of actors involved 
in condominium governance is sketched. The picture is assembled from the results 
of focus groups, demonstrating the interests of each party, the policy network 
characteristics, and the role of key professional actors in the system, such as the 
social manager, the property manager, and municipal property registry and cadaster 
departments. 
Chapter 7 explores how low-income homeowners perceive their maintenance 
problems in a rule-structure situation such as found in the condominium regime. 
While chapter 6 presents the external actors, chapter 7 turns the attention to the 
internal actors: homeowners and residents in condominium property. The dependent 
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variable is the perceived maintenance level (PML) of their own housing complex. Using 
the IAD framework, a series of variables regarding (1) community socio-economic 
characteristics and trust, (2) property law, and (3) physical qualities of the housing 
complex are then explained which ones are statistically associated or not associated 
with the maintenance level. Both formal and informal institutions are tested using 
multivariate regression methods in Bogota and Quito. 
The final part of the thesis resumes the application of the middle-range approach 
to the housing systems and housing theory. The condominium form of tenure 
involves formal and informal institutional variables, as will be demonstrated in the 
comparative analysis. Regarding policies to cope with the deterioration of low-income 
condominiums, this research makes some recommendations in the last chapter. 
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MAIN HYPOTHESIS The more modern property law in Colombia has a positive impact on self-organiza-
tion and in turn on the perceived maintenance level
Chapter 1 Introduction
Part I Theories and Methods
Chapter 2 Conceptual approach
Chapter 3 Research design and methods
Part II Formal Institutions
Chapter 4 Housing market and policy
Research questions How have housing policies been adopted 
in both Colombia and Ecuador?
How does the incentive-based policy 
work in producing condominiums?
What are the differences or similarities?
Chapter 5 Condominium Law
Research questions Who and what are regulated by horizon-
tal property law?
How does the regulatory system operate 
in condominium? 
What are the similarities and differences 
between Colombia and Ecuador?  
Part III Informal Institutions & Governance
Chapter 6 Network of professionals
Research questions How do professionals perceive mainte-
nance problems? How do they deal with 
these problems?
How do they perceive the role of the law?
What are the similarities and differences 
between Bogota and Quito?
Chapter 7 Governance of low-income homeowners
Research questions Which factors are related to the per-
ceived maintenance level (PML) of the 
common property? 
Do these factors differ between Bogota 
and Quito?
Conclusion Condominium housing institutions: governance and collective action 
Responding to the main hypothesis: the laws make a difference for maintenance 
outcomes
TABLE 1.1 Thesis outline 
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2 Conceptual approach
This thesis makes a theoretical and methodological contribution to the field by 
integrating the institutional theory of the commons to the middle-range, comparative 
housing approach. With the aim of understanding homeownership under divergent 
condominium regimes, the theory of the commons was deemed appropriate to explain 
the institutional complexity of this form of tenure. Accordingly, the thesis integrates 
the Comparative Housing Systems approach with the Institutional Development 
Framework (IAD) (Ostrom, 1990). Thus, the overarching goal of this thesis is to use 
self-governance theories to understand formal and informal institutions within a 
comparative housing approach (Oxley & Haffner, 2012; Ploeger, Lawson & Bontje, 
2001). 
The comparative housing approach will be explained first, in section 2.2, since it 
frames the institutional analysis of a particular housing sector in the two selected Latin 
American countries. The key concepts and definitions in comparative housing research 
are related to housing institutions, specifically to meanings of tenure (Bengtsson 
& Ruonavaara, 2011; Elsinga, De Decker, Teller & Toussaint, 2007; Oxley, 2001; 
Toussaint, 2011). 
The idea of homeownership in condominium is deconstructed, in section 2.3, by 
looking into the bundle of rights implied by the concept of a common property 
resource. Low-income homeownership within a common property resource inevitably 
runs into collective action dilemmas (Chu, Chang & Sing, 2012). In a subsequent 
search for solutions, Ostrom’s IAD framework is a suitable starting point to diagnose 
the situation (Chu et al., 2012; Orban, 2006; Ostrom et al., 2006). The framework is 
suitable because it can help the researcher to understand and compare the complex 
system in which institutions of homeownership operate and change. 
The complete institutional model to diagnose the structure of the situation is the 
subject of section 2.4. It should be kept in mind that in order to study the outcomes 
attributable to institutions and group behavior, it is necessary to choose a specific arena 
of action. To that end, section 2.4 defines maintenance as the ‘action-situation’ of 
this study. Maintenance is the arena in which it is possible to observe those rights and 
obligations that are not only individual but also collective. To evaluate the outcomes, 
the IAD model suggests the inclusion of the following variables that correspond to 
three levels: (1) the rules that individuals use, (2) the attributes of the physical world, 
and (3) the nature of the community. A cluster of these three factors can influence what 
occurs in the action-situation. Participants and their positions in that action-situation 
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are the relevant units of analysis; participants make decisions depending on the 
information they have, which depends in turn on their position, and these decisions are 
linked to costs and benefits and potential outcomes (Ostrom et al., 2006:27-37). 
To close the chapter, section 2.5 summarizes how the theories explained here are to 
be applied. It elucidates the integration of Ostrom´s theory with housing institutions, 
specifically regarding the study of condominium tenure. 
§  2.1 Comparative housing research 
§  2.1.1 Convergence versus divergence: A middle-range approach 
Cross-national comparisons of housing problems, markets, and policies have been 
made since the 1960s. The researchers in that field generally cite Donnison´s book, 
The Government of Housing (1967), as the starting point for comparative housing 
studies. His premise is that countries will proceed from pre-industrialism to post-
industrialism, setting in train a transformation in social bonds and social policy due 
to urbanization, individualization, and industrialization (Heijden, van der, 2013). The 
role of government in these development phases will be to focus on either residual or 
more comprehensive housing policies. Thus, the idea and form of the welfare state 
and the role of housing are prominent in Donnison´s thought. Without observing 
the differences between political or institutional backgrounds of the countries he 
compared, he identified three housing policy models: haphazard intervention, 
social or residual, and comprehensive. As Kemeny elaborates, Donnison´s book 
does not actually refer to theory. Reading between the lines, however, one finds 
traces of convergence theory, since the result of evolutionary thought is the ultimate 
convergence of social structures (Kemeny, 1992). As argued in Donnison (1967) 
and Donnison & Urgerson (1982), “differences between the housing situation 
and the nature of the housing policy in different countries are connected with the 
developmental phase of the individual countries” (Heijden, van der, 2013:9). 
The liberal point of view expressed in Donnison´s work about the convergence of 
housing policies was challenged in the 1980s from a neo-marxist perspective (Harloe, 
Ball & Martens, 1988). Arguing within a framework of the structure of housing 
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provision (Ball & Harloe, 1992), they asserted that changes in policy cannot be 
studied as if they exist in a static institutional context, and that policy studies need 
to consider actions by market actors (Heijden, van der, 2013). The idea that housing 
policy is not isolated from other institutional and contextual factors started to take 
root in comparative housing research. That idea of embeddedness subsequently grew 
into a more systemic vantage point from which to study housing problems and policy 
solutions. 
The structure of housing provision (SHP) approach suggests that the property rights 
regime is associated with the way that housing is consumed (Ball & Harloe, 1992). 
In this view, property rights are themselves a type of social relation, not only among 
owner-occupiers but with all of the stakeholders in the system as well (Ball & Harloe, 
1992:3). As Oxley (1991) explains, the structure of provision is useful as a ‘theoretical 
string’ that helps to tie things together, similar to other views such as ‘privatization’ 
or ‘convergence’ in comparative housing research (1991:69). Ruonavaara (1990) 
notes that it is possible to use the SHP approach from a non-functionalist perspective 
by making explicit the mechanisms and actors involved in the system. Citing the 
work of Harloe (1981), where he explains the growth of homeownership in contrast 
to the unprofitable private rental market in the British context, Ruonavaara shows 
that there are elements that can help explain a systems view and its mechanisms by 
reformulating Harloe’s account:
"The reformulated account identifies a number of actors: suppliers seeking 
profitable investment opportunities, consumers making choices to obtain the 
desired kind of housing and policies searching for solutions and electoral support. 
These are also the main actors of previous models, now linked together in one 
model. The outcome, the growth of owner-occupation, is an unintended (but 
probably not unanticipated) result of the actions of the different actor groups 
pursuing their own objectives. The role of consumers is twofold but not a very 
active one: on one hand their resources make home-ownership profitable, on 
the other hand they constitute the electorate the politicians draw their support 
from. The other two actors categories are the more active ones." (Ruonavaara, 
1990:140) 
In this paper Ruonavaara explains that in the reformulated account of the structure of 
the housing provision, the state and its policy are key participants interacting with and 
supporting the tenure change in the system. Ruonavaara’s interpretation also reflects 
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the systemic view of the SHP framework as a complex interplay of actors with different 
interests and powers. Seen in this way, the SHP approach is useful because it draws 
upon provision phases to portray each actor’s interactions. 
The divergence theory developed by Kemeny introduces new conceptual approaches 
to housing welfare regimes, as derived from Esping-Andersen´s typology of welfare 
states. His main point is to give a central role to housing, not only in society in general 
but in welfare states in particular (Lennartz, 2011). Regarding rental housing systems 
in European countries, Kemeny observes that a dominant tenure form will influence 
the welfare state from a wider perspective (Lennartz, 2011:347). Advanced industrial 
societies in countries where homeownership predominates are associated with a 
privatist ideology and a residual policy of welfare (Kemeny, 1992, 1995). On the other 
hand, societies with a representative rental sector are associated with ideologies of 
collectivism and more commitment to welfare provision (Hoekstra, 2010). 
A lesson to be drawn from Kemeny’s position is that housing should be considered 
in context, which means looking at both homeowning and rental societies. This also 
means looking into the historical tendency of a society to pursue a certain path towards 
a preference for a certain kind of housing policy. The divergence approach is supported 
by the path-dependence theory in housing; in short, history matters, since it influences 
social and political processes (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2010; Malpass, 2011). 
This section comes to grips with the theoretical and methodological grounds of 
the scholarly work on comparative housing research. A more systemic approach to 
the study of housing situations has been developed to encompass the institutional 
complexity in which housing markets are embedded (Boelhouwer and van der 
Heijden, 1992; Hoekstra, 2010; Heijden, van der, 2013). Therefore, Boelhouwer and 
van der Heijden (1992) proposed a systemic approach in which housing systems are 
not determined by economic and demographic developments alone. This approach 
explains why systems matter and includes both policy outcomes and institutional 
frameworks, which are necessary in order to compare housing systems in different 
countries. 
Comparisons of housing systems are carried out for many purposes (Lawson, 2001; 
Lundqvist, 1991; Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2011). These include the evaluation of 
policies, their transferability, and outcomes, as well as the development of welfare 
theories following the convergence or divergence path of housing policies (Doling, 
1997; Heijden, van der, 2013; Hoekstra, 2010).
Theoretical approaches and methods have been evolving in order to explain rather than 
just describe “similarities by common processes and differences by variation” in the 
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housing systems of the countries or localities of study (Oxley & Haffner, 2012:199). 
In the search for explanatory models, and as explained above, different approaches 
have been applied to conduct international comparative research as a way to explain 
and theorize the differences and similarities between housing systems (Bengtsson & 
Ruonavaara, 2011; Boelhouwer & van der Heijden, 1993a; Doling, 1997; Harloe & 
Martens, 1984). Two methodologies have traditionally guided the housing debate: the 
universalistic and the particularistic. 
A basic tenet of the universalistic approach is that the terminologies used to describe 
tenure forms are the same regardless of the context. This kind of research assumes that 
homeownership and private and social renting are equivalent, and the studies describe 
similar phenomena in all countries included in the comparative studies (Hantrais, 
2009). A prime example is the body of housing reports produced by UN Habitat or 
the World Bank, organizations that need to generalize about housing conditions in 
order to develop global indicators. The main difference between universalistic and 
particularistic approaches lies in the level of generalization. 
While the universalistic approach generalizes and tries to establish the unilinear and 
global dimensions of phenomena, the particularistic approach only juxtaposes one 
country against others, whereby generalization is not the main goal (Kemeny & Lowe, 
1998). The highest level of generalization is pursued in the universalistic approach, 
which seeks to discover similarities, assuming the convergence of development paths 
with a causal relation to welfare and housing. These two approaches define the two 
extremes on the continuum of comparative housing research. However, over the last 
few decades we have seen the emergence of a middle-range approach seeking to 
“propose typologies of housing systems derived from cultural, ideological, political 
dominance or other theories as the basis for understanding differences between groups 
of societies” (Kemeny & Lowe, 1998:161-162). 
Haffner et al. (2009, 2010) proposed using a ‘middle-way’ approach to understand 
the private rental sector in different European countries. Their rationale for preferring 
a middle way is couched in the debate on tenure form in comparative research. They 
argue that “even though there is a large variation in tenure forms, it is still possible to 
construct a typology of housing tenure that uses categories that are similar enough to 
allow comparison across countries” (2010:359). Their approach does not emphasize 
differences, which would imply that private renting is unique to each country; nor 
does it emphasize similarities, which would imply that private renting is the same in 
all countries. Instead, their study of the private rental sector places emphasis on and 
is embedded in the historical and cultural context (Haffner et al., 2010:366). But to 
identify patterns and typologies, the middle-range approach needs a grounding in 
theory. Recognizing that need, the researchers justify the use of their approach on 
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three conditions: commensurability (forms of tenure can be comparable); context; 
and theory. They call for more qualitative research to flesh out the three conditions for 
conducting comparative analysis (Haffner, Hoekstra, Oxley & van der Heijden, 2009). 
The debate (see also Elsinga & Hoekstra 2005; Hoekstra, 2010; and Heijden, van der, 
2013) cites European studies or research done in countries with similar industrialized 
patterns of development. But more and more, the debate refers to housing systems and 
policy from other parts of the world; for example Choe (2011) has done such work in 
South Korea. Therefore, the middle-range approach, where history and context matter, 
is a comparative framework that is particularly suited to the Latin American context. It 
allows systemic analysis of countries that might appear homogeneous (such as Latin 
American countries) but actually differ when phenomena are observed in context and 
through an institutional lens. 
The welfare typology was developed for European comparisons of housing systems. 
Although it is interesting, that typology is not so useful to explain the current situation 
in Latin America. As other scholars have noted, housing policy in the Latin American 
region cannot follow the same social democratic, corporate, or neoliberal welfare 
regime typologies used in the most advanced capitalist countries (Balchin & Stewart, 
2001:334). As these authors note, housing policies have developed along a different 
path in Latin America. There, housing policy has consistently concerned low-income 
homeownership throughout the twentieth century. Despite the different political 
regimes, from dictatorships to conservative democracies, other neoliberal and even 
socialistic democracies, housing policies regarding the formal provision of housing 
for low-income and working-class families have predominantly been low-income 
homeownership schemes. 
Comparative housing research can be applied to improve housing policy 
implementation and to facilitate the transplantation of policy from one context into 
another (Oxley, 2001). However, in order to make comparisons useful, they would 
“all have to be based on an understanding of the meanings and definitions of tenure” 
that pertain in each country being compared (Haffner et al., 2010:358). Consider the 
debate on housing asset-based welfare and the meaning of housing for welfare (Castles 
& Ferrera, 1996; Doling & Elsinga, 2013; Doling & Ronald, 2010; Groves, Murie & 
Watson, 2007). For many countries, asset-based welfare is the housing welfare regime 
of the future. To make this welfare regime work, contextual factors of both formal and 
informal institutions are important (Toussaint, 2011).
For example, policies and informal institutions, such as the cultural meaning of a 
home as an asset, do matter in the release of housing equity (Toussaint, 2011). She 
demonstrates how formal and informal institutions interact at the household level in 
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building up and releasing housing equity. In summary, housing research in the Delft 
group has shifted its focus away from policy towards systems analysis, applying a 
middle-range approach to compare housing systems by analyzing and unraveling the 
institutions involved. 
The following sections define how housing institutions in general and condominium 
tenure in particular contribute to an understanding of the subject of this study.
§  2.1.2 Housing tenure institutions 
"Housing occupies a unique place in people’s lives. As the reference point of 
daily life, it is the prime reflection of individual desires, hopes, needs and status. 
It protects privacy and self-determination, yet is strongly affected by political, 
economic and social developments." (Toussaint, 2011:27).
It is not a simple task to unravel the meaning of housing tenure, picking out the various 
political and institutional contexts together with the diverse meanings attached to the 
tenure forms (Elsinga, 1998; Ruonavaara, 1993). Social renting in the Netherlands 
is institutionally different than renting in a Scandinavian country. And institutional 
differences deserve attention when making housing market comparisons. In Latin 
America, homeownership in an informal or self-help settlement is different from 
homeownership of a dwelling produced by developers, although both may be intended 
for low-income families and both certainly occupy a unique place in people´s lives. 
In the Latin American census data, the tenure in both settings is categorized as 
homeownership, following the type and not the form of tenure involved (Ruonavaara, 
1993). Housing census data generally refers to taxonomic forms of tenure and does 
not give information on the substantive characteristics of the tenure form (Barlow & 
Duncan, 1988). Therefore, important details on the provision, actors, and institutions 
cannot be understood by looking only at the country’s statistical housing surveys. 
The concept of housing tenure may be hard to apply if it is not clearly explained. 
Ruonavaara (1993), joining the discussion started by Barlow and Duncan (1998), 
asserted that there are basically two types of tenure, owning and renting, which are 
categories that allow for general cross-national comparisons. However, instead of 
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what Barlow and Duncan (1998) called the substance of a particular type of tenure, it 
is better to consider its form, referring to the particular “historically and geographically 
specific institutional arrangement through which possession of housing is organized” 
(Ruonavaara, 1993:11). When studying housing in condominium tenure, one is 
observing a form of tenure, including the institutions behind a complex development 
process and the bundle of rights involved. 
Owning a home (as a private and individual good) is a very recent phenomenon in 
urban history (Saunders, 1990). It is surprising that the desire to own a house has 
not been questioned but rather is considered self-evident. The role of housing (and 
the land it occupies) has clearly become a key economic asset in capitalist societies 
(Piketty, 2014). Over the twentieth century, owning one’s home came to be understood 
as a natural desire and a source of housing satisfaction in human beings (Elsinga & 
Hoekstra, 2005). Some assumptions about homeownership are obviously tautological, 
both in research and political discourses: because many people own and would like to 
own, making all kinds of sacrifices and major life-course decisions on this basis, it is 
common to assume that of course everyone wants to own their own place. As Saunders 
puts it, homeownership has become a fact of life that is rarely questioned (Saunders, 
1990:59).  
Studying the British case, in his book A Nation of Home Owners (1990), Saunders 
continues a long-standing debate in housing studies about the expected social and 
economic benefits of being an owner in contrast to being a tenant. He is worried 
about the outcomes of contrasting ownership and renting, since it neglects issues 
of class and inequality that affect the more vulnerable households and individuals 
who cannot afford to make homeownership a sustainable goal. In other contexts it 
has been demonstrated that both renters and homeowners can experience the same 
level of satisfaction. Most of the time the social status and the quality of the dwelling 
are at least as important as the role of tenure. The meanings of homeownership can 
therefore differ, depending on the institutional and cultural context of study (Elsinga, 
1998:138). 
In a seminal paper, Marcuse (1972) discussed the sometimes dangerous assumptions 
that are made about the financial benefits of homeownership for low-income 
people. He described five financial issues that are generally assumed as benefits of 
homeownership in comparison to renting: investment opportunities, maintenance 
advantages, tax benefits, transfer costs, and risks of change in housing cost. In terms 
of maintenance factors, Marcuse pointed out that owner-occupier homes may be 
better maintained than homes where the owner is an investor and does not live in 
the property. When an owner is also the occupant, he or she is close to the physical 
problems and can decide more promptly to attend to issues than an owner-investor 
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who has a tenant in the unit. For Marcuse, there is a difference in attitudes when 
comparing the owner-occupier with the owner-investor. For the owner-occupier, 
two interests are more important than money when considering proper upkeep to a 
property: “they have pride, status, personal enjoyment, community respect, and other 
such intangibles pushing them” (Marcuse, 1972:140). The other expected benefit 
is financial, since with good maintenance, the value of the unit to the owner will be 
greater. However, as Marcuse also noted, these issues can change depending on legal 
or institutional arrangements. In light of these issues Marcuse questioned whether 
these assumptions would still hold when the observed population consists of owner-
occupiers in low-income condominiums.
Marcuse’s main concern is the danger of taking ownership’s financial benefits for 
granted without considering the possible outcomes. For example, observing the 
market effects of owner-occupancy, he noticed that low-income owner-occupiers can 
be caught up in the processes of neighborhood decline, which are generally followed 
by a “decrease in real estate prices, aging of the housing stock, reduced maintenance 
and increased deterioration, increased density of occupancy,” among other effects 
(1972:139). There are many other factors that can affect policy outcomes in low-
income homeownership policies. He concluded that “the answer to the stance that 
public policy should take towards homeownership for low-income families lies in the 
possibilities of institutional changes in existing tenure arrangements, and in the social 
or political, not the financial characteristics of homeownership” (Marcuse, 1972:143). 
The recommendation is clear: to focus on tenure institutions and their complexity. 
The debate about the natural desire for and benefits of homeownership appears to 
be fed by the situation in Europe or the USA, but it is also pertinent to Latin America. 
Ideas about ‘a home of one’s own’ are reflected in policies such as those governing 
low-income subsidized homeownership in Latin America and even in the policies 
that secure tenure in the informal settlements (Ward et al., 2014). Both the formal 
provision of low-cost dwellings and the existence of land titling programs are based 
on familiar ideas about housing as being important for households in terms of self-
determination and economic stability. Some scholars have studied the outcomes of 
the titling programs for informal settlements, hoping to find the dreamed-for capitalist 
land market envisioned by De Soto (2001). Considering De Soto’s book “primarily as a 
mystification of property law,” Gilbert (2002) noted the existence of enough evidence 
that “actually contradicts the claim that granting formal property rights is a central 
ingredient of housing improvement” (Gilbert, 2012a:vii). Security of tenure in Latin 
American self-help settlements is granted in many other informal ways, and people 
improve and continue building their self-help dwellings either with or without a 
property title. However, as the longitudinal research done on consolidated settlements 
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in selected Latin American countries demonstrates, new policies to rehabilitate and 
improve the self-help innerburbs (former suburbs) are necessary (Ward et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, in many cases ownership or possession of a home can contribute to 
securing the social and economic lifecycle of a family. As a resource, a home can create 
benefits that might bring the family out of poverty (Moser, 2009). Moser’s research 
shows that a home can become an asset that generates income when the resident 
sets up a small business in it. Living rooms of low-income dwellings are commonly 
transformed into barbershops, stores, or seamstress workshops. These enterprises 
are often organized by women in order to generate income while keeping up with their 
household and childcare responsibilities. By focusing on these kinds of resources, 
Moser contributed to the homeownership sustainability debate by showing both the 
‘tangible and intangible assets’ the poor actually have instead of focusing on what they 
do not have. By doing research in a low-income self-help neighborhood in Guayaquil, 
Ecuador, Moser discovered that housing is a tangible productive asset connected with 
intangible ones such as household relations and social capital (Moser, 1998). Moser’s 
research and methods demonstrate the value of including both formal and informal 
institutions in the study of poverty and housing-related problems. 
The focus of these perspectives on homeownership is the individual household, which 
corresponds with the focus of most scholarship: the owners of single-family houses. 
Separate debates concern the benefits of homeownership and owner-occupation as 
a preferred tenure type, but little research has been done on what it means to be a 
homeowner in multi-owned complexes, which are typical under the condominium 
regime (Blandy, Dupuis & Dixon, 2010). Many of the individual responsibilities as 
a homeowner still pertain in condominium. Yet others, such as maintenance or the 
freedom to set up a business in your home, are highly constrained by the community 
and the form of ownership involved. Since there are formal rules that can shape 
the way multi-ownership is arranged, the ownership form in itself might not be as 
disadvantageous as the social dilemmas that may arise in a property that is collectively 
owned. 
Looking at a housing system from an institutional perspective, the focus is on the 
various arenas in which actors meet. Within those arenas they adapt to the rule-
structured situation of tenure and policy and simultaneously to other actors’ behavior 
as well (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this thesis, these arenas are assumed to arise 
in response to the condominium institutions and the housing provision process. 
Both create the environment in which actors will consider their strategies and where 
they will take their chances and develop either cooperative or conflictive positions 
when following their interests. Bengtsson (2012) asserted that tenure institutions 
are important in research efforts that aim to integrate the role of households and of 
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other actors around them and their effects into the analysis of policy outcomes. As he 
explained: 
"Housing tenures should be seen as the most important political institutions of 
housing provision as welfare state policy. Forms of tenure are vital to housing 
policy and implementation at all levels because they define the formal position of 
residents in their capacities as owners (Bengtsson, 2012:209)." 
One of the main lines of inquiry found in current work on institutional analysis within 
the fields of economics and sociology concerns how institutions change. While change 
refers to how the actors in interdependent relationships adapt to other actors in the 
network, institutional change refers to how actors behave within a rule-structure 
arena, more specifically, to how they follow or modify rules when developing formal or 
informal monitoring and sanctioning processes (Nee, 1998). 
By linking the institutional theories to the housing systems approach, two questions 
come to the fore. How do the tenure institutions of the system (formal and informal) 
influence (or change) actors’ behavior. And, in turn, how does institutional change 
influence policy outcomes? Boelhouwer and van der Heijden (1992) noted that 
in housing market and policy research a key issue remains unresolved: “what the 
influence of similar institutions is on the actions of government” (1992:11). Since 
then, institutional analysis in multi-owned housing research has revealed critical 
aspects of actors’ governance and the functioning of the network that have measurable 
effects on markets and policy (Alterman, 2010; Orban, 2006; Yau, 2014; Yau & Ho, 
2009). 
Ostrom defined institutions broadly as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize 
all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, 
neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and 
governments at all scales” (Ostrom, 2005:3). Nee and Ingram defined an institution 
as a “web of interrelated norms – formal and informal – governing social relationships’ 
(Nee & Ingram, 1998:19) (emphasis in the original). The mechanisms and the effect 
of the interaction between formal and informal institutions like those discussed in this 
thesis constitute the core of the scholarly debate within institutional theory. 
The institutional approach focuses on the rules of the game. These are either formal 
rules such as those based on property law or informal rules such as those based on 
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the trust that develops (or fails to develop) between actors. In housing research, it 
is necessary to recognize that sometimes “households’ norms and routines diverge 
from the rationality assumptions” (Toussaint, 2011:9). Moreover, households’ 
behavior might also diverge from the stipulations of the property law and policy. This 
kind of ´non-rational´ behavior is not confined to households, though. Other actors 
in the housing system can behave in rather informal ways within the rule-structured 
situation, developing strategies and actions based on trust with the goal of increasing 
efficiency in policy implementation. 
Scholars in the fields of economics and sociology have been seeking agreement on 
the levels that exist in institutional analysis and its mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Williamson, 2000). The work of the Nobel Laureate in Economics (2009) 
Elinor Ostrom demonstrates that it is possible to accept the institutional diversity 
involved in structured human interactions, which can help to avoid indeterminacy 
in the research on social and economic behavior (Ostrom, 2005). Ostrom and her 
colleagues developed the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework as a 
tool to study the diversity of institutions involved in both common pool resources and 
common property resources. 
Institutional views on the housing provision process, such as the one proposed by 
Ball (1998), clarify that the ‘structure’ of interest is the “network of organizations 
and market involved in a particular form of building provision” (1998:1513). Both 
organizations (actors) and markets (dwellings in demand and supply) influence each 
other and are constrained by the same rules of the game in the context of any specific 
particular housing sector and policy process. As the housing systems research group 
at OTB, TU Delft understands it, the institutional level is precisely where the demand 
and supply side of the housing market meet (Heijden, van der, 2013). This institutional 
view is contingent on the historical and political process under which the provision 
of housing is taking place (Bengtsson, 2012; Boelhouwer & van der Heijden, 1993b; 
Malpass, 2011). In the end this is a ‘nested’ approach that focuses on tenure as the 
specific arena in which to study institutions from a systemic point of view. 
On one hand, the formal institutions that this thesis investigates follow the two basic 
rules that bind actors in the particular housing systems under study. As it is defined 
in Baldwin (1990), a ‘rule’ refers to written statements, such as legislation, a code of 
practice, or guidance notes, (Baldwin, 1990). Accordingly, “enforcement of the rule 
does not only look at the formal prosecution, but to all forms of compliance-seeking” 
(Baldwin, 1990: 321), such as those established informally within the policy networks 
and communities of owners. Rules are also called regulations, such as the internal 
regulations in condominium property (statutes) or ‘policy by regulation’ (Black, 2002), 
as in the case of the subsidy policy regulating the market for and provision of low-cost 
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dwellings in Colombia and Ecuador. The government regulates for a public purpose, 
but policy implementation is no longer centralized within the government structure 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999). These housing policies or rules are designed to regulate 
different actors in the policy network; policies are considered in the institutional and 
regulatory debates as a ‘decentered’ form of the state (Black, 2002). 
The first formal institution examined in the research is the policy law that regulates 
the housing market of low-cost dwellings that will be purchased by low-income 
families. The subsidy policy defines the price and minimum size of the dwellings and 
also stipulates some of the mechanisms for subsidy allocation. The policy regulation is 
considered comparable for the two selected countries from Latin America (an analysis 
of these regulations will be presented in chapter 4). The second formal institution, 
which is central to the research, is the law of horizontal property or condominium. 
The condominium law is the formal institution designed to constitute, regulate, and 
facilitate condominium governance.6  
On the other hand, the research identifies the informal institutions that have 
developed around the formal ones. This requires the investigator to focus on actors’ 
perceptions of the problem, which will reveal the ‘informal institutions’ (Toussaint, 
2011:11). The only way to study institutions is to see them in action, observing which 
actors interact and how they behave in a particular action-situation such as that 
surrounding maintenance practices regarding the common property. This research 
chooses maintenance as the particular situation that brings actors together. The factors 
affecting the action-situation of interest are set forth in section 2.4 of this chapter.
Williamson’s (2000) work in institutional economics has found that the definition 
of actors used in institutional analysis is useful because it focuses on key attributes 
of actors whose behavior is studied, including their positions and the resources they 
share. Studies of social human behavior can be broad and complex, as behavior is 
studied by almost all social science disciplines. Therefore, as Williamson elaborated, 
there is close unanimity in institutional analysis “on the idea of limited cognitive 
competence – often referred to as bounded rationality.” He pointed out that there are 
cognitive limits on the complex contracts and that some explanations are ‘unavoidably 
incomplete,’ especially when considering the opportunistic behavior that actors 
sometimes demonstrate (2000: 59-60). However, he also pointed out another quality 
that can help balance incompleteness: foresight, or the capacity of actors to imagine 
and see problems (Williamson, 2000:60). 
6 The comparative method to analyze the horizontal property laws is presented in chapter 3; the analysis and 
comparative results are found in chapter 5.
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Actors in the housing system of study have choices; in Ostrom’s (2005) words: 
"Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices regarding 
the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves and 
for others (Ostrom, 2005:3)."
This notion of a chain of events is important in the present research. It helped the 
investigator to visualize and focus on an action-situation in which actors’ interactions 
might have a systemic effect on the outcome: they have consequences for themselves 
as well as for others. Policy problems or a lack of maintenance affect not only the 
households but also other actors, including the state, developers, and the lending 
sector. Therefore, interaction between external and internal factors is considered here, 
as implied in Ostrom´s IAD framework set forth in the next section. 
§  2.2 Condominium: Individual and common property 
§  2.2.1 Bundle of rights in condominium 
The ‘bundle of rights’ refers to “all the various rights obtained by ownership of 
property” (Blandy et al., 2006:2366). Going one step further to understand owner-
occupation in condominium, it is important to see that it mixes individual rights 
with collective rights; therefore the implications of this regime are better understood 
by looking at rights and obligations in a ‘bundle’. The formal institutions have to be 
the focal point of analysis when the tenure form is seen as the key factor in the policy 
system. From that perspective, the investigator is better prepared to later understand 
how actors both interpret and change those rules in their everyday practices. Therefore, 
this section delves into the rights in a common property, which are more complex than 
just the right of alienation (sale or transfer) of a property. Special attention is given to 
those rights and obligations regarding maintenance. 
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The bundle of rights is a particularly useful angle from which to study governance 
institutions in common property resources (Ostrom, 2005). However, researchers 
studying condominium problems from a socio-legal perspective on the property law 
(Blandy et al., 2006; Blandy & Hunter, 2012; Edelman & Suchman, 1997) have also 
used the concept. The advantage of the ‘bundle of rights’ view is that it draws attention 
to those rights that are linked to or ‘nested’ in other rights with respect to the collective 
ownership and management of a common property resource (Ostrom, 2007), such as 
occurs in the condominium regime. 
Ownership rights in common property are more complex than the individual right 
to sell and make a profit or to transfer. For example, in a common property resource, 
there is a collective right to exclude others from access and use of the private resource 
(Ostrom, 2003). The understanding of those collective rights is important since, in 
practice, individual property rights are contingent on collective rights. Blandy and 
Goodchild explain that the bundle of rights view has “the merit of shifting the focus 
of analysis away from a home (or any other land use) considered as an object to the 
interests of the different parties involved in buying, selling and living in a home” 
(Blandy & Goodchild, 1999:34). The bundle of rights, therefore, shifts the emphasis to 
the relationships that actors have with each other regarding a ‘thing’. 
Conventional wisdom divides individual property rights into three major categories, 
namely private, state, or communal rights (Demsetz, 1967:354). But, according to 
Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom (2010) this division does not reflect other institutional 
diversity existing in different property rights systems (Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, 
2010:46). Property rights, as defined by Ostrom, “define actions that individuals 
can take in relation to other individuals regarding some ‘thing’, and if one individual 
has a right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that right” (Ostrom, 
2003:249). As Schlager and Ostrom explained, “rights refer to particular actions that 
are authorized, and rules refer to the prescriptions that create authorization” (Schlager 
& Ostrom, 1992:250) (italics mine). Both rules and rights are therefore formal 
institutions. 
Many studies on common property resources have been conducted, providing 
empirical grounds to propose the existence of five rights in the ‘bundle’. These are 
access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1992), which are defined as follows in Table 2.1. 
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Access: A right to enter a defined physical property
Withdrawal: A right to obtain the “products” of a resource 
Management: A right to regulate the use patterns and transform a resource system by making improve-
ments
Exclusion: A right to determine who else will have the right of access to a resource and whether that 
right can be transferred
Alienation: A right to sell or lease any of the above four rights
TABLE 2.1 Bundle of rights in common property resources (Source: Ostrom, 1992:250-251)
Scholars studying institutions of the commons have noticed that, depending on the 
rules, these rights can be constituted, monitored, or controlled by collective-choice 
rights and operational-choice rights. These two categories may be used to classify 
the individual and collective rights that are involved in a common property resource, 
depending on who possesses the rights. Especially when observing management 
strategies of the common resource, the rights of both individuals and collectivities can 
include some or all of the rights mentioned above. For example, a family has the right 
to access and enter into a national park (a common natural resource) and can purchase 
the operational right to use and enjoy the natural park facilities. However, the family 
does not have the right to harvest the forest (Ostrom, 2003). The family in this example 
becomes an ‘authorized entrant’. 
In a common property resource, the owners are not the only parties to operational 
rights. There are also other users of the property, such as tenants, workers doing 
maintenance, or the property manager. In a condominium (a common property 
resource), an owner of a unit using its right of alienation can put the unit onto the 
rental market. The tenant enters the community as a user, purchasing some of the 
operational-choice rights of use of the common property. Tenants, as ‘authorized users’ 
according to the collective-choice rules (under condominium law), do not have the 
right to vote in the assembly of owners; they only have the operational-choice right to 
enter and use the common property. 
As Ostrom (1992) explains, “the rights of authorized users are defined by others who 
hold collective-choice rights of management and exclusion” (1992:252). Regarding 
users such as tenants, however, there are specific rules protecting their rights and 
obligations. Therefore, in the condominium law, which is at the same level as the 
tenancy law, the relationship between the owner and tenant is defined under the 
principle of solidarity and responsibility for the property that is being rented out. This 
relationship is not yet well documented in the housing literature, but as will be evident 
from the empirical data presented in the next chapters, tenants are important users 
and, in the end, participants in common resource management.
TOC
 65 Conceptual approach
To summarize, Table 2.2 below shows how the five rights are associated with different 
positions or actors involved in condominium tenure. Special attention is given to the 
right and obligation to manage and maintain the property, which is the phenomenon 
that we are investigating as a problematic housing policy outcome. Rights and 
obligations augment or diminish, depending on the actor’s position. In the table, 
owners are included both as a collective (i.e. the assembly of owners, which is the only 
formal moment when key decisions can be made) and as individuals, on the basis of 
their rights regarding the interior and private space of their dwelling. Other actors’ 
positions are as the authorized claimant and user and the authorized entrants. 
Owners in 
HOA 
Owner* Authorized 
claimant
Authorized 
user (tenant)
Authorized 
entrant
Access x x x x x
Withdrawal x x x x -
Management x <— x - -
Exclusion x x - x -
Alienation x x - - -
TABLE 2.2 Bundle of rights in condominiums associated with positions (source: adapted from Ostrom 
(2003:251)) 
 * Owners, as individuals, have four rights regarding their private space (interior of the flat) and five rights in 
collective spaces (as shown by the arrow <—).  
HOA = Homeowners association
Owners in assembly meetings have all five rights regarding the common property. 
In the literature on multi-owned housing, the association of homeowners, or HOAs 
as they are called in the USA (McKenzie, 1994) and VVEs in the Netherlands (Meijer 
& Smid, 1994; Weesep, van, 1984), are similar forms of condominium owners’ 
associations. ‘HOA’ is an umbrella term covering many other forms of collective 
ownership; it is not unique to condominiums. The reason for including the position 
of owners in the assembly rather than in the association is that the laws in the context 
of this study use the wording Assembly of Owners when referring to the association 
and the key meeting moment of owners. Moreover, in this particular analysis it would 
be redundant to use the term HOA: owners in condominium are by default already 
associated. Deconstruction of the rights and obligations is therefore critical. Owners 
practice and exercise their rights explicitly during the assembly meeting. According to 
the formal rules, owners in assembly is the only moment when decisions to adopt new 
rules, such as establishing a maintenance budget or hiring a property manager, can be 
made. The minutes of a meeting are a legally binding document. 
The condominium regime recognizes individual property as well. An individual owner 
has the right of access, withdrawal, exclusion, and alienation within a particular private 
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and exclusive space. The right of access can be connected to some of the collective-
choice rules. For example, the right to grant access (and to exclude someone) from 
one’s own home (the private and exclusive space) is guaranteed, but what residents do 
inside their homes can relate to operational rules established for the collective, such as 
regulations for keeping quiet after midnight, restrictions on having pets inside the flat, 
or any other social and informal rule regarding good-neighbor relationships. Alienation 
is also better defined in conjunction with collective-choice rights. For instance, an 
owner individually owns a flat, to be used as a residence, but does not have the right to 
change its use from residential to commercial unless this is agreed unanimously in an 
assembly meeting, which would make the necessary changes in the general regulations 
of the common property. 
The right to manage, in principle falling under the collective-choice arrangements, 
could be construed as the fifth right for individuals, in view of the physical attributes of 
the resource. It is a gray area, in that sense. Management and maintenance decisions 
depend on the kind of intended improvements. If improvements are made to kitchen 
cabinets, which technically belong to the interior and fall into the exclusive ownership 
domain, then it is possible to make improvements independently. However, if the 
desired improvement involves changing the location of the kitchen or moving walls, 
then this intervention would require a redesign and change of the communal water 
pipes, sewage, and electricity systems. Since such extensive renovation would impact 
elements that are part of the common property, then, according to the property law, 
permission from the management of the building would be required. It may or may 
not be possible to obtain their permission, since it is contingent on collective decision 
making. 
Another example is the maintenance or renovation of windows to improve insulation 
for energy efficiency. Like any other element of the facade, windows are part of the 
common property. Renovation of the facade can clearly benefit all parties, due to 
the physical improvements, overall increased quality, and energy consumption of 
the building. Since the facade is common property, its renovation and the costs 
thereof may be assumed in collective. However, due to problems and difficulties in 
decision making, including a lack of interest or inability to pay for renovation, owners 
sometimes decide to carry out improvements by themselves. The other scenario is that 
the association of owners could decide to renovate the facades without requiring the 
contribution of some owners. Owners in condominium do not have the right to avoid 
management responsibilities, according to the collective-choice rules. 
Other actors besides owner-occupiers are also involved in the management of the 
common property. An authorized claimant is a person who has ‘operational rights’ 
given by the owner. When there are owner-investors, such as those who leave and rent 
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the units to others, the rights and obligations are sometimes assumed by a family 
member or other person external to the community of owners. An authorized user such 
as a tenant may or may not be an authorized claimant. Under a contract with a tenant, 
the owner passes on some of the rights of use for both the individual and common 
property parts of the property. Owners can sometimes give their tenant permission 
to attend the assembly of owners and vote in their name, thereby transferring some 
of their rights and obligations to participate in management. A tenant acquires the 
right to exclude others from the individual private rented space, but he or she does 
not have the right to exclude others from the common spaces. An authorized entrant, 
for example, can be a visitor or an external property manager hired to take care of 
maintenance of the common property. It can also be a person working with individual 
households (like a nanny) who would first need permission to enter into the private 
common property before going into a private apartment.
The objective here was to give an indication of the contents of a particular ‘bundle of 
rights’ and how its composition can change, depending on who holds the rights and at 
what level (collective or operational rule). Its composition also depends on the physical 
aspect of the property: the ‘thing’ can be a common property element, or it can be the 
individual and exclusive space inside an apartment or unit. 
To close this section about the condominium bundle of rights, there are two clear 
distinctions to be made. First, in each property that is under the condominium regime 
there are several formal rules, ranging from the property law to the internal regulations 
that are required by law. In this thesis, it is clear that the rights are not equivalent to the 
rules: “for every right an individual holds, rules exist that authorize or require particular 
actions in exercising that property right” (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:250). 
The second distinction, which will be better explained in the next section, is the fact 
that the condominium bundles of rights and rules create a common property resource 
(CPR). The distinction is made in terms of the rights of excludability and because the 
common property is also a rival good. Owners have the right – in collective – to exclude 
others from physically entering into the boundaries of their resource. And it is rivalrous 
because the use and overuse of the common property can reduce the availability of the 
resource to other co-owners. The complex bundle of rights is an indication of the latent 
collective action dilemmas that come to light when looking at everyday practices and 
decision making for maintenance of the common property. 
The next section expands on collective action dilemmas in condominium. As Ostrom et 
al. (2006:15) explained, not all situations in common property resource management 
are dilemmas. 
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In institutional economics, collective action dilemmas are the informal institutions 
that arise around a rule-structured situation. Collective action might have an effect 
on the economic and policy outcomes (Assche, Beunen & Duineveld, 2014; Ostrom, 
1990). As discussed above, actors are not purely rational individuals, so they may 
exhibit either non-cooperative or cooperative behavior. The possibility of collective 
action dilemmas is the distinctive feature of homeownership in condominium. Well 
known theories have been used to explain collective action dilemmas in organizations. 
This thesis turns to the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) 
of Ostrom (2005) to understand collective action dilemmas as they relate to the 
comparative analysis of the two condominium housing systems under study. 
§  2.2.2 Collective action dilemmas 
The effect of the institutions in condominium on maintenance of the collective 
resource can best be appreciated in light of the latent collective action dilemmas that 
individuals and the group of owners will face to achieve a collective good. The collective 
good in this study is the level of maintenance of the common property parts.7 The 
social dilemmas that arise can affect the process of collective action and, in turn, the 
outcomes. This section links the literature about collective action dilemmas to the 
institutional analysis of the condominium regime. That background was essential to 
the research design and analysis since it helped define the variables that come into play 
when institutions are in action. 
Marcur Olson (The Logic of Collective Action, 1965) theorized about groups’ collective 
action dilemma. Orban (2006), who used collective action theories to explain groups’ 
cooperative behavior in Hungarian condominiums, explained that collective action 
theory is “concerned with the question of how people behave and act in groups when 
pursuing their common goals, how collective action for a collective good, that is 
cooperation, can or cannot take place” (Orban, 2006:13) (emphasis in the original). 
Olson’s seminal work proposing the theory of collective action helped to explain key 
aspects of group behavior as it affects policy and economic development. He challenged 
the traditional group theory, which poses that groups or organizations are formed by 
individuals with common interests (Ostrom, 1990). But their common interests may 
7 In condominiums, there are different collective goods that may be studied; maintenance outcome is just one of 
them. Others might be small collective action-situations such as attendance of the assembly meeting of owners 
or a particular decision on the maintenance budget. 
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or may not be sufficient to guarantee collective action (Olson, 1965: 2). For Olson, the 
outcome of the group behavior depends on individual incentives and choices:
"What a group does will depend on what the individuals in that group do, and 
what the individuals do depends on the relative advantages to them of alternative 
courses of action (Olson, 1965:23)."
Individual choices regarding a collective good depend on the characteristics of the 
goods and the community involved. First, regarding the characteristics of the good, as 
explained by Ostrom (2003), Olson’s initial theoretical contribution is to distinguish 
those goods from which it is possible to exclude others. Excludability of a resource 
creates the differences between a common pool resource and those of common 
property resources: 
"Whether it’s costly or not to exclude beneficiaries from consuming a good, once 
it is provided, is the most important theoretical distinction to be made among 
goods. It separates those where temptations to free ride exist and goods where 
individuals cannot free ride and still benefit (2003:261)." 
Another important distinction pertaining to the condominium is the characteristic 
of rivalry. A common good is rivalrous when “consumption of units by one person 
subtracts from the availability of benefits to others” (Ostrom, 2003:261). Over-
consumption of either a common pool resource or a common property resource can 
lead to degradation and potentially to the tragedy of the commons, as advanced by 
Hardin (1968). 
Hardin’s metaphor of the tragedy of the commons looks into the dilemma that 
can accompany the use of a natural common resource. The story of herders who 
overharvested their pasture and destroyed their common resource illustrates how 
rational individuals’ interest in maximizing their utility can create both a positive 
(and individual) effect and, at the same time, a negative (collective) effect (Hardin, 
1968:1244). The condominium, by extension, is a resource that can be over-consumed 
and, if not protected or maintained, the negative effects will accrue to all owners and 
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users collectively. Hardin’s metaphor, however, did not assume the existence of any 
rules or norms in the situation (Ostrom, 2007). In real life, herders might have kin 
relationships, or they may have a long, indigenous history of communal grazing and 
organization, or there may be formal institutions regulating management that can 
change and guide social behavior and common agreements to make their system 
sustainable. The individual incentive to maximize the return of their investment might 
not be the only interest involved. As Olson explained, “economic incentives are not … 
the only incentives; people are sometimes also motivated by a desire to win prestige, 
respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives” (Olson, 1982:60). 
Regarding the characteristics of the group, the second main contribution of Olson’s 
work is the argument that group size can positively or negatively influence collective 
action. In a large group, single individual contributions to the collective good might not 
make perceptible differences to the group as a whole. On the contrary, lack of payment 
towards the collective good in a large group is more difficult to trace or notice for the 
rest of the group, which creates the conditions that may lead to free-riding. According 
to Olson, small groups can work better because monitoring and social sanctioning 
practices can be more direct. However, costs such as maintenance fees can be higher 
within smaller groups since they are spread over a smaller group of shareholders. 
On the one hand, sharing costs within a large group of owners might create a cost-
distributive effect that could address affordability problems. On the other hand, the 
size of the group can create other costs, such as difficulties in decision making and with 
formal and social monitoring. 
There is no consensus about the exact relationship between group size and its effects 
(Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). It is interesting to observe that the relationships might be 
positive or negative, depending on the institutional arrangements in place. Scholars 
studying condominium maintenance problems have included the variable of size in 
their models, generally defining it as the total number of flats in the units, as a proxy for 
group size (Chu et al., 2012; Ho & Gao, 2013; Orban, 2006; Soaita, 2012; Werczberger 
& Ginsberg, 1987). For example, Orban (2006) found that size negatively influences 
the cooperative potential in condominium (correlation -0.451), but the effect is small 
(R square .203), indicating that other variables are influencing cooperation (Orban, 
2006). 
Other scholars acknowledge that size might not have a strong effect. Therefore they 
do not include it in their models, since other institutional variables can be just as 
important (Choe, 1992; Yau, 2012, 2014). For Ostrom, group size is not a definite 
condition for collective action, and it is not the only group characteristic that needs 
attention. Size can also be related to the physical characteristics of the common 
property that has to be maintained. There is a difference in costs whether there are two 
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entrances or one, as noted by Werczberger and Ginsberg (2007). Whether the variable 
pertains to the group or the resource, size may affect the ‘calculus and strategies’ of 
individuals by making them think their contribution will actually be noticed and that it 
can make a difference in the collective good (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004:439-440). 
A property rights regime that creates a non-excludable and rival good can lead to 
opportunistic behavior or the free-rider problem (Cárdenas, 2009; Olson, 1965; 
Ostrom, 1990). This, phenomenon was touched upon earlier as occurring in 
condominium regimes, particularly as it affects maintenance outcomes (Chen & 
Webster, 2005; Chu et al., 2012; Ho & Gao, 2013; Orban, 2006; Yau, 2011). The well-
known narrative of the free-rider explains the behavior of an actor who has complete 
information about benefits, costs, and strategies to decide on individual action: a 
rational actor. The rational actor will decide to take a ‘free ride’ on the expenses and 
costs of others unless he or she finds it is profitable to cooperate (Bengtsson, 1998). 
If the costs of collaboration do not equal its benefits, the rational actor will choose to 
not cooperate. If every actor decides to free-ride, then the collective benefit will not 
be produced. If free-riders were present, scholars would recognize a collective action 
dilemma:
"Collective action dilemma: a game with many actors who benefit from 
cooperation but find it impossible, or at least difficult, to achieve cooperation (also 
known as ‘n-person prisoner’s dilemma’ and the ‘tragedy of the commons’) (B. 
Bengtsson, 2012:226)."
The collective action dilemma is the result of individual rational choice or a social 
dilemma. In psychology, Dawes and Messick (2000) have defined social dilemma as 
the ‘paradoxical possibility’ of individuals, a problem that has been studied in almost 
all the social sciences (2000:111):
"Social dilemmas are situations in which each member of a group has a clear 
and unambiguous incentive to make a choice that- when made by all members- 
provides poorer outcomes for all than they would have received if none had made 
the choice. Thus, by doing what seems individually reasonable and rational, 
people end up doing less well than they would have done if they had acted 
unreasonably or irrationally (Dawes & Messick, 2000:111)." 
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Or, as Ostrom says: 
"The temptation to free-ride, however, may dominate the decision process, and 
thus all will end up where no one wanted to be. Alternatively, some may provide 
while others free-ride, leading to less than the optimal level of provision of the 
collective benefit (Ostrom, 1990:6)."
The theoretical assumption of rationality of actors means that individuals will always 
choose self-benefit (less individual cost) rather than collective benefit, even if the 
collective outcome is, in the long term, more beneficial to all. The rational choice is 
to do nothing, to not cooperate or ‘to defect,’ as it is called in game theory. In game 
theory, rational individual behavior is explained using mathematical models based on 
the prisoner’s dilemma theorem. The prisoner’s dilemma is a conflict that one player 
has to grapple with when choosing between what is best individually and what is best 
for the group as a whole. 
As Ostrom (1990) explained, the prisoner’s dilemma is a non-cooperative game 
because “communication among players is forbidden or impossible or simply irrelevant 
as long as it is not explicitly modeled as part of the game” (1990:4). This is a theoretical 
game where there is no trust; each prisoner does not trust the other to remain silent. 
Also, it is assumed that each player has ‘complete information’ about the situation, 
which means that each player has all the information about the full structure of the 
game and the payoffs. Ostrom ascribed the fascination of this theorem among social 
and economic scientists to the following: 
"The paradox that individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational 
outcomes seems to challenge a fundamental faith that rational human beings can 
achieve rational results (Ostrom, 1990: 5)." 
For Ostrom, these models are important, but she warned about the danger of adopting 
them as the foundation for policy formulation (Ostrom, 1990:6). The danger lies 
in believing that human beings are trapped in non-collaborative rational and self-
interested behavior, as if they were incapable of changing the rules, or as if humans live 
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in a vacuum that makes them incapable of improving their conditions in a collective 
without the influence of either formal or informal institutions, such as trust and social 
capital, which in fact exist in many communities. 
Over the last few decades, these models have influenced the study of organizations, 
markets, and the provision of public goods (Ostrom, 1990). An enormous amount of 
scholarly research has been done to test the theories, both in laboratories, where it is 
easier to assume rationality of the participants, and in the field, where it is harder to 
assume rational behavior with no influence of context. In the social sciences, these 
models have been treated only as metaphors (Ostrom, 1990). Some scholars have 
criticized these theories for promoting the privatization of many important communal 
resources and commons, arguing that individual self-interests will fail to meet and 
sustain collective interests and efforts (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). The critics have, 
in fact, failed to recognize the existence of millions of instances of commons, markets, 
and organizations that are very much capable of sustaining and managing the 
collective good. Therefore, when studying groups and the collective good they do or do 
not achieve, instead of only studying what makes groups fail, we should also study what 
make groups strong and successful. 
Orban (2006) explained that collective action dilemmas occur not only when 
consuming a good but also when providing it to a group of people (2006:13). Orban’s 
remark reminds us that collective action dilemmas may exist alongside housing 
provision processes when other actors are involved in building, selling, or renting the 
units to low- and middle-income homeowners. Therefore, condominium common 
property collective action can occur at different levels of governance, thereby creating 
a nested system within the bounds of property law. These nested governance levels in 
housing institutions were explained earlier (in a previous section of this chapter). 
Actors involved in building and selling are providing a common good and have 
different interests than future owners. On both sides, however, the external interests 
pertain to the same common resource. To understand how actors in the course of the 
housing provision phases, such as professionals (developer, lending sector, property 
management, and social management), are involved requires some knowledge of these 
external groups’ characteristics and how the collective good maintenance is perceived 
by them. 
To summarize, models such as the tragedy of the commons elucidate the suboptimal 
collective outcome explained by the prisoner’s dilemma. In both cases the logic of the 
free-riding rational actor is evident when considering four characteristics of the good 
and the group: rivalry, excludability, size, and trust. However, the outcomes are also 
influenced by other institutions, such as the rules of the game. The next section of this 
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chapter concentrates on the solutions to collective action problems to understand the 
other factors that might be involved. 
§  2.2.3 Solutions to collective action problems
Olson’s free-rider idea has deeply influenced the conventional wisdom about collective 
action with the mistaken belief that an external solution is the ‘only’ solution to 
collective action problems (Ostrom, 1990). In Olson’s words, “the collective good will 
not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducement that will lead the 
members of the large group to act in their common interest” (Olson, 1965:44). His 
solution basically goes back to Hobbes’ Leviathan (Orban, 2006). 
Other scholars concerned with how to avoid the tragedy of the commons, particularly 
regarding natural resources, have advocated the development of private property 
systems. However, regarding the condominium private property system, Ostrom noted 
that “even when particular rights are unitized, quantified and salable, the resource 
system is still likely to be owned in common rather than individually” (Ostrom, 
1990:13). She then asked, is there really an ‘only’ way to solve collective action 
dilemmas?
Since Olson’s work of 1964, much work has shown that there are many other solutions 
to the free-rider problem. The development of models following the prisoner’s 
dilemma problem in game theory have also shed light on what happens when people 
have different – and iterative – opportunities to develop strategies of action, which can 
lead to achieving collective goods. 
"Instead of basing policy on the presumption that the individuals involved are 
helpless, I wish to learn more from the experience of individuals in field settings. 
Why have some efforts to solve commons problems failed, while others have 
succeeded? What can we learn from experience that will help stimulate the 
development and use of a better theory of collective action – one that will identify 
the key variables that can enhance or detract from the capabilities of individuals to 
solve problems? (Ostrom, 1990:14) "
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The literature on the governance and management of commons presents a diversity 
of solutions to the free-rider problem. Law and formal institutions matter, and some 
solutions can concentrate on regulation that ensures strong monitoring and sanctions 
policies (Williamson, 2000). However, these are not the only options, as can be seen 
in condominium dilemmas, where monitoring and sanctions are already established 
in the property law, as particularly evident in Ecuador and Colombia. Apparently 
these regulations are not sufficient to enforce and ensure optimal outcomes for 
maintenance. 
The pay-offs of some people’s free-rider behavior put the community into the situation 
explained by game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma models (Ostrom, 1990). Co-
owners have fewer incentives to cooperate in governance and management of the 
common property if they don’t see others doing so, if there are no communication 
pathways, or if there is insufficient information to guide individual strategies. 
The first step towards finding a solution is to understand that the ‘tragedy’ is 
predictable; by implication, it is possible to manage and avoid degradation or 
deterioration by ensuring organization. The literature contains optimistic arguments 
based on evidence demonstrating that in the field, so outside the laboratories 
and computer models, individuals cooperate in many ways. Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that the assumptions underlying the old collective action models hardly 
apply in the real world, such as the perfect rational individual, homogeneous groups, 
or the lack of institutions (Simpson, 2006; Simpson, Willer & Ridgeway, 2012). The 
extensive body of case studies has revealed other factors, such as the group’s social 
norms and the processes of iterative cooperative games, that may also promote 
and sustain trust (Hardin, 1992; Ruttan, 2006), reciprocity (Axelrod, 1981), and 
ideas of collective efficacy (Kleinhans & Bolt, 2013; Yau, 2014). Interdependence, 
otherwise called ‘mutual dependency’ between actors (Bueren & Heuvelhof, 2005), 
also influences nonrational group behavior (Olson, 1965:43). Moreover, key physical 
aspects of common resources themselves are said to interact with informal institutions 
(Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 2007; Toussaint, 2011). 
Understanding the institutional diversity involved in a situation is a difficult but 
very important process in the search for policy solutions. It requires insight into the 
physical characteristics of the resource, the users’ attributes, and governance (rules 
and interaction with rules), as suggested by Ostrom (2007). Solutions that work in 
laboratory and model-like settings might not work in the same way in the field. The 
recommendation is to first diagnose the collective action problem and to start by 
identifying the relevant variables regarding the key action-situation of study (Ostrom, 
2010). In the next section, where the focus is on housing, Ostrom’s institutional 
framework is applied to the dilemma of affordable condominium maintenance. 
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§  2.2.4 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
The theories behind the IAD framework help explain the dilemmas of groups when they 
engage in cooperative behavior and shed light on how these dilemmas affect collective 
outcomes in different contexts, such as governments, markets, or in local situations 
of everyday life. The historical roots of this approach, as explained by Ostrom, include 
political economy (e.g., Hobbes, Montesquieu), institutional economics, public choice 
theory (i.e., Olson 1965), transaction costs economics (i.e., Williamson, 1965), and 
non-cooperative game theory (i.e., Harsanyi & Selten, 1988) (Ostrom et al., 2006:25). 
Institutional diversity implies that many different theories can become effective tools 
for explaining the different situations and policy problems present in common pool and 
common property resource management (Ostrom, 2005). 
A framework is there to orient the analysis, but it does not necessarily need to be visible 
in the institutional analysis. In Ostrom’s words, “it is the questions that are generated 
by using the framework that appear in most analyses rather than the intellectual 
scaffolding used by the analysis to diagnose, explain and prescribe” (Ostrom et al., 
2006:25). Many of her writings use the IAD framework to analyze a set of elements 
that can be found in many situations. These are guidelines, and it is up to the analyst 
to decide which factors are necessary to explain the institutional problem of concern 
(Ostrom, 2009c; Poteete et al., 2010). The framework suggests observing or making 
assumptions about what occurs with certain elements that might be influencing the 
situation of study: first, what occurs in an action arena; and second, the attributes of 
(1) the rules that individuals use, (2) the attributes of the physical world, and (3) the 
nature of the community.
IAD set of elements in action arenas
Given the multiple levels of analysis in institutional analysis, IAD recommends 
selecting an action arena. This ‘conceptual unit’ is subsequently deconstructed in order 
to understand its structure and outcomes. The action arena has two parts: an action-
situation and actors. 
Action-situation “refers to the social space where individuals interact, exchange goods 
and services, engage in appropriation and provision activities, solve problems, or fight 
(among the many things that individuals do in action-situations)” (Ostrom et al., 
2006:28). The action- situation has seven parts: (1) participants, who are in different 
(2) positions, who decide on different (3) actions, according to the (4) information they 
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possess and how these are (5) linked to potential (6) outcomes, considering the (7) 
costs and benefits of the actions and outcomes (Ostrom et al., 2006:29).
When studying a commons dilemma, it is necessary to understand and predict how 
actors will behave in an action-situation. An actor can be an individual, a group, or a 
corporation. In this context, the IAD framework recommends observing and making 
assumptions about the following four clusters of variables about actors (see Table 2.3). 
(1) Preference evaluations that actors assign to potential actions and outcomes
(2) The way actors acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge contingencies and information 
(3) The selection criteria actors use to decide upon a particular course of action
(4) The resources that an actor brings to a situation 
TABLE 2.3 Cluster of variables explaining actors’ behaviors (source: Ostrom et al., 2006:33)
Factors affecting the action arena
Resource unit
Characteristics
Attributes of the
community
Users Providers,
Policy makers
Rules in use
Constitutional 
Collective choice 
Operational
Action
Arena
Action situation
and actors
Patterns of
Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluation
Criteria
FIGURE 2.1 A framework for institutional analysis (adapted from Ostrom 2005:15. source: Poteete, Jansen, and 
Ostrom, 2010:41 ).
The IAD framework shown in Figure 2.1 assumes that there are external factors such as 
the rules, the resource characteristics, and the nature of the community involved that 
work together with the action arena. All these factors influence the way the action-
situation is conceptualized and will therefore affect the outcomes. An institutional 
analysis should begin by understanding these factors, including the rules that apply 
to them: these may be constitutional rules, collective choice rules, or operational 
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choice rules. The physical attributes of the resource under consideration will depend 
on the particular common pool resource or common property resource of study and 
on those situations related to the action arena. As Ostrom explained, fishers’ issues in 
the oceans are not the same as fishers’ issues in the fish market. Different situations 
and the different physical attributes of the resource involved, such as the fish as the 
resource unit, the ocean as the resource system, or the market spaces, need to be 
specified when developing an institutional analysis. 
The explanatory variables for the characteristics of the resource system, the attributes 
of the community, and the rules in use will be determined in light of the particular 
questions posed by each analyst and the different levels of analysis for the action arena 
under study. This thesis defines the action arena as maintenance of the common 
property. Maintenance is the arena in which to observe the rules of the game, payoffs, 
and various factors influencing actors’ behavior. Both the level of policy and the 
co-owners’ governance level are considered to interact within the action arena. In 
summary, the general conceptual model for the development of theories in which 
factors affect the maintenance of the common property resource of low-income 
families and why they do so is described in the following diagram (Figure 2.2): 
Affordable housing in
condominium State
External
governance
level
Internal
governance
level
ACTION SITUATION: MAINTENANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY
Developers
Municipality,
property
registry and
cadaster
Lenders
Homeowners and residents
Social managers
Property
managers
Perceived
maintenance
level
Comparative
evaulative
criteria
Common property deterioration
Resource characteristics
Attributes of the community
Rules in use
Low-income households 
and policy network
(formal) Property law and
housing policy
(informal) governance, 
trust, social capital
FIGURE 2.2 Conceptual framework to study affordable condominium deterioration levels. Based on Ostrom 
(1990)(source: Poteete, Jansen, and Ostrom, 2010:41).
Three clusters of variables representing the characteristics of the resource (affordable 
condominium housing), the attributes of the community, and the rules in use could all 
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influence how the actors who are involved in the maintenance practices of the common 
property will behave (Ostrom, 2003:262). Actors are also participants. Each occupies 
a specific position from which to make decisions, based on the available information, 
which are linked to potential outcomes (Ostrom et al., 2006:27-37). The outcome of 
interest here is the maintenance level as perceived by policymakers, housing provision 
actors, and residents in affordable condominium housing. 
Each city has its own institutional context, and this particular set of institutions will be 
expected to yield different outcomes in the provision and maintenance of low-income 
condominiums. In order to compare and explain the differences that will be observed 
in each city, a series of hypotheses has been developed. Since the law in Colombia has 
been updated more than that of Ecuador, all hypotheses will pertain to the Colombian 
context and outcomes, which will form the reference for comparison. 
§  2.3 Housing institutions as collective action
This last section sums up the theories presented in this chapter from the perspective 
of the institutional approach that guides this study (see Figure 2.3). The goal of this 
approach is to understand the different institutional levels in condominium. Collective 
action is necessary in order to keep the common property well maintained (Orban, 
2006; Ostrom, 1990; Yau, 2014). From the perspective of comparative housing 
systems, collective action is seen in the relationship between professional housing 
providers and housing consumers. Both sectors need to cooperate in the phases of 
housing provision, wherein every actor has a specific goal and interest, be it building or 
buying the dwelling. 
For the professionals involved in the production and transaction of housing, 
condominium regulations are critical, as these steer the process of provision. At this 
point in the development process, rules are designed for the future condominium 
property. This is a top-down institutional solution in the condominium regime, and a 
collective action solution as promulgated by Williamson (2000). The bundles of rights 
in condominium determine the rights and duties of the residents. Moreover, the rights 
invest them with the power of self-management and self-governance. The right to 
change the rules is the main collective right. In Ostrom´s (1990) view, this is one of the 
most important principles in governance of the common property: the collective power 
to modify rules either by establishing other formal rules or by developing informal ones. 
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Informal institutions:
custums, traditions, norms
Institutional levels based on Williamson (2000)
Condominium institutions
Institutional levels based on Ostrom (1990)
Formal institutions:
State, market, non-profit
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Governance:
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Outcomes:
Individual
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traditions, norms
Formal institutions:
Condominium property law
Governance:
Trust - collective agreements
Self-management / 
self governance
Outcomes:
Individual & collective
Bridge
FIGURE 2.3 Institutional levels in condominium tenure
When the researcher selects and compares different low-income condominiums, the 
goal is twofold: to understand how the institutions of the condominium form of tenure 
differ from each other; and to ascertain whether one law in one context actually makes 
a difference by comparing it with the other context that has a different law. Initially, the 
research will focus on the formal institutions that constitute the bundle of rights of the 
actors involved in condominium ownership, such as the property law and how actors 
interpret and use it. 
The fact that the bundle of rights can be observed among homeowners does not 
necessarily mean that the study has to be targeted to the selfish rational individual. 
Rather, it can look at residents in light of the boundaries within which they operate. 
These boundaries are based either on trust and knowledge about each other (informal 
institutions), or on compliance with the law (formal institutions). Therefore, this 
thesis studies governance from two angles: the Ostrom approach and the Williamson 
approach. 
Both top-down and bottom-up institutional solutions for governance can be found 
in condominium. The law is the top-down agreement that households accept when 
buying a house or an apartment in condominium property. But are the rules clear 
about maintenance? What do people think about aspects of the top-down solution 
such as the regulations set forth in the property law? Do they acknowledge these 
regulations, and do these regulations play a role in the maintenance outcomes? The 
use of Ostrom´s framework recognizes the role of collective arrangements that are 
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informally developed -- for instance, trust, leadership, and learning processes within 
governance structures -- as key variables that might influence collective actions. In the 
present research such informal arrangements are important since the study is about 
people’s homes; a home is a locus of emotional and social ties among members of the 
household and with neighbors. 
This thesis explores top-down solutions in part I and bottom-up initiatives in part II. 
The next chapter presents the research design according to the phases of institutional 
analysis in this PhD project. For each phase of the analysis, the data and methodology 
used is explained. 
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3 Research design and methods
§  3.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines condominiums in Colombia and Ecuador, particularly those 
facilitated by state-led policies for low-income homeownership. As explained in the 
preceding chapters, comparing two similar markets for low-income homeowners under 
different property laws makes it possible to distinguish the effects of these institutions 
on maintenance outcomes. However, since the housing stock in both markets shows 
signs of deterioration, a comparative research design offers the advantage of pursuing 
hypotheses amenable to both qualitative and quantitative methods (Oxley, 2001). This 
chapter focuses on the methods applied in the present study to collect and analyze the 
data. The research design of this thesis was developed by integrating two established 
frameworks. One is the comparative housing system perspective (Boelhouwer & van 
der Heijden, 1993b; Doling, 1997; Oxley, 2001), which is grounded in institutional 
concepts of tenure (Elsinga, 2005; Ruonavaara, 1993). The other is the perspective 
recommended by Ostrom (1990, 2007), which studies outcomes by looking at 
the effects that these might have on (1) the characteristics of the households and 
community, (2) the physical characteristics of the housing complex, including the 
common property parts and individual units, and (3) the governance system (law and 
network of actors). 
The research project was rolled out in three stages, reflecting the multilevel character 
of the phenomena of interest, from the macro (policy and law) to the micro level (policy 
actors and low-income households). First, the focus was on the policy setting and the 
historical housing context. In a second stage, the focus was on the comparative analysis 
of the formal institutions such as the property law. In the third stage, the focus shifted 
to the actors and their perceptions. Attention to the behavior of actors incorporates the 
informal institutions within the policy network and enacted by the households in the 
system. Table 3.1 below lists the methods used to collect data and to analyze each of 
the hypotheses at each of the three stages. This chapter briefly explains the methods 
applied in stage 1 and 2 and then concentrates on the methods for stage 3: the design 
of focus groups with policymaking and professional stakeholders and the quantitative 
survey of households. Before proceeding with that explanation, though, it is necessary 
to describe the design of the survey and introduce the cases selected for comparison. 
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Research design Method Data Comparative analysis
Main hypothesis:
The more modern property law in Colombia has a positive impact on self-organization and in turn on the perceived 
 maintenance level
Part II Formal Institutions
Chapter 4 Housing market and policy
Hypothesis: 
Deterioration paths seen in 
the privately owned afford-
able housing complexes is 
disregarded in the available 
market and policy data
Qualitative &
Quantitative
Literature and policy reports 
Census data and collection of new 
data from cadaster 
Subsidy policy results and inter-
views with key stakeholders
Housing market 
and housing policy
Chapter 5 Condominium law
Questions: 
Who and what are regulated 
by the horizontal property 
law?
How does the regulatory 
system in condominiums 
operate? 
What are the similarities and 
differences between Colombia 
and Ecuador’s horizontal 
property laws?  
Qualitative Horizontal property law of Colom-
bia and Ecuador 
References on socio-legal analysis
Comparative law socio-le-
gal perspective
Part III Informal Institutions & Governance
Chapter 6 Network of professionals
Questions: 
How do the professionals 
perceive the maintenance 
problem? 
How do they deal with it?
How do they perceive the role 
of the law?
Qualitative Focus groups to collect policy 
actors’ and professionals’ per-
spectives on interdependency and 
maintenance problems  
Institutions in 
policy network
Chapter 7 Governance of low-income 
homeowners
Questions: 
Which factors involved in 
the affordable condomini-
um system are related to 
the perceived maintenance 
level (PML) of the common 
property? 
Do these factors differ be-
tween Bogota and Quito?
Quantitative Household survey, sample from 
selected condominium cases in 
each city 
Institution in governance, 
collective action, Institu-
tional and Analysis Devel-
opment (IAD) framework
Conclusion Condominium housing institutions: collective action 
Responding to the main hypothesis: do laws make a difference with respect to maintenance outcomes?
TABLE 3.1 Research design  
Section 3.2 describes the collection and analysis of policy and housing market data 
from both cities. Section 3.3 presents the methods applied to compare the horizontal 
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property laws of each country. Section 3.4 introduces the design and analysis of 
focus groups conducted in Quito and Bogota. Section 3.5 narrates and describes the 
selection of condominium housing complexes as cases. Section 3.6 explains the survey 
sample and questionnaire design and presents the statistical model. Finally, section 
3.7 reflects on existing data and methods, considering the reliability of that body of 
research and how replicable it may be in other contexts. 
Networks in housing provision
As set forth in the introduction to this chapter, the actors’ perceptions are studied at 
two regulatory levels to simplify the researcher’s task; the focus is narrowed to two 
levels of governance. One is the policy network, which comprises the actors engaged in 
housing provision during the policy implementation process (developers, the lending 
sector, the state). The other is the internal level, or the households’ institutional 
arrangements regarding their common property and relevant external actors. At both 
levels formal and informal institutions are integrated in a housing system approach 
to reveal the mechanisms through which institutions shape the parameters of choice 
(Nee & Ingram, 1998:19). 
"Specifying the mechanisms through which institutions shape the parameters 
of choice is important to an adequate sociological understanding of economic 
action. These social mechanisms, we argue, involve processes that are built into 
ongoing social relationships - the domain of network analysis in sociology (Nee & 
Ingram, 1998:19)."
Understanding how the external and the internal network cooperate to achieve a 
collective outcome is therefore critical from the housing system perspective. From the 
literature, one suggested pathway to cooperation is to adjust perceptions, “which can 
create a common ground for collective decision making and joint action” (Termeer & 
Koppenjan, 1997:97). Managing complex networks, particularly those pursuing public 
policy, is an important task for government (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997). In a 
policy network environment, relationships are based on interdependence of resources, 
whereby actors have to cooperate with each other to access these resources and 
achieve particular and policy goals (Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2000; Bortel, van, 2009). 
Interdependent relationships exist, though “not necessarily based on equity, between 
public, private and civil society actors” (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 587). Asymmetry in 
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interdependent relationships between actors should be considered in a governance 
network analysis, because one has to be aware that actors do not have equal power 
and resources. In the condominium, for instance, developers might have land but need 
buyers, and the latter are low-income owners that will pay for and assume property 
rights. 
Policy networks are not always transparent and can become ‘impenetrable structures 
of interest,’ which, as Kickert et al. (1997) note, “can prevent necessary innovations 
in public policy and form a threat to the effectiveness, efficiency and democratic 
legitimization of the public sector” (Kickert et al. 1997:9, citing Marsh & Rhodes 
1992:249-68). Actors in the policy network can encounter the same kind of 
cooperation problems as those experienced by homeowners inside the communities. 
The policy network approach is used to explain the perceptions and positions of the 
external actors regarding the problems that low-income owners have with maintaining 
the common property (chapter 5).
The next section reviews the literature on institutions of homeownership in order 
to shed light on the meaning of the institutions studied in this thesis. According to 
Giddens (1979), “as expressed in forms of life, institutions are analysed only in so far as 
they form a consensual backdrop against which action is negotiated and its meanings 
formed” (Giddens, 1979:50). Institutions become observable when actors assign 
meanings and interpret their role as homeowners. Generally these meanings express 
the idea of a homeowner in single-family ownership. However, it will be interesting 
to trace how these meanings and the institutions surrounding them may or may not 
change when observing the actors’ behavior in condominium ownership.  
§  3.2 Collection of policy and housing market data 
For the policy and housing market aspects of this research, descriptive statistics from 
census and cadaster data complement the narrative of policy approaches in both 
countries. The analysis of this data is presented in chapter 4. 
The goal in this stage was twofold: to show the centrality of low-income 
homeownership in the housing policy history; and to demonstrate that available 
statistics used for policy analysis are not sufficient to analyze the extent of the 
deterioration problems of common property in the condominium regime. First, 
quantitative data was collected to describe and compare the path of housing policy by 
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looking at some of the generally documented outcomes, such as the total number of 
dwellings and subsidies given to families. Then census data was collected, specifically 
on housing markets in Bogota and Quito. Third, cadaster data was retrieved to track the 
growth of the condominium housing sector since the 1960s. Despite the importance 
of the currently available data for both policy and housing analysis, at this stage of the 
research it was only useful to sketch the context in which the housing market research 
was conducted. 
For the historical overview of housing policy, secondary sources were used, namely 
statistics published in the literature and in official public documents. An effort was 
made to concentrate on data that gives an impression of the policy outcomes achieved 
at the city level, both in Bogota and Quito. This data is better understood when it is 
juxtaposed with census data in order to analyze the growth of homeownership in both 
countries. 
Census information about tenure focuses on types of occupation rather than forms of 
tenure. While this data provides a general description of the market, it cannot be filtered 
regarding the condominium form of tenure. In both countries, the census specifies types 
of occupation, including categories such as owner-occupancy, renting, and other (i.e., 
prisons, convents). In condominiums the units may be occupied by both renters and 
owners. Therefore, it would be useful to designate condominium as a distinct category, as 
this would allow researchers to assess another institutional level, one that intersects the 
standard classification in terms of tenure forms and types of occupation. 
Condominium is a form of tenure and not a housing type (Rosen & Walks, 2013). Since 
condominium tenure is not captured by the survey’s categories of the types of tenure, 
it is not possible to do cross analyses of housing typology by condominium tenure. The 
housing typology in the censuses of both countries is ‘single-family’, ‘apartment’, or 
‘other’, the last including local categories such as ranchos or covachas.8 Apartments may 
or may not be classified under condominium tenure. Single-family detached houses 
may be on single lots in real individual property or within a gated community that can 
be subdivided under a condominium regime. Single-family attached dwellings, or 
rowhouses, if individually owned, probably will be under condominium tenure since 
the structure and land are shared. Therefore, census categories miss the opportunity to 
capture information about condominium housing conditions. In terms of form of tenure, 
the occupants of condominium housing may be owners and renters, whereas in terms of 
housing type, condominiums can be multi-family as well as single-family. 
8 Rancho and covacha refer to rural housing typologies.
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Census data can also shed light on the quality of the built housing stock. However, 
the census usually concentrates on the quality of the individual units that are 
occupied rather than on the common property elements shared by different owners 
simultaneously. Although there are drawbacks to the available census data, chapter 
4 describes the market using the last census of housing in Colombia, which was 
conducted in 2005, with another intermediate survey done in 2007. In Ecuador, the 
last census of housing and population dates back to 2010. 
Due to the lack of sufficient census and housing survey data for both case-study 
contexts, it was necessary to search for other sources. Housing policy data on the total 
number of families that have received a subsidy to purchase a low-cost dwelling is 
readily available. However, that information is not very useful for the current research 
purposes, since it does not give any details about whether the purchased unit is under 
condominium tenure or in a single-family house. Subsidy data distinguishes between 
urban and rural housing subsidies but not between categories of housing type or tenure 
form. It is possible to find out how many individual units have been built, but not how 
many complexes in co-ownership have been developed since the 1960s. 
To find out how many housing units there are in condominium within the housing 
market of each city, data was requested from municipal cadaster departments in both 
Bogota and Quito. They provided a general list of units in condominium that had been 
built and registered until the summer of 2011. That list is merely an indication of the 
number of individual units and does not distinguish shared ownership. Still, this is 
primary data that can be used to show both the growth in and total market share of 
residential units under the condominium regime in the Bogota and Quito housing 
markets. 
It turned out to be difficult to draw a sample from the whole population of middle-
income and low-income condominiums built under the affordable housing policy in 
the main cities and to assess the physical conditions of the housing stock in common 
property in the cities as a whole. The research design of this project was highly 
influenced by the drawbacks of the existing data. A small-N household-level survey was 
envisioned to be able to delve into the condominium arrangements and co-owners’ 
behavior regarding maintenance of a common property resource. Case studies in 
condominium ownership were selected in each city to draw the sample of households 
from these locations. Section 3.4 expands on the case-study selection. The strategy to 
design the survey is explained in sections 3.4 and 3.5 of this chapter. 
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§  3.3 Comparative analysis of condominium property laws 
The comparison concentrates on the current laws of the condominium regime, 
or horizontal property laws, as they are called in the Latin American region. The 
Colombian Horizontal Property Law was first adopted in 1948, but the current 
version is Law 675 of 2001. In Ecuador, the current law was adopted in 1960, with 
its regulatory law (Reglamento Ley) enacted in 1995 and 1998. Some articles of the 
law of 1960 were modified in 2011. The regulatory law has also been amended at 
different times, sometimes by presidential decree. Although there have been some 
modifications to the Ecuadorian law, the Horizontal Property Law of 1960 is still the 
main formal institution in effect for the condominium regime. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the property law scrutinized in this analysis is the 
central formal institution governing the common property resource. It is assumed that 
the law establishes the rules that authorize or require a particular action in exercising 
a property right (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). A rule provides information, but access to 
information does not mean that actors will follow the rule. 
The comparison takes a socio-legal perspective of the law (Blandy et al., 2006; 
Edelman & Suchman, 1997). Here, we treat the law as an independent variable in 
order to see its effects in each studied context. Who are the parties being regulated by 
the horizontal property law? How is the law structured? What are the similarities and 
differences between horizontal property laws in Colombia and Ecuador? 
To answer these questions it is first necessary to understand the content of each 
property law from a comparative perspective. The goal of this research stage was to 
see who is addressed by the law and how the law regulates the bundle of rights of 
the common property resource. For this purpose a coding strategy was developed to 
analyze and compare each article of the laws. The coding was based on the conceptual 
framework (see chapter 2), using three levels of coding: (1) the actors and institutional 
arrangements, (2) the phases of housing provision, and (3) the environment 
of the laws. Once this analysis had been performed, it was possible to trace the 
different actors and their positions regarding the common property resource and its 
maintenance. The analysis was extensive, covering all arenas that the law regulates, 
but not all parts of the law pertain to the maintenance issues of the common property 
resource. Therefore, the analysis in chapter 5 uses the extensive analysis but focuses 
on those operational and constitutional rules that are relevant to the self-management 
and maintenance of the common property resource. The data analysis focuses on those 
articles that are meant to regulate maintenance actions both at the collective-choice 
level and operational-choice level (Ostrom, 2005). 
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§  3.4 Focus groups 
A focus group methodology was applied to assess the problem as it is perceived by 
policymakers and professionals who are involved in the implementation of low-income 
housing policy and low-cost housing provision. The focus groups held in Bogota and 
Quito in October and November of 2012 were intended as means to collect data and to 
observe actors interacting with each other and debating about the problem. 
Focus groups are a specific type of a group interview and are often conducted in 
studies of governance networks in which the researcher plays an active role during 
the discussion (Damgaard & Sørensen, 2007:180). This type differs from in-depth 
and individual interviews in that it is more concerned with organizational and policy 
implementation issues and less with particular or personal information about the 
actor. The group dynamics and interaction in a focus group stimulate experts and 
professionals to discuss their different perspectives (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). 
It works like this: a comment from one individual often produces more ideas and new 
comments from others in the group. Therefore, conversation around a key topic is 
nourished by the synergy generated within the group (Krueger & Casey, 2009). The 
basic idea is that comments would emerge spontaneously following the guidance of 
the moderator (Fallow & Brown, 2002). The focus group method is a useful way to 
discover how respondents talk about a particular problem; there is no correct comment 
or answer and there is no need to reach agreement in the group discussion (Hennink, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011).
The participants in the focus groups in Bogota and Quito belong to the external policy 
network, as defined in the conceptual framework of this research (see Table 3.2). These 
actors were identified during exploratory interviews with key stakeholders and through 
the analysis of policy documents and the detailed examination of the horizontal 
property law. The underlined actor included in the table below is one that was not 
mentioned in the laws of either Colombia or Ecuador but was considered to belong 
to the network. In the same vein, social managers were also invited to attend. This is 
a ‘purposive sampling’ technique that is generally applied in focus groups (Fallow & 
Brown, 2002:161). 
To collect information, simultaneous focus groups were organized in each city as part 
of a workshop event. The event was planned for one Saturday morning in Quito, and 
it was repeated a month later in Bogota. At each event, the problem of the study and 
the agenda were presented in a plenary session. The purpose of the event and the 
simultaneous focus groups was stated and the presence of different actors from the 
external network was recognized by the researcher, who pointed out the importance of 
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the event. In a round-robin format, all participants were asked to introduce themselves 
and share their expectations about the discussion that the event will promote. Certain 
words -- such as maintenance, horizontal property law, and condominium -- were 
deliberately not mentioned in the invitation, introduction, and questions. It was 
expected that the participants would bring up these topics in their discussions and 
comments. The main words defining the problem of the study were the ‘deterioration 
of the social interest housing stock’. ‘Social interest housing’ is the English translation 
of Vivienda de Interes Social, which in this thesis it is better called affordable housing. 
The focus groups were held in Spanish; therefore, the notes, discussion guidelines, 
recordings, and transcripts are also in Spanish. The planning was done both in English 
and Spanish, and self-recorded information on cards was translated from Spanish into 
English for the analysis. 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
Ministry Owners (individual households)
Municipality Tenants (users by contract)
Building permit department Developer/owner
Cadaster Owners as collective: Assembly of owners 
Property register Board of homeowners
Notary Property manager 
Developer
Lender
Property manager
Social manager
TABLE 3.2 Actors and governance levels of governance of low-income condominium policy network (source: 
Analysis of horizontal property law, empirical research)
* Only external actors were invited to the focus group. 
Invitations to attend the focus group event introduced the topic of the research, its 
objectives, and the agenda for the day. The letter also mentioned who else was invited 
so that actors might see the event as a networking opportunity and therefore as an 
incentive to come to the event. In Bogota, the event took place in a large meeting room 
of the Habitat Department of the Municipality of Bogota.9 In Quito, the plenary meeting 
9 Secretaría del Hábitat, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, thanks to Dr. Maria Mercedes Maldonado, who authorized and 
provided the institutional support to hold the workshop on Saturday, November 24th, 2012.
TOC
 92 Affordable Condominium Housing
and group interviews took place in FLACSO’s10 academic building. In addition to the 
interest and concerns shown by the participants, both the location and the institutional 
support from the Municipality of Bogota and FLACSO positively influenced the high 
response rate to the event.
In each city, 50 invitations were physically distributed by a mailman who was hired 
specifically to distribute and check the receipt of the invitations. The response rate 
and attendance at the focus group event was remarkable, with more than 50% of the 
invited actors confirmed in each city. In Bogota a total of 27 actors attended the focus 
group event, while in Quito 31 people attended. Six focus groups were simultaneously 
held in Quito, and then the same strategy was applied in Bogota, where it was possible 
to hold five simultaneous focus groups. Groups of five or six participants were invited to 
sit at round tables. Each table was organized to ensure heterogeneity among the actors 
so that different perspectives could be brought up in the discussions. Each table had 
at least one person representing the following actors: housing ministry, municipality, 
developer, property manager, nonprofit social managers, and property registry. 
One facilitator was assigned to each table to assist in the discussion and to record 
information. Considering the research funds available, and given personal experience 
in participatory and group discussions, the principal investigator was the moderator 
of the event. This fact influenced the techniques for recording information, since as 
researcher and moderator it was necessary to be aware of multiple aspects at the same 
time, and some information might have been overlooked.
Focus groups included two discussion activities, ranging from general to more specific; 
the first activity concerned roles and resources. In institutional and network analysis, 
the first step is to identify actors’ positions (Poteete et al., 2010). The objective was to 
trace and visualize resource interdependencies and to identify the actors’ main roles 
and how they measure outcomes (Kickert et al., 1997). The idea was to test whether 
the actors see themselves as ‘participants’ in the action-situation under study. The 
moment they see themselves as participants, they can see the interdependencies and 
the links among them. Different characteristics of the network were recorded, such 
as multi-formity, interdependence, and closedness (as used in van Bortel & Elsinga, 
2007). Every position of a participant is associated with authorized set of actions that 
are linked to outcomes in the process (Ostrom et al., 2006:30). These positions can be 
traced by identifying their interests and the resources they possess and those that are 
shared (Enserink et al., 2010). 
10 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Quito, Ecuador, thanks to the support of Dr. Ramiro Rojas and 
Arq. Marco Cordova, assistant professors of the Public Policy and City Studies program.
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The second activity was devoted to the actors’ perceptions of the maintenance of 
low-income condominium housing. The strategy of presenting a ‘vignette’ was used 
to offer a scenario of a deteriorated housing stock. The vignette was also presented as 
a poster so that actors could see pictures of the deteriorated housing complex. Actors 
were asked to respond to three questions: (1) What went wrong? (2) What caused 
the deterioration? and (3) What can be done to solve the problem? This activity was 
designed to reveal whether actors consider themselves involved (as participants) in the 
action-situation under study. Moreover, it was useful to hear what the participants said 
about the responsibilities of other actors regarding the problem. 
During both activities, information was self-recorded by the participants, who were 
asked to write down their thoughts and responses on colored cards, which were later 
hung on boards. During the second activity, those boards included a timeline of 
housing provision phases (production, exchange, and consumption). While responding 
to the three questions, participants were asked to locate the card according to the 
phase of housing provision pertaining to their comment. Secondly, information 
was captured in voice recordings. Thirdly, the facilitators, principal researcher, and 
moderator made field notes. Analysis of data then took into account these three 
sources of information, using some quotes from the transcriptions of the colored 
cards and the voice recordings. The systematic analysis followed the sequence of the 
questions, responding to the sub-questions regarding actors, institutions, and the 
phase in housing provision (see Table 3.3).
QUESTION LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 Level 3
1 What went wrong? Are problems related 
to formal or informal 
processes; external or 
internal institutions?
Who is the actor men-
tioned or implied?  
During production, ex-
change, or consumption?
2 What are the problems? Are they physical or 
organizational (coopera-
tion) problems? Other?
Who is the actor men-
tioned or implied?
During production, ex-
change, or consumption?
3 What are the solutions? Are solutions formal 
or informal? Within 
external or internal 
existing institutions, or 
new ones?
Who is the actor men-
tioned or implied?
During production, ex-
change, or consumption?
TABLE 3.3 Methodology for the systematic analysis of the focus groups’ second activity and posters
In light of the data in each table, it is apparent that the total number of focus groups 
held in each city was adequate. The information started to repeat itself, showing ‘data 
saturation’ (Hennink et al., 2011). Some of the actors who accepted the invitation and 
attended the focus group event had a special interest in talking about the problem. 
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Others were just curious about the event and saw the invitation as a networking 
opportunity. Therefore, it was necessary to be aware that a small amount of bias can 
exist in the collected data. The qualitative research and analysis methods covered in 
chapter 6 deal with possibly biased information by clarifying the role of each actor and 
his or her position in the network.
The participants are key stakeholders. Their opinions are interpreted in their contexts, 
and their agency in policymaking is of significance in both cities. The participants had 
the opportunity to evaluate the event: the course of the day, the methods, and the 
moderator. Overall, they rated the event as positive and useful, especially with respect 
to the group of people invited to the meeting.11 See Appendix A for a detailed list of 
participants in both cities and the guidelines for the discussion, as well as a translated 
summary of the collected data. 
Judging from observations of the principal investigator, some collective learning 
took place during the focus group discussions. This may have had some influence on 
the actors’ behavior by changing how they perceived other actors’ positions in the 
network. Transformation of perceptions and learning from others’ opinions is generally 
expected as an immediate outcome of focus group interviews (Damgaard & Sørensen, 
2007:206). The interactive aspect of a focus group helps actors to reformulate 
their points of view and sometimes to reconsider their own ideas about and their 
understanding of a topic (Fallow & Brown, 2002:159). The data from and results of 
this stage of the research are analyzed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
§  3.5 Case-study selection
Four housing complexes in condominium tenure were selected in each city (Figure 
3.1). The first reason to select cases was to have a sample of housing complexes in 
condominium from which to draw the small-N survey of households in co-ownership. 
The second reason was to remain consistent with Ostrom’s method to understand 
collective action and governance of the common property (Poteete et al., 2010) and to 
be able to compare the phenomena between the two cities. 
11 An exit questionnaire was given to all participants.
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FIGURE 3.1 Selection of case studies in Quito (Q01-Q04) and Bogota (B01-B4)
Common property resource case studies
For an institutional analysis of common property resource management, it is useful 
to conduct small case studies and compare them. This case-study approach offers the 
specific context from which to develop theories of the different relationships of the 
phenomena that are observed: 
"Close examination of individual cases offers opportunities to develop concepts 
and theory, identify the limits of general relationships and disprove deterministic 
hypotheses, control for confounding effects through within-case comparisons, 
and disentangle causal processes. The case study method is especially appealing 
in the effort to make sense of complex processes. (Poteete et al., 2010:33)"
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There are some disadvantages, as set forth in the literature, to the case study as a 
method in the social sciences. One issue is external validity, possibly making it difficult 
but feasible, to replicate the analysis. The other is confusion about what a case really 
is. This research is a multi-level case study: first comes the city, second the housing 
complexes, and third the household. However, in this chapter the qualitative and 
quantitative research cases are specifically the housing complexes from which (1) 
interviews with key internal actors were conducted and (2) a sample of households was 
drawn for the quantitative survey. The external validity and the possibility of replication 
are tied to the selection of variables. Considering the various forms that housing 
complexes can take, the variables selected for this research can be found in all cases, 
regardless of differences in architectural and urban design. Knowing that condominium 
tenure is a global issue, and following the literature and studies on condominium 
maintenance and collective action dilemmas, researchers will acknowledge that they 
could find and test the selected variables in other contexts too. Therefore it is plausible 
that the theoretical and methodological approaches underlying this thesis can be 
replicated in other contexts to compare the theoretical results. 
YEAR BUILT HOUSING/LAND 
POLICY 
DEMAND 
SUBSIDY
SOCIAL 
MANAGEMENT
DWELLINGS 
PER COMPLEX*
TYPOLOGY 
Bogota
B01 1958 ICT No Yes 752 High- and middle-rise 
block towers 
B02 2003 Market approach Yes Yes** 184 Terrace dwellings 
B03 2010 Ciudad USME Yes No 83 Middle-rise building
B04 2012 Ciudad Verde Mixed Yes 240 Middle-rise building
Quito
Q01 1974 BEV-JNV No No 480 Middle-rise building.
Q02 2003 Vivienda Solidaria Mixed No 16-50 Rehabilitated historic 
center house 
Q03 2010 Market approach Yes Yes** 74-120 Terrace dwellings
Q04 2012 Ciudad Bicentenario Yes Yes 50-104 Mixed, middle-
rise building and ter-
raced dwellings
TABLE 3.4 Controlled variables for case study selection  
* In Ecuador these vary, since case selection is based on the housing program. 
** Social managers were hired after problems within the community affecting the development and external actors. 
This thesis applies a case-study method with qualitative and quantitative statistical 
analysis. Individual perceptions affect collective outcomes. Thus, there was a need 
to gain access to certain housing complexes where it was possible to hold in-depth 
interviews with key informants as well as the household survey. Both sources of 
TOC
 97 Research design and methods
information were deemed to elucidate group behavior and agreements on managing 
the common resource and carrying out maintenance. A total of four cases (housing 
complexes) were selected in each city. These cases were chosen by controlling 
for the following characteristics of the resource. According to theory, these are 
important physical categories that can have an effect on collective outcomes of 
maintenance. Four attributes were taken into account for the selection of cases: (1) 
year of construction and type of government intervention, (2) involvement of social 
management in the process, (3) size, and (4) housing typology. These may be seen as 
conditions that ensure variation in the selection of cases among properties sharing the 
same condominium regime (see Table 3.4). 
Government involvement and year of construction
The first controlled factor in the selected cases is government intervention. There 
are many housing complexes that were built throughout the several decades in 
which the homeownership program was implemented. How to choose among 
these? The selection ensures that at least one case dates from the beginning of the 
low-income homeownership policy and other cases are from the current period. 
Government involvement is what distinguishes the selected cases from other high-end 
condominiums in the market. Case selection by either state-led or subsidy-based policy 
inevitably helps to set a time variable, since the form of policy correlates with the year 
of construction. The age of the housing complex is important because deterioration 
can depend on how old the materials used in the buildings and units are. A general 
hypothesis would be that the older the case, the more deteriorated it will be, unless 
other factors play a more important role. 
The first housing complexes built both in Quito and Bogota are iconic buildings due to 
the novelty of state-led provision at the time. One case representing the first generation 
of middle-income and low-income housing in condominium was chosen in each city: 
the Urban Center Antonio Nariño in Bogota (1958) and Condominiums Luluncoto 
in Quito (1974). The next three selected cases in each city belong to a more recent 
period, the decades after the 1990s, when the policy was liberalized and the subsidy 
implemented. 
In Quito, one of the first housing programs that was built in collaboration with the 
municipality was Vivienda Solidaria (Q02), whereby low- and middle-income families 
were able to purchase dwellings with a down-payment subsidy. The program got 
started in the historic center of Quito in the late 1990s and ended in 2003 when 
people moved into the new dwellings. The selection was intended to ensure a similar 
age of cases. Accordingly, a housing development built in 2003 in Bogota was chosen 
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to make it comparable to Q02 in terms of year of construction. The second selected 
case in Bogota, Alameda del Parque (B02), is the first affordable housing project built 
by a private developer. It is a project of single-family houses in condominium tenure 
purchased with subsidy. The particular aspect of this project is the involvement of 
social managers. 
Next, two projects built in 2010 were selected in Quito and Bogota. In Quito, case Q03, 
Alba Azul, was completed with the collaboration of many actors, including a nonprofit 
organization as the main lender, a private developer in charge of construction and 
sales, and the housing ministry as the subsidy provider. In Bogota, case B03 is a five-
story building located in USME, an urban area in the southern part of Bogota’s capital 
district. This affordable housing property was built by a private developer. 
In addition to the subsidy policy, many affordable housing projects were developed 
together with land policies and programs resorting under the municipalities and 
intended to provide affordable land for social interest housing. This is the policy context 
for cases Q04 in Quito and B04 in Bogota. To make affordable housing possible, the 
municipalities played a key role in both the urban design and development of a large 
housing development project. Urban blocks would then be given or sold to private 
developers, who would build the homes. Q04, Ciudad Bicentenario, is located in the 
very north of Quito Metropolitan District, and B04, Ciudad Verde, is a new town that 
was built to provide affordable housing on the periphery of Bogota. It was among these 
big developments that some housing complexes were chosen for the investigation. 
Involvement of social managers (Acompañamiento social) 
During the first year of research, social managers were identified as actors in 
the system. Social managers are professionals with training in social work and 
social psychology. Their role is to assist the developer (of either private or public 
agency) handle relationships with the community of the future homeowners. For 
instance, social managers organize information meetings about the tenure form 
of condominium. They also bring together the community by helping its members 
identify leaders and assisting with the constitution of the board of homeowners and 
other institutional arrangements required by law. Each social manager has a different 
method and approach to the communities. Their work ranges from facilitating two or 
three informative meetings to organizing sustained work with the community during 
the process of provision. Regardless of their method, the role of the social manager is 
temporary. 
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Formal actors would be those that come to the action-situation because they are 
authorized participants according the rules of the game; among them is the property 
manager. By contrast, an informal actor is someone who participates in the action-
situation (maintenance) even though the contribution of that actor is not mentioned in 
the laws and policies. The role of social manager is rather informal. There is no explicit 
policy that requires the involvement of social managers in the housing provision 
process in Colombia and Ecuador. Nor are there any guidelines or policies regulating 
their involvement with the collective rights and obligations of homeowners. Although 
not explicitly mentioned in the regulatory frameworks, their role appears to be 
important. 
During the research, social management was observed in just a few projects, and some 
differences in its implementation were noted between Bogota and Quito. Thus, the 
cases in each city were selected to ensure that the sample has some projects with social 
management during the provision phases and others that function without it. The 
social manager is an outsider who can influence what occurs among the homeowners. 
Chapter 6 expands on the role of the social manager; in chapter 7 this actor is included 
as a dummy variable to consider the effects of such involvement on the statistical 
analysis. Social managers can be private social entrepreneurs or they can be public 
actors, resorting under municipal housing departments or the housing ministry. 
Table 3.1, which shows a list of the selected cases, has a column showing whether 
intervention by social managers has occurred. 
Size and housing typology 
Size, both of the group and the resource, is an important variable in collective action 
theory, so it had to be taken into account when selecting the cases. A variable to 
control for when selecting housing complexes was the total number of dwellings 
they comprised. Here it was necessary to be consistent with previous research on 
condominiums, which defines the size of the resource as the total number of dwellings 
(Werczberger & Ginsberg, 1987; Yau, 2011). Therefore, when selecting cases for this 
study, care was taken to choose complexes that did not all have the same number of 
dwellings. 
The case selection naturally differentiates by location and typology, although the 
controlled factors are mainly tied to the housing program and, therefore, to the year of 
construction. By definition, cases from the period when government acted as builder 
are more centrally located than those built in 2012. Multi-family structures can take 
the form of a mid-rise building, a group of townhouses, detached dwellings, or a 
combination of these. The effect of typology, however, will be analyzed in a descriptive 
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format, including diagrams to clarify what the common property of each housing 
complex is. The common property resource needs maintenance, and it must be clear 
what those common elements are. In summary, the number of dwellings is deemed to 
be an appropriate variable, as it is easily comparable and amenable to this particular 
research design. 
The definitive selection of cases involved a careful process of ensuring that some 
conditions were met, including being able to access and survey the owners living in the 
housing complexes. Certain cases had to be eliminated because some of the conditions 
were not met, and the goal of the selection procedure was to ensure both comparability 
across the cases and access to the complexes. Although some complexes were 
evidently heading towards physical deterioration of the common property elements, it 
was not always possible to access information about this impending problem. In some 
instances there was no working board of homeowners; in others it proved difficult to 
find homeowners willing to initiate contact with the research project. Other complexes 
had obvious problems with security or were located within distressed areas, making it 
difficult or even dangerous for a single researcher to perform fieldwork. Therefore, the 
definitive selection of cases might not include the most deteriorated or problematic 
housing complexes from each city. As Ostrom would say, researching failure in 
collective action is sometimes more difficult than researching success, but we can learn 
lessons from both (Poteete et al., 2010).
The following section includes a brief description of the selected cases in Bogota and 
Quito. In each case the investigator was able to interview both the president of the 
board of homeowners and the person who acts as the property manager. In Quito, 
these two roles are sometimes performed by the same person. Each case is introduced 
by describing a particular aspect of its history and identifying who was involved in 
the building and sales process. Then, using qualitative data from the interviews and 
pictures and diagrams about the property, the description includes some details about 
the physical configuration, typology, and size of the common property. Third, the 
narrative concentrates on how the particular community manages the institutional 
arrangements regarding maintenance issues. Data about the attributes of the 
community of homeowners and how they evaluate their maintenance of the common 
property is presented and analyzed in chapter 7. 
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§  3.6 Quantitative survey 
The survey was deemed an appropriate means to elucidate how a sample of co-owners 
perceive maintenance levels of their common property and identify the factors related 
to these perceptions. More details on the survey questionnaire and statistical analysis 
are included in Chapter 7. To investigate the factors that influence households’ 
collective action, the study used the IAD framework (Ostrom, 1990, 2007) as a model 
to select the main variables of interest: (i) attributes of the community, (ii) attributes 
of the physical resource, and (iii) governance system. This section first explains the 
sample design and fieldwork, then it presents the questions and variables used in the 
analysis, and finally it outlines the quantitative methods applied in the analyses. 
§  3.6.1 Sample design and fieldwork
The small-N sample design took into consideration both the case-study characteristics 
and the comparative approach. In view of the multi-level approach of the research 
and the limitations on the budget, access to dwellings, and time to perform the data 
collection, a random sample of 50 households from each of the four selected housing 
complexes was drawn. Therefore, considering that the case sizes (total number of 
dwellings in shared property) are different, the goal was to survey 200 households 
in Bogota and 200 households in Quito, thereby ensuring a balanced sample of 
households per case and per city for the sake of comparability. 
Both the postal and telephone survey options were rejected because of local conditions 
and the difficulty of obtaining both postal addresses and phone numbers. To ensure 
a high response rate, the fieldwork plan and questionnaire were designed as an 
interviewer-administered survey, to be completed after ringing the doorbell of random 
units within each selected case. Trained interviewers were hired to administer the 
interviews, and an interviewer supervisor was also employed.12 To be able to access 
the common property, authorization was solicited from the board of homeowners 
12 CENAC was contracted to assist with the interviewing process in Bogota, where a team of six interviewers with a 
supervisor worked for four weekends to complete the expected sample. In Quito, a team of six interviewers and 
supervisors worked during four consecutive weekends. In both cities interviewers were given a one-day work-
shop and training to familiarize them with the questionnaire and let them practice how to introduce the purpose 
of the research and themselves.
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and/or the property manager in charge.13 This made it likely that we could get a high 
response rate. Table 3.5 shows the total number of interviews per housing complex 
that was achieved. The goal was reached by collecting data from a total N universe of 
414 households, being 200 from Bogota’s cases and 214 from Quito’s cases, creating a 
nested sample of household information. 
Cities (2) BOGOTA QUITO
Cases (8) B01 B02 B03 B04 Q01 Q02 Q03 Q04
Households samples 54 50 46 50 56 52 50 56
Total (N = 414) n = 200 n = 214
TABLE 3.5 Surveyed nested sample of households in Bogota and Quito
The pilot questionnaire was first tested in both cities and then adjusted accordingly. 
Some terminology was adapted, since the laws and the communities use different 
wording for key concepts, including the ‘board of homeowners’. In Bogota, the board 
is called a council but in Ecuador a central committee or directiva. The interviewer-
administered questionnaire took about 30 to 40 minutes to complete with each head 
of household, and a team of six interviewers surveyed 50 households from one housing 
complex on a weekend day. In general, the fieldwork consisted of one month in Bogota 
and one month in Quito. Since a flyer was distributed a couple of days before the 
interviewers knocked on doors, people were already familiar with the survey, and this 
facilitated the self-introduction of the interviewer. The flyer or invitation to participate 
in the survey was addressed to both tenants and owner-occupiers. 
The following section describes the nested-level approach and identifies the variables. 
The households in the sample are not independent from the context to which they 
belong. Households coming from each case (B01, B02…B04; Q01, Q02…Q04) are 
dependent on their common property resource. Both Bogota and Quito are macro-level 
units in the sample, each subject to a different legal context due to the property laws. 
Households are at the micro level where the dependent variable is defined. 
13 Only common properties from which authorization was received from their board or property manager were 
surveyed.
TOC
 103 Research design and methods
§  3.6.2 Multiple variables and statistical methods
The sample is structured hierarchically: a sample of households within a case and 
within a city. There is one single outcome that is measured at the lowest level: individual 
perception of maintenance level (PML). According to Ostrom’s theory and model, the 
characteristics of the resource and the governance system (formal rules) might have an 
influence on both individual and collective outcomes. The perceived maintenance level 
(PML) becomes the main dependent variable as the key outcome of the action-situation 
of study. 
How the PML score varies depends on the households, the case (resource attributes), or 
the city (different property law). The variance needs to be explained with a multivariate 
statistical model, which is basically a hierarchical system of regression equations. The 
univariate relationship between each variable is explored by a general linear model 
controlling for the city in order to discern comparative effects. Only statistically significant 
variables will be included in a regression controlling for factors regarding the common 
property attributes and legal context. However, for the final model two different 
regressions will be developed, and the results will be carefully evaluated in light of the 
sample design. 
Dependent variable: Perceived maintenance level 
Maintenance entails processes and actions targeted to manage the use and deterioration 
processes of the physical elements of a building. How acceptable is the maintenance 
level of a property? The answer to this question is given by the owner and the user of the 
building and its common physical parts (Lowry, 2002; Mossel, 2008; Straub, 2002). 
The survey questionnaire used for the case studies in Bogota and Quito did not imply any 
particular problem with maintenance. The assessment of the maintenance level was left 
to the residents themselves. The questionnaire allowed each household to provide any 
information about problems by answering yes/no and open questions. Each was also 
asked to grade the maintenance level of ten selected common property elements, from 
which a score was calculated. Ten elements shown in Table 3.6 represent the three main 
common property components covered in the questionnaire: (1) land, (2) structure, and 
(3) infrastructure. In the present study, three common elements were measured that 
belong to the category of land: the gardens, walkways, and parking areas. There are five 
elements that belong to the category of structure: entrance, facades, stairs, roofs, and the 
common room where assembly meetings can be held. Lastly, there are two elements that 
fall into the category of infrastructure: water pipes and lighting in public/private areas.
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Other elements of the common good such as service equipment (elevators, water pumps, 
office supplies) were not included in the questionnaire because these elements require 
more technical assessment; furthermore, not all buildings in condominium have elevators 
or water pumps. The methods and questionnaire design had to ensure the compatibility 
of the results. Information about elements that require more technical assessment was 
collected in the interviews with the president of the board of homeowners or with the 
property manager. 
Common property category Physical elements 
Land Gardens, walkways, and parking areas 
Structure Entrance, facades, stairs, roofs, and the common room where assembly meet-
ings can be held 
Infrastructure Water pipes and lighting in public/private areas
TABLE 3.6 Three main common property elements and the selected
There are many common elements of a building in condominium for which the 
maintenance can be assessed separately. The ones that were chosen are clearly elements 
that households can easily recognize and grade as to their own perceived level of 
maintenance. In the literature, Werczberger and Ginsberg evaluated maintenance by 
observing the upkeep of the entrances of buildings, looking at the doors, staircases, and 
mailboxes (Werczberger & Ginsberg, 1987). However, theirs was an external evaluation 
made by the researchers themselves. 
In another study, Orban was able to use a survey that had been conducted by government 
where the general condition of the building was assessed, including the quality of the 
surroundings.14 Orban applied a factor analysis to choose variables to determine building 
condition, but the dependent variable was the cooperative potential. Therefore, she 
estimated the probability of the effect of rundown conditions on the surroundings but 
did not take household evaluation of the common property into account (Orban, 2006). 
Soaita (2012), studying Rumanian condominiums, made a ranked-priorities table for 
repair and renovation of the residential block, such as pipe renewal, staircase painting, 
exteriors, roofing, and upkeep of green areas (Soaita, 2012:1021). That study, also 
presented descriptive statistics linking these results with qualitative data. 
14 Six factors: police factor, rundown and dirty house factor, reconstruction factor, shabby surroundings factor, 
development factor, and industrial factor. All these factors explained 63% of the total variance in a logistic 
regression of participation rate (0=participation rate under 50% and 1=participation rate above 50%).
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The diversity in the physical characteristics and the architectural design of housing 
blocks and complexes in condominium make the assessment of the maintenance level 
of the common property resource a challenge. It becomes even more difficult when 
the purpose is to compare the outcomes in two different countries. Therefore, this 
study developed a measure that follows the standard definition of common property 
in condominium for this study: land, structure, and infrastructure as latent variables. 
These three elements will always be found in common property irrespective of the 
context of analysis.15 In the survey (question 18)16 the head of household that was 
interviewed was asked to grade maintenance level of each individual element of the 
three main categories: well maintained, maintained and not maintained. An option 
of does not apply to that building was also included. Responses from each of the ten 
elements were recoded to build a score of over 30 points. A higher score towards 30 
means a higher level of perceived level of maintenance.  
Independent variables
Each variable that corresponds to the attributes of the community, governance, 
or resource characteristics will enter the model only if after performing a bivariate 
analysis it shows a statistically association with the perceived maintenance level (PML). 
Association is measured using correlation analysis when variables are continuous 
and using ANOVA when the measurement is categorical. To test the between-subject 
effects within the two cities, a general linear model is used in SPSS, analyzing each 
variable in relationship to the PML and the city. With this test it is possible to observe 
when a variable is significantly associated with the PML in one city but not in the other, 
or in both. Moreover, knowing the independent effect without controlling for other 
variables first helps to see more clearly how the effect changes once other case-level or 
city-level factors are controlled and not assumed as constant. 
The attributes of the community imply latent variables such as socioeconomic 
characteristics, history of use, and also trust and social capital as suggested levels 
included in the theory of the commons. The second-tier level is defined by the 
researcher and is measured in the questionnaire. Trust and social capital are both 
informal institutions and are included in the model in order to test their effect on the 
15 Other high-end condominium developments will have common swimming pool areas and many other facilities 
or amenities that are not found in the selected cases of study. Affordable housing projects have the most basic 
common areas possible; these are not luxury complexes or condos.
16 Questionnaire included in the appendix.
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outcomes. Question 39 of the questionnaire for instance asks: How much trust do you 
have that the money that people pay for the maintenance fee is well administered? 
And question 52 asks: How much trust does the Management Council/Board of 
homeowners inspire? 
Governance system variables regard both the household level and the case level, such 
as the dummy variable involvement of ‘social management’. The independent variables 
in the third block correspond to those that measure the attributes of the physical 
common property. Data entry and preparation (recoding) was necessary in order to 
start the comparative, multi-level analysis of the different effects in each city regarding 
the maintenance outcome. 
§  3.7 Mixed-method approach 
Combining qualitative and quantitative methods (Brannen, 2005; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989; Guest, 2012), is a scientific research strategy 
implying a cycle that includes the contextualization and the findings of qualitative 
research stages developed at the beginning of the research project, which is significant 
for the design, validation, and interpretation of the quantitative stage (Brannen, 2005; 
Hennink et al., 2011). The survey and quantitative analysis at the end helps to test both 
contextual and theoretical hypotheses and to develop theories for maintenance issues 
in common property resources. 
Case selection in this thesis not only provides a basis for drawing a sample of 
households in common property but also shows the variability of affordable 
condominium housing in the market. The variability of physical resource attributes 
among the cases presents a challenge to the effort to understand the problems 
that arise in a condominium regime. This study shows how these constraints can 
be addressed in a larger-scale survey. However, the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research is a critical methodological decision, as it allows us to interpret 
the quantitative results. 
Consecutive field research for data collection that involved traveling to both Bogota and 
Quito was done in 2011, 2012, and 2014. Data was collected through (1) interviews 
(May-July 2011), (2) focus groups (October-November 2012), and (3) case-household 
surveys (February-March 2014). After each fieldwork period, data was analyzed in the 
Netherlands. When data is not available and accessible, it is necessary to collect it, 
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which requires careful planning and dedicated research funds. Fieldwork is intensive, 
and data takes a considerable amount of time to process. The research design in 
the first stages informed the subsequent second and third phases of the research. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the research design proved successful and can be 
replicated in other contexts. 
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Part II
This part is devoted to formal institutions. 
The housing market and the subsidy policies promoting homeownership are covered in 
chapter 4. An analysis of the property law of each country is presented in chapter 5. 
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4 Housing market and 
affordable housing policy 
§  4.1 Introduction 
The first step in the comparative analysis is to examine the data on housing markets 
and subsidy policy. The underlying hypothesis is that those sources ignore the path of 
deterioration seen in privately owned affordable housing complexes. 
This hypothesis challenges the idea that it is possible to analyze condominium 
deterioration processes with conventional quantitative methods of policy analysis. 
Does the available data reveal how many condominiums exist in the housing sector? 
What can we know about the deterioration process? Section 3.2 of the preceding 
chapter described the data on which this comparative analysis is based and explained 
its limitations with respect to the low-income condominium housing stock. 
Condominiums were initially developed in both Colombia and Ecuador with the 
support of housing policies for low-income homeownership. Condominiums, or 
‘condos’, are buildings in multi-owned structures (Blandy et al., 2010) that constituted 
a new form of home ownership in capital cities such as Bogota and Quito. Condos were 
first built when both populations and housing needs were rising. The governments 
decided to create public, national institutions to mass-produce affordable housing in 
multi-family buildings (Ballen, 2009; Montoya, 2004). Development began in 1958 in 
Bogota and in 1960 in Quito after the adoption of the horizontal property laws in each 
country. Those years establish a point of departure for the housing policy and market 
analysis that is the subject of this chapter. 
This chapter concentrates on the comparative analysis of housing markets and 
incentive-based policy for low-income homeownership in Bogota and Quito, and it 
is divided into three parts. Section 4.2 explains, from a historical perspective, how 
housing policies in both Colombia and Ecuador were adopted under the constitutional 
housing rights and how the role of government has changed. Section 4.3 treats 
Colombia’s policies and Bogota’s housing market data with a particular emphasis 
on the incentive-based policy for low-income homeownership. Section 4.4 treats 
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Ecuadorian policies and Quito’s housing market data and describes the incentive-
based policy as it is applied in Quito. Section 4.5 summarizes the findings from the 
comparative analysis, accentuating the similarities and differences between the 
housing markets of Bogota and Quito. 
§  4.2 Housing policy in historical perspective in Colombia and Ecuador 
Latin American housing markets have both formal and informal housing sectors; 
for each there are specific policies and programs, which are funded and developed 
by the national governments (Blanco, Cibils & Muñoz, 2014; UN-HABITAT, 2010). 
The formal housing market comprises housing that is generally mass-produced and 
that has building permits and property titles; the informal market occurs outside the 
bounds of the legal systems and prescribed patterns of urban development. Informal 
housing includes dwellings that are self-built over time without participation of the 
construction companies and investors that are typically involved in the formal housing 
market. It is common for homeownership and renting to coexist within the formal 
and informal markets in Latin American countries, and they certainly do in Bogota 
and Quito. This section examines some of the policies and programs developed 
within the formal sector, specifically those facilitating low-income homeownership in 
condominium. 
The foundation on which housing policy is developed, either in the formal or informal 
sectors, is institutional: the constitutional housing rights and the human rights 
declaration regarding living standards, which includes the right to adequate housing 
(art. 25, Human Rights Declaration). This section is subdivided into two parts. The first 
reviews the constitutional housing rights of both Colombia and Ecuador. The second 
subsection offers a historical overview of the policies that facilitated low-income 
homeownership. The goal is to revisit the institutions and governance of policy and 
programs encouraging low-income homeownership to see how these have changed 
through the years, considering the role of government and the participation of the 
private sector. 
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§  4.2.1 Constitutional housing rights 
The existence of the right to housing within the national constitutions of Colombia 
(1991) and Ecuador (2008) has its origins in the Human Rights Declaration of 1948. 
Both countries have signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which is the international treaty adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1966. The Colombian State signed and ratified the treaty under law 74 of 
1968 (Florian, 2012). Ecuador signed and ratified the treaty in January of 1969 (Garcia, 
2014). 
The right to housing in the Human Rights Declaration is mentioned in art. 25, which 
stipulates that everyone has “the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services …”. This article names housing among the 
central and basic conditions that humans need to live, along with food, clothing, and 
health. Later, the United Nations’ definition of adequate housing was clarified, focusing 
on seven factors that together comprise the standard of living in adequate housing. 
An adequate home has the following elements: (1) security of tenure; (2) availability 
of services, materials, and infrastructure; (3) affordability; (4) habitability; (5) 
accessibility; (6) location; and (7) cultural adequacy (UN-HABITAT, 2014). Both renting 
and owner-occupation should occur in adequate homes. If a country wants to fully 
satisfy the right to housing for its population, it has to start out on a complex process 
and realize that a long road lies ahead. That ambition can be achieved gradually, 
considering that the process involves adopting a series of laws and programs regarding 
different aspects of housing (Florian, 2012). To ensure this right, governments have 
recourse to various instruments, such as planning and land use laws, property and 
rental laws, and even construction regulation, to mention just a few. 
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In view of what the housing right might involve, both Colombia and Ecuador have 
included the right to housing in their constitutions. Colombia’s housing right is 
enshrined in the Constitution of 1991, Article 51: 
Article 51. Every Colombian has the right to a decent housing. The State will 
arrange the necessary conditions to effectuate this right effective and will promote 
social interest housing plans, adequate long-term financing and associative forms 
to execute these housing programs." 
(original language:) 
Artículo 51. Todos los colombianos tienen derecho a una vivienda digna. El Estado 
fijará las condiciones necesarias para hacer efectivo este derecho y promoverá 
planes de vivienda de interés social, sistemas adecuados de financiación a largo 
plazo y formas asociativas de ejecución de estos programas de vivienda. 
As this right is enshrined in the constitution, it is understandable that the national 
government would promote public policy under three main housing strategies: a) mass 
housing provision; b) adequate long-term financing systems; and c) different forms of 
association to manage the development and financing programs (Florian, 2012:109). 
Florian also pointed out that since the adoption of the right to decent housing was 
included in the Constitution of 1991, no efforts have been made to define what decent 
housing means for public policy in Colombia. Florian suggested following the guidance 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights regarding what 
it means to ensure adequate living standards. The seven elements mentioned above 
serve in the end as parameters to measure the adequacy of someone’s home (Florian, 
2012, p.110). 
It is helpful to use the seven parameters as indicators of whether housing is adequate, 
and in that vein Florian identified a group of collective conditions external to the 
housing unit: infrastructure, public services, location, transportation connectivity, 
education, and health-related services (Florian, 2012). Another group of parameters 
refers to those qualities of the house existing inside the space occupied by each family. 
Government involvement as well as housing policies and programs generally concern 
the first group of rights, since they are considered a priority; collective conditions are 
not only more expensive but also require the coordination of city planning regulations 
and management.  
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As will be shown in the next sections, housing subsidy policy in Colombia is focused on 
two aspects of art. 51. First, it promotes the provision of affordable dwellings; second, 
it facilitates a financial market that would create opportunities to buy mass-produced 
dwellings. Both the provision and the financing mechanisms steer the institutions and 
actors towards housing units that will be sold in the market. Although the Constitution 
does not explicitly grant people the right to a house in ownership, both the policy and 
programs are geared towards this end. In a sense, talking about housing rights is like 
talking about merchandise that can either be bought or not. According to the United 
Nations Declaration, a housing right is more complex than an individual right to a 
private good. 
In comparison, the Ecuadorian Constitution (2008) defines the housing right 
more extensively. It includes a right to ‘habitat and housing’ in articles 30 and 31. 
Then articles 375 to 376 explain the responsibilities and competencies that local 
governments must have to ensure the right to habitat and housing. 
Article 30. Everyone, independently of their economic or social situation, has a 
right to a safe and healthy habitat and adequate and decent housing. 
Article 31. Everyone has the right to enjoy the city and its public spaces under 
the principles of sustainability, social justice, respect for different cultures, and 
a balance between the urban and the rural. The right to the city is based on the 
democratic management of it, on the social and environmental function of 
property and of the city, in full exercise of citizenship.
(original language:)
Artículo 30. Las personas tienen derecho a un hábitat seguro y saludable, y a una 
vivienda adecuada y digna, con independencia de su situación social y económica. 
Artículo 31. Las personas tienen derecho al disfrute pleno de la ciudad y de sus 
espacios públicos, bajo los principios de sustentabilidad, justicia social, respeto 
a las diferentes culturas urbanas y equilibrio entre lo urbano y lo rural. El ejercicio 
del derecho a la ciudad se basa en la gestión democrática de ésta, en la función 
social y ambiental de la propiedad y de la ciudad, y en el ejercicio pleno de la 
ciudadanía.
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Unlike the wording of the constitutional housing right in Colombia, the Ecuadorian 
Constitution first presents the main principles and then rights are elaborated. Later, 
art. 375 to 376 within the Good Living17 regime of the Constitution expand on the 
ways in which the national state is bound to guarantee people’s right to habitat and 
housing. The first obligation is to generate the necessary information for the design 
of strategies and programs. The second is to maintain a modern and geo-referenced 
cadaster of habitat and housing. Third, the state should implement and evaluate policy, 
plans, and habitat programs for universal access to housing. Fourth, the state will 
improve precarious housing conditions by creating shelters and public spaces and by 
promoting renting. Fifth, the government will develop plans for social interest housing 
and related financing programs through public banks and other financial institutions, 
mainly serving low-income people and female heads of household. Sixth, the state will 
guarantee the provision of public services to schools and public hospitals. Seventh, it 
will ensure that everyone has the right to rental contracts at a fair price and without 
abuses. Lastly, the eighth obligation is to guarantee public access to seashores and river 
basins; furthermore, the state will be responsible for the planning, regulation, control, 
financing, and development of policies for habitat and housing. To effectuate this right, 
art. 376 allows municipalities to expropriate, reserve, and control land for the future. 
In summary, the Constitution of Ecuador asserts the right to housing in conjunction 
with the rights to habitat, which includes those collective rights that Florian explained 
with respect to the Colombian law. However, a special feature of the Ecuador’s 
constitutional housing right is the clear separation of rights from the rules on how to 
put these rights into practice. In this section, it has been shown that the state plays a 
particularly prominent role in the coordination of the efforts of municipalities. Another 
aspect of how these rights are implemented is revealed by looking into the types of 
tenure, both renting and owning. 
Housing rights can be understood as complex, not limited to the right to 
homeownership or a dwelling in private property (Florian, 2003:6). This 
conceptualization of the right to housing has steered all of society’s and government’s 
efforts to address housing problems towards producing new homeowners (Florian, 
2003:7). While there are many ways to solve housing problems, homeownership is 
often treated as a self-evident solution in policies framed under the constitutional 
housing rights as it will be seen in the policy sections of this chapter. 
17 Good Living, or Buen Vivir in Spanish, is a concept that was introduced in the Constitution of 2008.
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§  4.2.2 The changing role of government in housing policy
Within the formal provision of housing, national governments have intervened in 
different ways over the decades. This section gives an overview of the programs 
that illustrate the changing role of government in order to provide some context for 
understanding current subsidy policy. As this section demonstrates, even though the 
strategies have changed, the focus on policies for owner-occupation remains central. 
This path dependence in homeownership is evident in the housing data presented in 
the following sections. 
Colombia created the Institute of Territorial Credit (ICT) in 1939. Decades later, 
Ecuador created the Ecuadorian Housing Bank (BEV) together with National Housing 
Board (JNV) in the 1960s. National governments in Colombia and Ecuador created 
these housing institutions with the role of affordable housing providers for low- and 
middle-income families during periods of rapid urbanization and population growth. 
These institutions, that were both financers and builders, also built public services and 
streets of housing developments and financed the mortgages for families buying social 
interest housing (Held, 2000). Many of the housing complexes dating from this phase 
of housing policy were built in mid-rise apartments in the style of European modern 
architecture (Ballen, 2009). 
By the 1990s, the production of housing by the national governments was not 
sufficient to meet the housing need in the capital cities of Bogota and Quito (Lizarralde, 
2015; Molsalve, 2003). The evidence of a shortfall is clear from the rapid expansion 
during this period of informal settlements in both cities (Gilbert & Ward, 1982). 
Moreover, it became obvious that public housing was not built for the poorest; the 
programs excluded people with informal jobs and those who cannot apply for a 
mortgage (Maldonado, 2005). Therefore, by the beginning of the 1980s, housing 
policy implementation took a different approach, turning away from the state-led 
mass-provision of finished dwellings for owner-occupation. 
Research into informal activity helped to clarify that squatter settlements were not 
exactly a housing problem; rather, these were better seen as a housing solution 
provided by and for the urban poor (Bromley, 2003; Mangin, 1967; Rojas, 2010). 
Learning from informal and, more specifically, incremental ways to build a house, 
international agencies began to fund different housing programs with an emphasis on 
serviced land. The main thrust of this policy phase was to provide small plots of land 
with public services and finished streets. On these lots, families were able to build their 
houses with professional assistance, through community work, or by themselves. In 
practice these sites-and-services policies did not last long, since cheap land and urban 
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expansion became of overriding importance (Zanetta, 2001). Since sites-and-services 
housing policy did not produced the expected outcomes, different Latin American 
countries embarked on developing a new approach. 
At the end of the 1980s in Colombia and the beginning of the 1990s in Ecuador, 
public policy implementation and public services provision underwent change. This 
is the phase during which privatization of public services took place. In the process, 
development was reoriented towards a neoliberal agenda in which the role of nation 
states in public policy started to shrink (Rolnik, 2013). Decentralization of policy 
implementation along with the modernization processes taking hold during the 1990s 
changed the way government implemented housing programs. Its role shifted away 
from direct involvement in provision towards subsidization alone (Klaufus, 2010). 
For example, the role and functions of the ICT in Colombia were absorbed into a new 
institution, the National Institute for Social Interest Housing and Urban Reform (called 
INURBE). In 1991 the law created both INURBE and the system of incentives enabling 
the affordable housing market. Later, INURBE was closed but the system of family 
subsidies remained in Colombia. 
Something similar occurred in Ecuador in the 1990s. The Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing was created to manage the first international loan given 
by the Inter-American Development Bank with the intention to launch the subsidy 
program or housing certificate (bono de vivienda) for low-income homeownership 
(Klaufus, 2010). When the subsidy policy was launched, the Ecuadorian Housing Bank 
(BEV) stopped building housing units (Personal interview with former President of 
Ecuador, Sixto Duran Ballen, 2011). 
The main idea behind the incentive-based housing program is to create a system 
to provide affordable housing for low-income families. This system is built upon a 
network of both public and private actors, who create a market of low-cost housing 
for low-income owner-occupation. To steer the actors in this system, the government 
planned a subsidy policy, actually an incentive or down-payment assistance, to help 
families become eligible for loans in the financial market (Ferguson et al., 1996). This 
incentive attracts housing developers into the affordable housing market because the 
subsidy secures an effective demand or prospective buyers (Ferguson & Navarrete, 
2003). 
The structure of this last phase of housing policy is similar in many Latin American 
countries (Gilbert, 2004, 2012b; Rojas, 2001). The next section examines the subsidy 
strategy in more detail. 
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§  4.2.3 The Latin American subsidy policy for low-income homeownership
This section describes the basic structure of the program and its main objectives. The 
specific details will be explained in the section devoted to each country. In principle, 
households have to meet requirements under the following headings: a) subsidy, b) 
savings, and c) mortgage. 
Regarding the requirements under heading a), to be eligible for a subsidy a household 
first needs to prove vulnerable conditions or poverty levels; second, the household 
cannot have any other property in ownership. Income eligibility thresholds are set 
according to each country’s economic conditions and monthly basic salary standards. 
The subsidy, which is given directly to the builder of the project, is granted to 
households that have already chosen a project in which they are interested.
To complete the application process, households need to have some savings in a 
bank account. In Colombia this particular part is arranged jointly with the private 
organizations that manage social security funds. The amount of savings, together with 
the subsidy, would make a household eligible for a small mortgage with any private 
bank that is part of the incentive system for housing. 
Table 4.1 below summarizes the different actors involved in the system and their roles. 
In subsequent sections, this table will be adapted to the specific situation of each 
country and city. In the end, the role of the municipalities is critical; it is the land policy 
that makes it possible to provide more affordable land for builders of low-cost housing. 
ORGANIZATION INSTITUTIONS: REGULATION 
Housing Ministry Subsidy allocation and affordable housing provision 
Municipality Land policy instruments for affordable housing provision 
Lending sector Affordable financing for low-income families
Builder’s financing mechanisms
TABLE 4.1 System of housing incentives for low-income homeownership
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§  4.3 Housing market in Bogota, Colombia 
Bogota, known as the Capital District of Colombia, is the biggest and most populous 
city in the country with 7,785,965 inhabitants (Dane, 2014). In 1964 the population 
was 1,697,311 and it grew rapidly to 3,982,941 in 1985. The annual growth rate in the 
1960s was 7.83% but has since slowed down to 1.85%, calculated in 2010. 
The territorial and political organization of Colombia, based on the 1991 Constitution, 
positions the Capital District at a similar administrative level as one of the departments 
of Colombia, which are like provinces in other countries like in Ecuador. As a Capital 
District, it has a two-tiered system of government: first the city level with a city 
council; second the 20 ‘localities’, each with an appointed mayor and an elected 
council from the corresponding territory (Ardilla-Gomez, 1997). Since 1983, the city 
charges public service fees according to division of the territory into six socioeconomic 
levels. The city is stratified by the quality of the housing stock as it is organized by 
homogeneous characteristics, following physical and habitat features (Alzate, 2006). 
The stratification goes from stratum 1, which means poor housing quality and 
socioeconomic levels, to stratum six in wealthier zones (Alzate, 2006). During phases 
of exploratory research, it was confirmed that stratum 1 consists mostly of barrios 
that grew more informally, and social interest housing is generally built in locations 
qualified as strata 2 and 3. 
The Capital District has a total of 2,421,945 households (DANE_ECV, 2014). 
Household composition breaks down as follows: 12% one-person households, 20% 
two-person, 26% three-person, 26% four-person, and 16% households with more 
than five people. Ideally the housing stock of the city should adjust itself to that 
composition to avoid overcrowding. In general numbers, comparing the total number 
of households with the total number of housing units as of 2014 (2,391,709) yields a 
quantitative housing deficit of 30,236 units. 
Data from 2014 shows that 9.1% (220,801) of the households have some housing 
deficit, either quantitative or qualitative. Out of all households coping with a housing 
deficit, 60.4% have some sort of qualitative deficit; for instance, they may need 
improvements in the house structure, within the infrastructure, or public services. 
Households with a quantitative deficit are those that need a separate dwelling; this 
group represents 39.6% of those identified with a deficit (Habitat Bogota, 2014). 
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§  4.3.1 Owner- and renter-occupied stock
As the population grows, owner-occupation is reduced while renting becomes more 
common. Figure 4.1 shows that in the 1960s more than 60% of households were 
owner-occupiers and about 25% were renters. Even though homeownership is the 
focus of the housing policies implemented in both formal and informal housing 
markets, renting is clearly on the rise in Bogota. Currently, the number of households 
renting matches the number occupying their dwellings as owners. Of the 1,088,102 
households that owned the dwelling they occupy, 82% owned it outright while 18% of 
them were still paying a mortgage (DANE, ECV 2014). 
The forms of occupancy classified as ‘other’ refer to dwellings that are occupied as part 
of a service performed, such as domestic work or in exchange for some kind of labor. 
The category also includes occupancy as usufruct, such as an apartment given to one 
member of family but not in exchange for rent. These particular forms of occupancy 
decreased considerably from the 1960s until 2005. However, statistics show an 
increase to 14% in 2007 and then a reduction to less than 10% in 2014. 
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FIGURE 4.1 Bogota: percentage of occupied housing units by tenure 1964-2014 (sources: Data from Census 
by DANE (Censo de poblacion y vivienda); data for 2007 estimated by CENAC; data for 2014 by ECV Survey 
(Colombia)).
Other = other forms of tenure are ‘service’ or ‘usufructo’.
Elaborated by the author.
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§  4.3.2 Housing by type
Figure 4.2 arranges the total number of occupied dwellings by typology. Units are 
classified as single-family (attached or detached), apartments or flats, single rooms, or 
‘other’, such as convents or jails. Looking at the statistics since the 1970s, it appears 
that the trend of densification in Bogota was followed by changes in the housing stock. 
Bogota has changed; from a city of low-density, single-family houses in the 1970s 
it has turned into a city of high-density apartment dwellings, markedly from 2005 
onward. The lines indicating the different types in the graph below intersect in about 
the year 2000, and from then provision changes the direction towards more production 
of apartments and less single family dwellings. Currently, the housing stock consists of 
more than 50% apartments and 40% single-family dwellings, with the rest being other 
types of housing. 
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FIGURE 4.2 Bogota: percentage of housing units by type 1973-2005 (source: Census, DANE)
Other = cuartos, inquilinato, desechos, rancho, carpa, en construcción, colectivas.
Elaborated by the author. .
§  4.3.3 Condominium housing stock in Bogota
As explained in chapter 3, one limitation of a census and surveys of quality of life is 
that these register the type of tenure, not its form. The problem is that a typology does 
not provide information about the form of tenure of the unit. Both renting and owning, 
and both single-family houses and apartments, can fall under the condominium 
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regime. Therefore, cadaster data was gathered and analyzed to compile the statistics 
represented in Figure 4.3. That graph visualizes how relevant the understanding of 
condominium institutions and governance problems is to managing the housing 
stock of a city. The share of housing units in condominium is as high as 60% of the 
housing stock, which means that there are about 1,358,025 units in condominium in 
Bogota (Cadastre, 2016). It was not possible to determine the number of complexes in 
condominium on the basis of the current data available from the census and housing 
surveys. Looking at Figure 4.4, however, one observes a consistent growth of housing 
in condominium tenure through the decades since the adoption of the horizontal 
property law in Colombia in 1948. 
Bogota is stratified by income and the quality of the housing stock, which allows the 
cadaster to provide information about condominium housing by economic strata. 
The most updated information from 2015 provided by the Cadaster of Bogota for 
this research shows that 0.08% of the units in stratum 1 are in condominium (1138 
units), while 16.80% are in stratum 2 (228,241 units). The biggest share of housing 
in condominium is in stratum 3 with 31.95% (434,026 units) and stratum 4 with 
30.20% (410,313 units). Housing in horizontal property of strata 5 and 6 together 
represents 21% of the housing stock. This information confirms that condominium 
tenure in Bogota is not particularly intended for higher-income occupants. In 
summary, the city has a total of 663,405 units in condominium from strata 1 to 3, 
corresponding to low- and middle-income groups. 
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FIGURE 4.3 Bogota’s housing stock: percentage of housing units under condominium regime 1964-2005 
(sources: Census Data (Dane) and Cadastre Bogota, July 2011) 
Horizontal Property or condominium property. Elaborated by the author. 
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§  4.3.4 Subsidy policy in Bogota, Colombia
The national subsidy policy created in 1991 in Colombia provides one-time assistance 
for households to purchase a house or an apartment that has been identified as social 
interest housing (VIS). Even though the subsidy system has undergone some minor 
changes through the decades, the system and the actors involved remain similar. There 
are four organizations through which households apply for and receive subsidies in 
Colombia. All are related to the welfare institutions that manage savings or pension 
funds, and also some of the subsidies are channeled through the public agrarian bank 
when the recipient is a family living in a rural area. These four organizations are: (1) 
the National Savings Fund (FNA); (2) the Family Welfare Agency, which is made up of 
private agencies (Cajas de Compensación Familia, CCF) that manage pension funds of 
workers in the formal economy; (3) the Military Housing Promotion Agency; and (4) the 
Public Agricultural Bank (Arbelaez, Camacho & Fajardo, 2011).
INCOME RANGE 
(SMLVM*) 
INCOME CEILING SMLVM 
-2016 = 644,360
COLOMBIAN PESOS
SUBSIDISED 
SMLVM UNITS
IN COLOMBIAN PESOS IN US 
DOLLARS (2016)
>0 - 1.00 644 350 22 14 175 700 4 976
>1.00 – 1.50 966 525 21.5 13 853 525 4 863
>1.50 - 2.00 1 288 700 21 13 531 350 4 750
>2.00 - 2.25 1449 788 19 12 242 650 4 297
>2.25 - 2.50 1 610 875 17 10 953 950 3 845
>2.50 - 2.75 1 771 963 15 9 665 250 3 393
>2.75 - 3.00 1 933 050 13 8 376 550 2 940
>3.00 - 3.50 2 255 225 9 5 799 150 2 036
>3.50 – 4.00 2 577 400 4 2 577 400 905
TABLE 4.2 Subsidy levels by income range in Colombia (elaborated by the author, based on information available at the Welfare 
Family Agencies, website.)
SMLVM = four basic monthly salaries COP 644,360 (Colombian pesos) in 2015 
From 1991 until 2009, the FNA and CCF allocated 72% of the subsidies. The rest were 
allocated by the Military Housing Promotion Agency and the Public Agricultural Bank 
(Arbelaez et al., 2011). The Family Welfare Agency, comprised of numerous Cajas de 
Compresación Familiar (CCF), was created in 1954. Today Colombia has a total of 53 
CCF agencies around the country, and workers are free to choose the one through which 
they want to be registered. By definition they are “juridical persons of private rights, 
without profit purpose, organized as corporations, that conform to welfare functions, 
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which are controlled by and under supervision of the State” (Art. 39 Law 21, 1982 in 
Colombia, 2004: 2). Law 21 of 1982 requires every employer in Colombia to give four 
percent of the total payroll to the CCFs. These funds are distributed among different 
channels of welfare assistance, such as housing subsidies, health, education, and 
unemployment. 
Only families that earn less than four basic monthly salaries (SMLMV) are eligible 
for the housing subsidy (see Table 4.2). The subsidy can be granted to (1) purchase 
a new home, (2) build on a plot of land, or (3) refurbish a dwelling. The amount of 
subsidy depends on the income of the family that applies for it. Moreover, the award 
is progressive, which means that lower-income families receive higher amounts of 
subsidy than families earning almost four SMLMV. The following table specifies the 
relationship between income and subsidy and the total amount a family can receive.
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FIGURE 4.4 Allocated subsidies in Colombia 1991-2009 (source: Ministry of Environment, Housing and 
Regional Development (in: Arbelaez et al., 2011))
Figure 4.4 shows how the total amount dedicated to the subsidy has changed over 
the years. In 1991, the government invested over 500 million in Colombia pesos but 
was only able to allocate slightly more than twenty thousand subsidies. To ensure that 
there are houses on the market for people to buy, housing provision needs to go hand 
in hand with the subsidy allocation system. By 2009, the subsidy allocation improved, 
dedicating more than 800 million Colombian pesos and allocating 160 thousand 
subsidies. City-level land policy and regulation are also related to the increase in 
housing provision. In summary, the policy regulates the system and how it works for 
TOC
 126 Affordable Condominium Housing
households. The total amount of funding allocated for the subsidy is based on housing 
deficit calculations, and the funds are distributed around the country. However, since 
Bogota is the biggest city in Colombia and has the highest housing deficit indicators, it 
is generally the territory that receives and allocates most of the subsidies (CAMACOL, 
2012).
§  4.4 Housing market in Quito, Ecuador 
Quito, the capital of Ecuador, has 2,239,191 inhabitants (Census, 2010). In 1993, 
during the decentralization and modernization process, Quito became a metropolitan 
district in order carry out elements of public policy and policy implementation. 
One of its new competencies was the promotion of housing policies and programs. 
As a metropolitan district, Quito has a city council, directed by an elected mayor. 
The territory is divided into eight administrative zones, each managed by a person 
appointed by the mayor and the city council. 
The population of the city is divided into a total of 640,753 households with an average 
size of three to four persons (INEC, 2010). To avoid overcrowding, the housing stock 
would ideally be adjusted to the current composition of households. Comparing the 
number of households with the total stock of 764,167 units, it appears that the city 
had no quantitative deficit in 2010. However, of that total, 634,611 housing units are 
actually occupied; 47,053 households are absent and 59,944 units are unoccupied. 
Additionally, 22,111 housing units were under construction in 2010. 
Housing quality is measured in the census survey by observing the conditions of 
building materials of roofs, floors, and walls. The survey then includes qualitative 
measures to indicate whether the materials are in good, regular, or bad condition. 
In addition to these physical parts of the dwelling, another indicator of quality is the 
presence of both a tap for drinking water and a toilet inside the dwelling. In terms 
of these indicators, 71% of dwellings in the urban part of Quito have a roof of good 
quality, 25% have one of regular quality, and 4% have a bad roof. The same proportions 
apply to the quality of walls and floors. To summarize, about 25% of the housing 
stock has qualitative deficits that can be repaired or maintained, and about 4% of the 
housing stock needs to be replaced. 
Out of a total of 466,960 housing units in urban Quito, leaving those in the rural parts 
of the metropolitan area out, about 20,000 units need repair on their roofs, walls, 
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and floors. Again, this information pertains to the individual unit, but for an analysis 
of condominium it is also necessary to know the state of the common property parts, 
which is generally not assessed in current housing surveys. 
§  4.4.1 Renters and owner-occupied stock 
Tenure data on the period 1961 to 2010 from Quito demonstrates that while rental 
occupancy has decreased, the number of homeowner-occupied units has increased 
(see Figure 4.5). In 1961, 35% of all households owned the units they occupied, 
while 50% of the population were renters. The 1960s marked the starting point of the 
housing policy of mass provision of housing for homeowners. The city was growing and 
people were moving into the capital. During this decade, the growth of homeownership 
was constant, reaching 50% by 2010. 
The household-level information reveals that, out of the 468,702 households in 
urban Quito, 148,089 own their dwelling outright while 35,123 are still paying on the 
mortgage. Another 38,758 own their dwelling because it was inherited or a gift. There 
are 202,417 households that rent, 3,521 that live in the place they occupy in exchange 
for service, and 1,248 that rent under the antichresis model, a form of lease (INEC, 
2016). 
Owners
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FIGURE 4.5 Quito: percentage of occupied housing units by tenure 1962-2010 (sources: INEC varios years) 
Other = other forms of tenure are ‘service’ or ‘usufructo’.
Elaborated by the author. 
In Figure 4.5, the forms of occupancy classified as ‘other’ refer to dwellings that are 
occupied as part of a service performed, such as domestic work or in exchange for some 
kind of labor. That category also includes occupancy as usufruct, such as an apartment 
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given to one member of the family but not in exchange for rent. The incidence of such 
‘other’ forms of occupancy has remained relatively constant over the past the decades, 
affecting around 10% of the population.  
§  4.4.2 Housing by type in Quito
Figure 4.6 shows the total number of occupied dwellings by typology. Units can be 
single-family (attached or detached), apartments or flats, single rooms, or ‘other’, such 
as convents or jails. An overview of the statistics since the 1960s shows a sharp drop 
in Quito’s single-family housing market in the 1970s, when oil production started in 
Ecuador and boosted the economy. During the 1970s, cities grew rapidly as centers 
of new employment. Urban growth was particularly strong in Quito, where apartment 
living was more culturally acceptable than in other cities of Ecuador; both private and 
public developers built mid-rise apartments in different parts of the city. Figure 4.6 
shows the trend in apartment development. Starting from zero in the 1960s, when the 
horizontal property law was first promulgated, it rose to 20% in only a decade in the 
1970s, and then continued to grow, supplying more than 30% of the market by 2010. 
1962 1974 1982 1990 2001 2010
Single-family Apartments Other
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0%
FIGURE 4.6 Quito: percentange of housing units by type (1962-2010)(source: Data from Census INEC (Censo de 
poblacion y vivienda). Elaborated by the author.
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After the drop in single-family development in the 1970s, the trend of single-family 
housing was revived. Quito expanded its territory in all directions, even into the valleys 
of Los Chillos and Tumbaco, which are 400 meters below the main plateau of the city. 
Single-family houses are the preferred typology in the housing market, and housing 
developers have responded to this demand. Today more than 50% of the housing 
market consists of single-family dwellings, either attached or detached. 
As explained earlier, condominium housing is not related to housing typology. Both 
apartments and single-family housing can be developed under the condominium 
form of tenure. However, neither the census nor the housing data provide information 
at this level. Therefore data had to be obtained from the cadaster department of the 
municipality in order to investigate the condominium market in Quito. 
§  4.4.3 Condominium housing stock in Quito 
The data presented in this section was obtained from the cadaster in 2011. As 
explained in chapter 3, there are some limitations to the census data, so other 
databases had to be accessed. Considering that the housing market in a Latin American 
city operates both formally and informally, the cadaster data relates to the formal 
market. As shown in Figure 4.7, out of all registered units with residential use in the 
cadaster, 45% are under the condominium regime. Comparing this number to the total 
number of housing units in the city, 21% of the housing stock in Quito is under the 
condominium regime. 
With this data it is possible to demonstrate that the condominium regime is a housing 
sector that goes unreported in the census and housing data. This omission is harmful 
when measuring housing quality regarding the elements of the property. Census and 
housing data only refers to individual units. However, when housing is collective it is 
also necessary to measure the common elements, such as the common patio, internal 
walkways, pipes, and other structural elements of the building or housing complex. 
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FIGURE 4.7 Quito's housing stock: percentage of housing units in condominium regime 1962-2010
Sources: Census Data (INEC) and Cadastre Information, Informatics’ Department June, 2011.
Note: Total number of housing units from Census data includes data from all the metropolitan areas (DMQ). 
Cadastre information includes as housing units: ‘Casas/lote’ and ‘Departamentos’. Years correspond to 
cadastral date. 5.6% of missing year values. Computed on SPSS 14. 
Elaborated by the author.
§  4.4.4 Subsidy policy in Quito, Ecuador 
The national subsidy policy that was created in 1998 is a one-time assistance for 
households to purchase a house or an apartment identified as social interest housing 
(VIS). The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MIDUVI), which was 
established in 1992, incorporated the voucher system into the subsidy housing policy 
not only to help people buy new affordable dwellings but also to offer a subsidy for 
housing improvement or refurbishment (Acosta, 2009). The total amount dedicated 
to the national subsidy policy varies according to the political administration in charge. 
For example, in 1998 a total of 23,833 subsidies were given to families for new 
dwellings and 24,054 for housing improvement. During the next presidency starting 
in 2003, only 10,623 subsidies were granted for new housing while 15,702 were 
granted for housing improvement (Acosta, 2009:100). This illustrates that changes in 
housing subsidy policy are recurrent, so shifts are inherent in the not-so-stable system 
of subsidy allocation.
A considerable amount of change has occurred since 2007 under the new socialist 
government and in a more politically stable Ecuador. After 2001, the currency was 
dollarized; Ecuador started using the American dollar as its official currency. By 
stabilizing inflation, the dollarization process has increased the amounts budgeted 
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for housing policy as well as other welfare policies established in the new Constitution 
of 2008. In addition to the political context, oil prices rose internationally to over 100 
dollars per barrel. The effect on the local economy made a high amount of liquidity 
available to a government for social policies. However, after almost five years of 
bonanza, oil prices dropped drastically in 2014, starting an economic crisis. Currently, 
many of the social policies implemented in Ecuador under this government have 
therefore been left without liquidity.
The economic situation has affected not only housing programs but other sectors of 
the economy as well; nonetheless, the changes in housing policy are important for the 
economy at large. The subsidy ceilings were raised in order to keep up with the new 
construction prices and housing needs. After 2007, the subsidy for new dwellings was 
increased from 4,000 dollars to almost 6,000 dollars for urban dwellings and similar 
increases were made in subsidies for housing built for households living in rural areas. 
Additionally, families could apply for generous relocation subsidies if they lived in areas 
susceptible to natural hazards, and a subsidy was offered for people with disabilities. 
Finally, a new subsidy was put in place to facilitate the land titling programs for families 
living in squatter settlements (Acosta, 2009). 
In the course of a research project like this one, the data keeps changing due to 
different political decisions; the amounts given in Table 4.3 changed at least twice 
in the last four years. The data presented there refers to the policy of 2013, when the 
basic income salary (SBU) was 318 dollars. In 2016 the SBU was 366 dollars. The 
subsidy for apartments and for single-family housing is intended for households that 
earn up to 2.9 times the SBU, which put the income ceiling at about 922 dollars in 
2013 and at 1061.4 dollars in 2016. 
TYPE OF SUBSIDY ELEGIBLE FAMILY 
INCOME
VALUE OF HOUSING 
UNIT (IN US DOLLARS)
OBLIGATORY 
SAVING 
(IN US DOLLARS)
SUBSIDY LEVEL 
(IN US DOLLARS)
Subsidy for new housing 
(appartments)
Unitl 2.9 SBU 15,000 434 6000
20,000 723 5000
25,000 1978 3500
30,000 2529 2500
Subsidy to buy 
single-family house
Unitl 2.9 SBU 15,000 706 5000
20,000 1129 4000
25,000 2472 3000
30,000 3146 2000
TABLE 4.3 Subsidy policy for new dwellings in Ecuador (source: http://www.habitatyvivienda.gob.ec/) 
*SBU - Salario Básico Unificado. In 2015 it was $354
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In Ecuador, the subsidy policy is expressed in the formula SAVINGS + SUBSIDY + 
CREDIT, which in Spanish is Ahorro, Bono y Credito, abbreviated as ABC. Households 
have access to the credit through banks or financial institutions that are registered with 
the National Corporation for Popular and Solidarity Finances. This corporation acts 
as a mortgage security guarantee system along with the private institutions that are 
registered. The savings account the households need to open is also connected to the 
National Corporation for Popular and Solidarity Finances. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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FIGURE 4.8 Subsidy allocation for new dwellings from its start in 1999 until 2012 in Ecuador (source: Housing 
Ministry (MIDUVI, 2012), provided for this research. Elaborated by the author) 
Figure 4.8 shows both the total amount of money invested in new urban dwellings and 
the total amount of subsidy that was actually given to families at the national level. 
Using information from 2012, as provided by the Ministry of Urban Development and 
Housing for this research project, it appears that the investment was high after 2006 
but the subsidy allocation was low. There were some problems in housing provision by 
the private sector, as also happened when the government was building by itself. 
§  4.5 Comparative perspective 
Both countries have had housing policy and programs managing the provision of 
housing for owner-occupation since the mid-twentieth century, and in Colombia these 
existed even earlier than in Ecuador. The constitutions of both countries recognize 
the right to housing, and therefore policies in both countries are aimed at reducing 
housing deficits through the provision of new dwellings. It is interesting to trace the 
path dependence of policy promoting owner-occupation, as it elucidates the way 
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both markets and policy adapt to the homeownership goal. Even though the role of 
government in housing provision has changed, the focus of policy on homeownership 
remains the same. 
It was decided to base this analysis on the kind of information that is available in 
both Bogota and Quito so that the results would be comparable. The purpose of the 
market analysis was not to examine affordability or quantitative deficit but rather 
to characterize the condominium housing market in these two capital cities. Since 
affordable condominiums, both as single-family housing and as apartments, are 
subsidized by the government, the analysis could be based on the assumption 
that all the units developed in both Bogota and Quito are units that fall under the 
condominium regime. 
The limitations of the data hamper a full understanding of the conditions of 
condominium housing, as has been demonstrated in this chapter. However, some very 
important historical data has been presented here, and it is interesting to compare it. 
In Bogota, renting is the main housing tenure, although about half of the households 
own the place they occupy. In terms of typology, the construction of single-family 
housing development is surpassed by the supply of apartment housing. Likewise, 
the high proportion of apartment housing in the stock is correlated with the high 
percentage of condominiums in the city. In Quito, even though the renter-occupied 
housing stock is large, owner-occupation is strong. The stock of single-family housing 
is still a key sector in the housing market. However, even though single-family housing 
is primarily built as individual units, these are developed in condominium tenure in 
small housing complexes. 
The subsidy policy and the number of dwellings built under this program give some 
indication of how many of the units on the housing market are basically promoted with 
subsidies for homeownership. The statistics on subsidy for both countries show the 
total number of units as individual units, but they are not. A more accurate database 
of policy outcomes could provide the number of housing complexes or the number of 
condominiums developed in addition to the total number of individual units. As these 
affordable units will remain under condominium governance, these housing complexes 
are prone to deterioration if they fail to organize themselves. 
The section above that introduced the policies mentioned the different actors that 
form critical parts of the system. In Bogota, the role of the Welfare Family Agencies is 
pivotal within the subsidy allocation system and currently even in housing provision. 
These private institutions with a public purpose have direct relationships with future 
homeowners; they know their housing demands and can therefore organize housing 
provision more efficiently than in Quito. 
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In Ecuador, the subsidy allocation system is managed by the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing in a decentralized institution working with provincial offices. 
That ministry registers and certifies developers as affordable housing providers. Only 
those that are registered are able to build and sell affordable housing because they can 
count on receiving the subsidies upfront, which gives developers an incentive to build 
for the future homeowners that are subsidy holders. 
The above overview of the existing data (or the data that is lacking) provides a 
justification for the research approach and the comparative analysis that are presented 
in the next chapters. The discussion of the existing data also demonstrates that the 
condominium form of tenure is largely overlooked in current housing analysis and 
policy outcomes statistics. 
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5 The formal institution: The 
horizontal property law
§  5.1 Introduction
The amount of literature on institutional analysis is vast. But what an institution 
means is not always clear, which has led to some problems in the social sciences. 
Misunderstanding can arise from the language used in the discourse on institutional 
analysis. In this regard, Ostrom explains that “rules and norms are at the heart of many 
core theoretical questions having to do with how individuals coordinate activities with 
one another” (Ostrom, 2005:179). Rules help to coordinate activities, as the law of 
horizontal property aims to do, in addition to constituting property rights in a bundle 
for both individual and collective owners. Although laws are produced and interpreted 
in the social arena (Keog & D’Arcy, 1999 cited in Oxley, 2004), this chapter treats the 
law on horizontal property as a formal body of regulations that creates a rule-structured 
boundary around the different actors. Seen thus, the law is the main formal institution 
that organizes authorized actions in the provision of housing in condominium (Ostrom 
et al., 2006). 
Legal scholars have already explained how the condominium property system 
can operate using Ostrom’s design principles (Glasse & Berrisfor, 2015). Ostrom 
(1990) did not identify any specific rules or written laws underpinning successful 
management of a common property resource. However, she did find a set of design 
principles that are present in all of the cases that she studied. She compared these 
to cases that had failed, thereby confirming the validity and identifying the qualities 
of robust institutions in common property resource management (Ostrom, 2009b). 
These principles fall under the following headings: (1) clearly defined boundaries; 
(2) proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; (3) collective choice 
arrangements; (4) monitoring; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) conflict resolution 
mechanisms, (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize, and (8) nested enterprises 
(Ostrom, 1990:90). Many of these arrangements can be either laid down in law or 
agreed upon informally by the agents that manage the common resource. 
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Within the multilevel structure of the IAD framework (Ostrom et al., 2006), there 
are three levels of rules that a common property resource may have. These are the 
operational, collective-choice, and constitutional-choice rules. 
What the role of the law of horizontal property entails for governance and management 
of condominiums is central to this thesis. In line with this interest, the following 
questions will be answered in this chapter: 
 – Which parties are regulated by the horizontal property law?
 – How is the law structured? 
 – What are the similarities and differences between Colombia and Ecuador’s horizontal 
property laws? 
Section 5.2 gives an overview of the literature on condominiums. Some of that research 
looks into the historical grounds of this form of ownership. And some contemporary 
research has been done from a socio-legal angle showing the conflicts regarding rules 
and actors. The socio-legal perspective taken in this chapter is introduced in this 
section, along with the levels of rules identified by Ostrom. 
Section 5.3 responds to the first question by showing which parties are regulated by 
the law. This section identifies which agents of condominium institutions are involved 
in the rule-structured situation of low-income condominium housing development 
processes, emphasizing how the law regulates interactions among them (Ostrom, 
2005). 
Section 5.4 responds to the second question by explaining the structure of the 
horizontal property laws of Colombia and Ecuador. The socio-legal framework helps to 
deconstruct the structure of both laws, highlighting the different legal environments 
in which the laws operate. By understanding the structure of the laws, it is possible to 
assess which of Ostrom’s principles are embedded in the respective property laws. 
Section 5.5 concludes the chapter with an account of what is regulated in the 
condominium regime. The emphasis lies on governance and management of the 
maintenance of the common property resource. This section takes a comparative 
perspective and draws out the differences between the laws, which will set the stage for 
comparisons in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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§  5.2 Studies on condominium regulation
Condominium property law is known by different names, depending on the region 
where it is located. It is called strata title in countries with a common-law tradition 
such as Australia and Israel (Alterman, 2010). In countries with a civil law tradition, 
condominium law is called apartment law in the Netherlands (Weesep, van, 1984), 
while it is called condominium or horizontal property in Eastern Europe (Orban, 2006; 
Soaita, 2012) and Latin America. Condominium property is also found in Asia and 
Africa; depending on the country, there are mixtures of common-law and civil law 
provisions within the condominium rules (Chen, 2011; Hsieh, 2009; Merwe, van der, 
2015; Park & Baek, 2012). 
In China and Hong Kong, which have public ownership of land, multi-family regulations 
concern management strategies, not the common ownership of the land and the 
building (Yau & Ho, 2009; Yip, 2010). In the USA, individual states adopted enabling 
legislation, learning from practices in Latin America, more specifically from the law 
in Puerto Rico, after the Supreme Court allowed US financial institutions to issue 
mortgages on property in condominiums in the 1960s ( Rohan, 1978; Weesep, van, 
1987; Rosen & Walks, 2013). 
The Napoleonic Code of 1804 is important in countries where civil law pertains, or 
where the French and Spanish legal systems have had a strong influence, notably in 
Latin America. 
Article 664 of the Napoleonic Code is the direct reference for the separate ownership 
of floors and the regulation of maintenance and repairs of common property elements 
(Bennett, 2011; Merwe, van der, 2015): 
Art. 664. When the different stories of a house belong to different proprietors, 
if the titles to the property do not regulate the mode of reparations and 
reconstructions, they must be made in manner following:
The main walls and the roof are at the charge of all the proprietors, each in 
proportion to the value of the story belonging to him.
The proprietor of each story makes the floor belonging thereto.
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The proprietor of the first story erects the staircase which conducts to it; the 
proprietor of the second story carries the stairs from where the former ends to his 
apartments; and so of the rest.18 
France, where urban density is high, particularly in Paris, became the model for the 
transfer of property rights of vertical space and airspace. In the 1860s, French notaries 
developed “improved techniques for conveyancing, and these were codified into law” 
(Glasse & Berrisfor, 2015:216). This is how the ‘condominium model’ started to 
spread around the world. Even though there are some differences among countries, the 
basic rule stipulates the individual ownership of the apartment space and the common 
ownership of the rest, including land (Lujanen, 2010). 
The legal framework under which housing providers sell condominium housing has 
been studied by legal scholars in the United States since the first condominium act was 
passed in the 1960s. At first it was seen as something completely new but necessary 
to build the American metropolis, where apartment real estate and offices can be 
easily traded in the market (Cribbet, 1963). The transactional efficiency of units in 
condominiums was preferred to that of the cooperatives, as Hansmann (1991) noted 
when explaining the spread of condominium tenure in the United States. Mortgage 
financing in cooperatives is collective, whereas in condominiums financing applies to 
the individual unit (Hansmann, 1991). The condominium scheme was initially used 
for housing purposes but was later it extended to offices, time-shared vacation homes, 
and detached single-family dwellings in gated communities (Hansmann, 1991). 
Cribbet (1963) narrated the history of condominium living in other parts of the world19 
and mentioned that European countries already had some experience with shared 
ownership in the Middle Ages. In time, “splitting up of ownership of housing units 
became excessive, and since there were no clear rules as to repair and maintenance of 
the structure, disputes became common” (Cribbet, 1963:1210). Glasse and Berrisfor 
(2015) noted that solving this kind of maintenance disputes was the main goal of 
article 644 of the Napoleonic Code. 
18 http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/code/book2/c_title04.html#chapter3
19 Cribbet mentioned the examples of co-ownership (Geschosseigentum or Stockwerkseigentum) during the 
twelfth century in Germany, as well as similar ones from the late Middle Ages in France and Switzerland, includ-
ing reference to parts of the Napoleonic Code which over the years developed into the réglement de copropriété. 
For England he mentioned the Coke on Littleton policy as a way to enable ownership rights in a portion of a 
building. (pp.1212)
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Rohan examined the new legislative foundation for the condominium regime that 
was enabled by the federal government of the United States. He identified some 
imperfections in it, specifically regarding the “failure to clarify the unit owner’s posture 
(and that of his household) with respect to tort liability and insurance” (Rohan, 1967: 
305). Judging the condominium form of ownership as the future and best option for 
both multi-family and low-income homeownership schemes, Rohan raised many 
questions about overseeing liability problems in a co-ownership regime. For instance, 
he asked, “what is the nature and extent of the risk assumed as co-owner of the project 
and its facilities?” (Rohan, 1967: 305). 
He noted that condominium regulations are silent on liability issues. In practice this 
means that a co-owner cannot sue the negligent one when maintenance issues arise 
regarding shared elements in common property. Instead, the owners’ association 
or the maintenance person is liable. Noting that this silence in the law can lead to 
deterioration and violation of statutory duties, Rohan proposed some solutions in 
accordance with the legal culture and the status of the jurisprudence existing in the 
USA. Back in the 1960s he suggested the inclusion of rules in condominium laws to 
allow owners to sue negligent ones for maintenance issues. 
A recent edited book by Cornelius van der Merwe, European Condominium Law 
(2015), is an extensive compilation of the genesis of condominium laws in Europe, 
demonstrating the long history of this form of ownership regime. As explained there, 
the “condominium concept has three components: (a) individual ownership of an 
apartment; (b) co-ownership (joint ownership) of the land and the common parts 
of the building; and (c) membership of an incorporated or unincorporated owner’s 
association” (Merwe, van der, 2015:5). Accordingly, a condominium law is both a law 
of property and a law of association (Merwe, van der, 2015). 
The thesis of Annamaria Orban (2006) is one of the few that draw a connection 
between condominium property law and the privatization and maintenance of social 
housing in Hungary. The condominium was chosen as the form of property regime 
during the transition period in Hungary, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe (Orban, 2006; 
Soaita, 2012). She traced the evolution of condominium regulation in Hungary before 
analyzing how households interpret the law. She looked in detail at the changes made 
to the 1924 Condominium Act when it was revised in the Decree Law of Condominium 
in 1977. She then examined the adoption of the Condominium Act of 1997 when 
privatization started in the social housing of the socialist period (Orban, 2006). She 
emphasized how remarkable it was that the Act of 1997 provided an opportunity to 
improve condominium governance and management. However, she noted that it did 
not resolve many issues, such as differences in institutional powers between the chair 
or president of the owners’ association and the property manager. 
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She also mentioned that this process created a unique opportunity to call for 
the professionalization of the role of property manager. Moreover, the act did 
not incorporate the good qualities of the more flexible law of 1924, under which 
condominium associations could become legal entities, entailing unitary legal 
representation in cases when borrowing is necessary to finance improvements. A last 
point of criticism is that the opportunity was lost to allow old condominiums to be 
transformed into other forms of property, such as cooperatives. 
Owners are critical actors in condominium, but developers, property managers, 
and municipal authorities also play key roles within the condominium regime. 
Their involvement shows that multi-owned housing developments operate in a 
network of actors, at different phases, with certain legal frameworks that regulate the 
development process and others that regulate the housing complex (Blandy et al., 
2010). The book by Blandy et al. (2010) presents ample evidence that condominium 
development and governance often encounter problems. By including articles from the 
UK, the USA, Israel, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Australia, and New Zealand the book 
shows that conflicts of interest among actors is a recurrent problem. Various authors 
mentioned that while tenants are important actors, as occupants they have no formal 
rights of participation. 
Much of the legal literature on the condominium regime deals with juridical history, 
ending with the modern statutory body of law on mainly dualistic condominium 
regimes, wherein individual and collective rights coexist. Some research deals with 
common-law countries and therefore with a variety of condominium regulations, 
though these are similar from a socio-legal perspective to condominiums in countries 
that under civil law codes (Blandy et al., 2010). The socio-legal perspective is an 
approach that institutional analysts use to study how actors and institutions interact 
within the condominium regime (Ostrom et al., 2006). 
The IAD framework elucidates how rules affect the structure of an action-situation 
by clustering different types and levels of rules. “This is seen as a first step in a theory 
about how rules relate to the structure of action-situations, thereby affecting the way 
individuals behave and achieve outcomes” (Ostrom et al., 2006: 40). The types of rules 
shown in Table 5.2 exist within the levels that Ostrom identified, namely nested levels 
of operational rules, collective-choice rules, and constitutional rules (< 5.2). 
In institutional analysis rules are “prescriptions that define what actions (or outcomes) 
are required, prohibited, or permitted, and the sanctions authorized if the rules are 
not followed” (Ostrom et al., 2006: 38). In an action-situation, the actors may have 
prescribed positions and authorized actions they can take. There is a set of possible 
actions they can take or not; actors can follow the rule, not follow the rule, or change it. 
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From a socio-legal perspective, rules can be written to facilitate, regulate, or constitute 
different actions (Edelman & Suchman, 1997). Some of them can be changed in 
common property resources by collective-choice rules, as will be seen in some parts of 
the two laws examined here. 
RULE TYPE DEFINITION
1. Position rules Specify a set of positions and how many participants are to hold each position 
2. Boundary rules Specify how participants enter or leave these positions
3. Authority rules Specify which set of actions is assigned to which position at each node of a deci-
sion tree
4. Aggregation rules Specify the transformation function to be used at a particular node, to map actions 
into intermediate or final outcomes
5. Scope rules Specify the set of outcomes that may be affected, including whether outcomes are 
intermediate or final
6. Information rules Specify the information available to each position at a decision node
7. Payoff rules Specify how benefits and costs are required, permitted or forbidden in relation to 
players, based on the full set of actions taken and outcomes reached 
TABLE 5.1 Seven types of rules that may affect the structure of the situation (source: Ostrom et al., 2006:42) 
RULE LEVEL DEFINITION
Operational rules Directly affect day-to-day decisions made by the participants in any setting.
Collective-choice rules Affect operational activities and results though their effects in determining who is 
eligible and the specific rules to be used in changing operational rules. 
Specify the terms and conditions for interpreting, enforcing and altering opera-
tional rules.
Constitutional-
choice rules
Affect operational activities and their effects in determining who is eligible and the 
rules to be used in crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the 
set of operational rules.
TABLE 5.2 Three levels of rules in the action situation (source: Ostrom et al., 2006:46)
The socio-legal approach summarized in Table 5.3 looks into the legal environments 
according to the categories proposed by Edelman and Suchman (1997). With these 
categories in mind, property laws from Colombia and Ecuador were coded and 
analyzed. The research strategy is to study law as a system of procedural rules. Some 
rules facilitate the arena for action as well as procedures for dispute resolution for 
actors and institutions. The regulatory environment seeks to control processes and 
sanction the behavior of actors and institutions. The constitutive environments are 
expressed in articles of the law that establish when new institutions are formed and 
come into action, or when they cease to exist (Edelman & Suchman, 1997:479). 
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LAW AS TEMPLATE FOR INTERACTION EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATION/
PRACTICE OF LAW
Facilitative  
environment
Arena, tools for legal interactions and 
dispute resolution
Constantly transformed in the orga-
nizational context
Regulatory
environment
Law seeking to control agents and institu-
tional arrangements agent’s behavior
Organizations define the meaning of 
compliance
Constitutive 
environment
Legal forms and categories, rules, 
principles and values
Often arise out of organizational 
practices and norms
TABLE 5.3 Legal environment of organizations’ Integrative Model (source: Edelman & Suchman, 1997)  
In that light, the horizontal property law is the rule that prescribes and defines which 
actions are required, permitted, or prohibited. These stipulations will be written into 
different parts of the law and for different actors. Rules apply depending on an actor’s 
position regarding the governance and management of the common property resource. 
§  5.3 Agents in the condominium regime 
§  5.3.1 Agents and institutions in the horizontal property law of Colombia 
Agents
Within the Colombian legal framework there is a notion of the initial owner whose 
rights and responsibilities resemble the role of the housing developer, even though 
the term ‘housing developer’ is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the law.20 At the 
same time, the law gives separate treatment to two roles: the individual owner and 
the co-owner. This separation is reminiscent of the dualistic condominium regime 
explained by van der Merwe (2015). In addition to the role of the individual and the co-
20 This might be related to the legal process of incorporation or declaration of the horizontal property, because 
even though the developer takes care of the production process, the party who might sign the papers of declara-
tion is the owner of the land. Although the owner of the land can be the same developer, it can instead be a trust 
(fideicomiso) who has the rights of usufruct of the land for housing purposes.
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owner, the Colombian law includes the rights and responsibilities of other occupants 
such as tenants, thereby establishing a solidarity responsibility regarding the exclusive 
use of the apartment space.  
The processes of constituting, organizing, and managing the condominium also 
require input from other actors that appear to be outsiders to the condominium 
regime. These external actors are (1) the manager, who can be hired by the initial 
owner or the organized co-owners; (2) the municipality, including departments such 
as the building permit office, the cadaster, and the property registry; (3) the notary, 
who legalizes all the various documents; and (4) the insurance company that will have 
to establish a relationship with the condominium at multiple levels, taking care of the 
individual property (for which insurance is not obligatory) and of the common property 
areas (insurance for repair in case of emergencies such as earthquakes is mandatory). 
Additionally, another actor is (5) the lender, who for some legal status in the process 
of the constitution of horizontal property is required to issue individual mortgages to 
future homeowners. 
Institutions
In Colombia the main formal institutions created by law are the regulatory documents, 
which comprise the complete set of documents and information about the housing 
project. They include a complete table of property coefficients21, the document 
stating the rules and norms for governance and maintenance of the housing project 
and, finally, according to the law, the set of plans and construction details. All these 
documents will be part of the declaration process. Another formal institution is the 
individual property title, which is arranged as the development process moves forward 
and at such time as the social housing developer is prepared to transfer the property to 
a new owner. When a piece of land is built on with different kinds of houses or mid-rise 
buildings, the property is subdivided in condominium, thereby establishing the shares, 
and with each share a new property title can be established. 
One of the signs of a modern condominium law is the capacity of the owners’ 
association to appoint a legal entity or a juridical person which can represent the 
condominium in legal matters and contracts. For instance, that may occur with 
insurance, contracts with property management, or when it is necessary to sue an 
owner after defaulting on maintenance fees. According to the law, it is in the power 
21 Property coefficientes (coeficientes de propiedad o alicuotas) of the shared property are calculated in order to 
stablish the individual property rights of one owner. The legal term in the law is “alícuota”. 
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of the assembly of owners to choose who will represent the horizontal property as 
a juridical person. This person is the president of the administrative council or the 
property manager, if there is one. The law facilitates the process and states that to 
register the juridical person an internal regulatory document has to be approved in 
assembly, notarized, and registered. Therefore, the administration council will have 
to work and prepare the internal regulatory document to be approved in an assembly 
meeting. The assembly of owners, the management or administration council, and 
the council for co-residency are different institutional arrangements that the law in 
Colombia constitutes as one of the obligations that owners must meet in order to 
participate in the governance of the collective property. The council for co-residency 
(Consejo de conviviencia) is an institutional arrangement that was included in Law 675, 
2001 to instate a new internal solution to manage conflicts inside the condominiums. 
§  5.3.2 Agents and institutions in the horizontal property law of Ecuador 
Agents
The system of agents in Ecuador is similar to the system in Colombia, although the 
language of the document or the names of actors may differ. In Ecuador, the law 
establishes processes for constituting the horizontal property and specifies which 
documents are important in this process. According to the law, these first steps are 
the responsibility of whoever is developing housing project. The agent involved in the 
first steps of horizontal property declaration processes is not explicitly named as the 
developer, but rather it is the step that is mentioned in the text. 
In accordance with the notion of a dualistic form of tenure in condominium, the law 
and the bylaws refer to both individual owners and co-owners. An individual owner has 
rights over designated areas of individual and exclusive domain of the property, as well 
as rights as a co-owner over the areas of common domain of the property. The standard 
bylaws enacted in 1999, called the General Regulatory Law of Horizontal Property 
(1999) (GRLHP-1999), refers to co-owners and not individual owners. Moreover, the 
GRLHP-1999 refers to the ‘user’ or ‘occupant’ when establishing the rights and duties 
of the tenant, an agent that is missing in the general Law of 1960. 
The external agents of the condominium are similar to those in Colombia, yet their 
roles are sometimes different. In Ecuador, these agents are (1) a manager, who is 
generally responsible for managing the representation of the juridical person of 
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the horizontal property;22 (2) the municipality, also including departments such as 
the building permit office and the cadaster; (3) the notary, who also has to legalize 
every document before it goes to the fourth agent; and (4) the property registry. The 
insurance company is also involved with the condominium regime because co-
owners are obliged to get insurance to protect their common property against fire and 
mechanical problems with the elevators. These insurance packages include coverage 
for damages incurred by natural hazards such as earthquake.23 Finally, another external 
agent mentioned in the law is the lending sector which will issue the mortgage for the 
low-income household. The mortgage deed will not be issued until the declaration of 
the horizontal property is properly arranged. As it occurs with the agent that initiates 
the first main documents to declare one property into horizontal property, the law 
mentions the mortgage as a formal institution and does not directly mention the agent 
involved (the banks or other financing institutions). 
Institutions
The Declaration of Horizontal Property is a notarial document that provides all relevant 
information about the project. It includes the complete set of plans for the project 
and the table that specifies the share values, or participation quotas (alicuotas). This 
document contains the bylaws or the internal regulation (reglamento interno), which 
can be basically the same as the GRLHP of 1999 if the developer does not want to 
draft a new internal regulation. The individual property title is also an institution in 
horizontal property. It can be arranged once the declaration of the co-ownership 
regime is declared and a single title deed can be issued for a specific share value or 
participation quota.
Ecuadorian condominiums have a juridical person which can be represented by a 
manager or the president of the ‘board of homeowners’. The administrative council or 
the ‘board’, as it is called in Ecuador, is also a group of owners elected in an assembly 
meeting. In Ecuador the institution in charge of keeping the records of who represents 
the juridical person is the Property Registry Office, but the process and the documents 
necessary to register the juridical person are the same as in Colombia. 
22 This person can be an external manager or can be the president of the elected board.
23 Case-study research in Bogota and Quito demonstrates how expensive and unaffordable the insurance policy 
is for the co-owners. Low-income condominiums in Quito have not even thought about that. In Bogota, new 
low-income condominiums, which were established under the new Law 675, comply with the obligation to fund 
the insurance policy. As they can’t raise the maintenance fee to pay for the insurance policy, they hold a series of 
informal events such as parties or lotteries in order to collect funds in other ways.
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The legal entity of the condominium or the juridical person can represent the 
condominium in legal matters and contracts. For instance, this may involve insurance, 
contracts with property management, or bringing a lawsuit against an owner when 
defaults on maintenance fees accumulate. According to the law, it is in the power of the 
assembly of owners to choose who will represent the horizontal property as a juridical 
person; and this person is the president of the administrative council or the property 
manager, if there is one. 
In contrast with Colombia, Ecuadorian law does not require the constitution of the 
strata council. In Ecuador, conflict resolution mechanisms are established by law, as 
will be explained in subsequent sections of this chapter.
§  5.3.3 Comparison 
Both national laws were analyzed, looking at their agents and institutions. Regarding 
the agents at whom the laws were directed, the analysis and comparison demonstrates 
that some agents are linked to the common property resource and others are related to 
it but are external, such as the professionals and organizations involved in the provision 
of housing. Table 5.4 below summarizes the range of actors serving as agents of the 
law.
Agents are discussed here by dividing them into two governance levels. The first 
list includes agents that are external to the future collective rights of ownership 
in condominium. They are either individuals or organizations; these parties are 
involved in housing policy, the building industry and finance, and local government 
development departments. Also external are the cadaster, notaries, the insurance 
companies, and the property managers. The last can be either external or internal, 
depending on whether he/she is also a paid or unpaid co-owner. When an external 
property manager is hired by the assembly of owners, that person assumes obligations 
and enters into a direct relationship with the internal actors. The table below lists the 
actors in clusters based on their public or private nature in the market. 
At the internal level of the common property regime, there are both individual and 
collective actors. The laws of Colombia and Ecuador address the individual co-
owner but sometimes the owner in a collective sense using the term co-owner. The 
Ecuadorian law is more inclined to use the term ‘co-owner’ (coproprietario) than the 
law in Colombia. The actor that is not defined in the law of Ecuador as explicitly as in 
the Colombian law is the ‘initial owner’, the owner of the land who will subdivide the 
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whole into horizontal property parts. The same initial owner has important roles to play 
later after the main institutions of the condominium are established.
EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
Professionals and organizations Individual
Ministry Initial owner*
Building license department (Municipality) Developer as co-owner
Cadastre (Municipality) Owners (occupants and non-occupants)
Property registry (Municipality) Tenants or users by contract
Notary Property manager (co-owner unpaid or paid)
INTERNAL
Developer Collective
Lenders
Property managers (paid, individual or companies) Assembly of co-owners
Insurance companies Board of homeowners**
Security company* Strata council*
TABLE 5.4 Actors classified by position: external or internal to condominium property (source: comparative 
analysis of the law)
* Only in Colombian law.
** Represented by the juridical person of the horizontal property in both countries. 
Both laws presume that owners will let their units; therefore tenants are part of the 
body of regulatory body. As investor but not occupant, the owner can transfer voting 
rights to the tenant or other representative as a proxy. Nevertheless, the non-present 
owner remains a co-owner within the governance structure. Even though he/she does 
not occupy the unit, that person has the obligation to be represented in the assembly of 
owners, even if the unit is not occupied at all. 
The property manager is regulated in both laws, although the Ecuadorian law is more 
flexible and states that the manager can be paid or unpaid. An unpaid manager is 
someone from the community that assumes leadership on the board of homeowners. 
In Colombia, the property manager is always paid, as required by law. 
The assembly of owners is the most important institution of the condominium regime 
since it has collective-choice powers to change some operational rules of the internal 
regulatory document. The assembly chooses who will represent them, electing a 
president as required by law. The assembly also approves in an assembly meeting the 
person who will become the property manager. In Colombia this will be a different 
actor than the president, whereas in Ecuador the property manager can be the same 
TOC
 148 Affordable Condominium Housing
person as the president or another professional. The property manager is the actor that 
assumes the role of juridical person of the condominium. 
The juridical person is another important institution in condominium. The person who 
represents the condominium can sign insurance contracts, hiring contracts, and file a 
lawsuit if necessary. 
In Colombia, another role of the assembly meeting that differs from that in Ecuador is 
the obligation to elect a council for co-residence (Concejo de Convivencia). The task of 
that committee is to assist in conflict resolution by seeking informal solutions. 
The property regime of the condominium changes in the course of the housing 
provision process. While the units are being built, the governance of the external 
network of actors is critical. Not only are these external parties in charge of the 
construction process but they are also responsible for the constitution of the governing 
bodies and formal institutions of the property regime. The next part of the comparative 
analysis of the laws will concentrate on the structure of the laws and will describe the 
regulatory environments of each country.
COLOMBIA ECUADOR 
Formal institutions
Horizontal property law (Law 675, 2001) Horizontal property law 1960*
N/A General Regulatory Law of Horizontal Property 
(1999) 
Regulatory document** Declaration of horizontal property**
Individual property deeds  Individual property deed 
Internal regulations Internal regulations
Manual of co-residency N/A
Institutional arrangements 
General assembly of homeowners Assembly of co-owners
Administrative council President of the assembly, or board of homeowners 
Juridical person Juridical person 
Condominium owners council N/A
TABLE 5.5 Formal institutions and institutional arrangements in Colombia and Ecuador
* With amendments of 2011.
**Includes (1) the table of participation quotas adding 100% of square meters built over the common property 
of land, (2) architectural and infrastructure plans approved by the municipality, and (3) regulations of rights and 
obligations, and rules for the association. 
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§  5.4 Structure of the Horizontal Property Law
§  5.4.1 Structure of the law in Colombia (2001)
Colombia’s first horizontal property law was drafted in 1948 (Law 182) but not adopted 
until 1958. Its adoption coincided with the sale of apartments in the first modern unite 
d’ habitation complex built in Bogota. In 1985 a new law was adopted to avoid juridical 
problems with existing condominiums. Colombia maintained both the old and the new 
legal frameworks, creating a two-tier regulatory system. In 1998 a new law to regulate 
gated communities was adopted, as the existing regulations had become inefficient 
due to the complexity of the sector. Some of these developments were garden city 
gated communities. Others shared building structures and land so they were classified 
as condominiums and therefore had to comply with the 1985 law (Nader, 2002). Three 
years later, in 2001 the Ministry of Development presented to Congress a proposal that 
would fix the two- and three-tier system that had arisen under all these different laws. 
The open debate culminated in a single consolidated new law in 2001 (Velásquez, 
2001). 
The 2001 law is composed of 87 articles under four headings (called titles). Title I 
(art. 1 to art. 57) covers organizational issues: general definitions and objectives; the 
constitution, dissolution, and reconstruction of horizontal property; the definition of 
private and common goods; participation quotas or share values; horizontal property 
as a legal entity; and articles about the various governing bodies such as the general 
assembly, the administrative council, the manager, and the financial inspector. Title II 
(art. 58 to art. 62) is about the process and sanctions aimed at resolving community 
conflicts and addressing non-compliance with economic obligations. Title III (art. 63 
to art. 84) incorporates special norms for gated communities24 creating a subordinated 
regime for this form of property. Finally, Title IV (art. 85 to art. 87) includes general 
final dispositions of the law. 
24 This is a remnant of the adopted law of 1998 that regulated the gated condominiums, now called in Law 675 
‘Unidades Inmobiliarias Cerradas’. 
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Facilitative environment
The facilitative legal environment consists of procedural rules that define the arena 
of action. For the Colombian condominium property law, the facilitative environment 
may be described under the following categories: (1) objectives and principles; (2) 
procedures for exchange of property; (3) definition of individual and common goods; 
and (4) procedures for conflict resolution. 
1. Objectives and principles: 
The law’s objectives are (1) to regulate the special form of property domain where 
private and collective rights are expressed over the land and other common goods 
and (2) to guarantee security and a peaceful living environment as well as the social 
functions of property.25 The law contains the basic principles that will guide the 
proclamations of the law and will guide the content of the Declaration and Regulatory 
Document (art. 2). Principles such as ‘social and ecological function of property’, 
‘solidarity’, ‘peace’, ‘respect for human dignity’, ‘entrepreneurial initiatives’, and ‘due 
process’ are the priorities for setting the ground rules of the condominium regime. The 
‘social function of property’ refers to a Constitutional principle: that individual property 
rights are limited and regulated by the state, and that property owners have rights but 
also responsibilities to society. In Columbia, urban management tools such as zoning, 
expropriation, and property taxes were developed under this Constitutional principle. 
2. Procedures for the exchange of property:
Colombia’s horizontal property law states that the initial owners will transfer their 
responsibilities to manage common goods to a newly formed owners’ representative 
body after 51% of the property shares have been sold (art. 24 and 52). How 
management is carried out before 51% of the property is sold is unclear. The initial 
owner, who in some cases is the developer, owns most of the shares of property during 
this stage. There is no need to call an assembly meeting if the developer can make 
majority decisions by itself. 
After 51% of the units have been sold and the responsibilities have been transferred 
to the assembly of owners, the developer remains part of the owners’ association until 
the sales are completed. The path is clear at this point: the co-owners have to wait until 
the initial owners have transferred their collective rights and collective decision-making 
25 Colombia, Law 675 (2001), Art. 1.
TOC
 151 The formal institution: The horizontal property law
powers. At the same time the developer depends on the co-owners’ cooperation in 
fulfilling their responsibility for governance and maintenance costs as long as the 
developer remains a co-owner (i.e., while finishing the sales). 
One obligation of the general assembly of owners is to elect a manager; however, a 
provisional manager will have been hired by the developer in the interim (art. 52). The 
general assembly then has to decide whether to continue with the same manager or to 
hire a new one. New duties that fall to the collective owners have to be managed while 
settling the transaction processes with the new owners. These are moments when the 
facilitative environment of the law merges with the constitutional environment. To be 
able to take action and collectively start the decision-making process at the governing 
level, some formal institutions and new institutional arrangements have to be taken 
care of. There are no sanctions for the initial owners in the event they would fail to 
comply with the rules for transaction processes. 
3. Individual and common goods:
Colombia: private goods or goods of exclusive domain, common goods and non-essential 
common goods.26   
Art. 16 specifies that private goods, or ‘goods of particular domain’ have to be 
identified in the regulatory document or declaration and in the plans of the complex. 
The article also explains that the property of a private good implies co-ownership of the 
common goods of the building in proportion to each owner’s individual participation 
quota. 
Additionally, this article circumscribes the rules in the regard to the roles for the 
municipality, and specifically for the cadaster, in relation to what is understood as a 
private good. It states that property taxes will be calculated and charged individually, 
in proportion to the participation quota. Owners of private goods have collective 
obligations and these are clearly linked to the fact that the property is a small part of a 
bigger building. 
The term ‘non-essential common goods’ refers to parts of the collective property that, 
because of their location in the building, can be assigned in exclusive domain, such as 
the backyard or parking lots. Conversely, examples of essential common goods would 
be the staircase, walkways, etc. 
26 In Spanish: bienes privados o de dominio particular, bienes comunes, bienes comunes no esenciales
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4. Procedures for conflict resolution
Conflicts under the condominium regime can come from various sources; some of 
them may originate in the relationship to the management, others in the maintenance 
of the property (Orban, 2006). The law suggests that to manage internal conflicts, 
the administrative council will constitute the council for c-residency (concejo de 
conviviencia) consisting of three co-owners who are supposed to resolve conflicts 
using their own personal skills and dialogue. The members of this committee are not 
empowered to impose sanctions. 
Constitutive legal environment
The constitutive legal environment relates to the provisions that allow instatement 
of the main institutions mentioned above, in addition to the constitutive rule that 
gives voting power to owners. Regarding this environment the following categories of 
constitutional rules were identified: (1) bylaws; (2) assembly of owners; (3) juridical 
person; (4) voting rules.
1. Condominium bylaws 
The bylaws are contained in the regulatory document. Art. 3 defines it as ‘the statute 
that regulates the specific rights and obligations of co-owners of a building or a housing 
complex under the horizontal property regime’. Article 4 states that the constitution 
under the horizontal property regime, a notarial public instrument, is recorded in the 
property registry, whereby the juridical person of the condominium is born.
Then in an extensive and detailed text, art. 5 outlines the minimum contents of the 
‘deed’ (escritura), bylaws, and regulation (reglamento). In general, the bylaws give 
the name of the owner (initial owner), the name of the building, and information 
about the land on which the buildings in condominium are located, including the 
registration folios of each individual unit, jointly called goods of individual domain 
(bienes de dominio particular). The registration of these goods of individual domain 
has to conform to the blueprints, or to both the architectural and construction plans 
that had been approved by the municipal entity. The same should occur with regard to 
the common property elements, including those that are essential and those that have 
been assigned to other uses in the building. The bylaws also specify the ‘co-ownership 
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quotas’ (coeficientes de copropiedad) and modules of contribution (módulos de 
contribución).27 
In addition to the basic rules defining the individual and the common property, this 
article mandates that the bylaws will contain regulations regarding ‘organization, 
management, and control of the juridical person that is born under the administration 
of this law and the rules that govern the organization and functioning of the building or 
complex’. To draft these regulations, developers follow the articles included in the same 
law about governance and management of condominiums. But art. 5 contains three 
extra paragraphs in which it is clearly stated that regulations cannot determine what 
is not allowed under this law, and that any internal regulation can overrule any of the 
property rights regarding a piece of individual domain. 
Article 6, in accordance with article 4, states that to notarize the bylaws it is necessary 
to submit the blueprints or plans (architectural and engineering plans) with the 
building license. And if the drafted bylaws diverge from the submitted plans, the notary 
should make a note of the discrepancies. 
2. Assembly of owners 
The assembly is constituted by the owners of private goods. If they cannot attend, the 
owner can delegate their responsibility to the tenant or another person. According to 
the law, decisions made in the assembly are binding for every owner, including the 
absentees, and all other users and occupants of the building. When constituting the 
assembly, the law prescribes twelve specific functions. Some of these are related to the 
establishment of formal institutions; for instance, they may require elected members 
to serve on the strata council or the administrative council. In summary, this law (1) 
constitutes the governance body and defines when and how many times can it meet, 
(2) includes details and rules on taking minutes, and (3) mentions other general 
prescriptions on how to run an assembly.
27 Modules of contribution (módulos de contribución) are defined in art. 31, explaining that every internal regula-
tion of horizontal property should regulate how some of common goods and services in the common property, 
that are not intended for general use because of their nature and location, will managed and how costs of use 
and maintenance of these elements will be charged to co-owners.
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3. Juridical person 
At the first assembly meeting of co-owners, decisions will be made on hiring an 
external administrator or appointing a member of the administrative council as the 
legal representative of the juridical person. The juridical person is the institutional 
arrangement that holds collective powers. That person is responsible for signing 
contracts with other internal employees in charge of maintenance, or with 
maintenance companies for the repair of elevators and water pumps, for garden 
maintenance, or for security. The objective is to ‘correctly and efficiently administer the 
common services and goods, and to manage issues of common interest to the owners 
of private goods to comply with the law’ (art. 32 to art. 36).
According to article 8, it is the mayor’s responsibility to keep the records and certify 
the existence of horizontal property juridical persons. Condominiums elect or reelect 
the president of the assembly meeting, and in this meeting the property manager can 
also be reappointed or changed. Then the person whose name is under the legal entity 
will change too. And therefore, to keep the registration of the legal entity current, the 
records in the municipal system have to be updated every time there is a change in 
who represents the common property juridical person. To constitute a juridical person, 
it is necessary to present the notarial document of the bylaws, which is deposited at 
the property registry office, plus the documents such as the minutes of the assembly 
meeting that validate the decision. 
4. Voting rules
Participation quotas determine the following: (1) the proportion of rights of each 
owner of private goods over the common goods of the building; (2) the percentage of 
participation at the general assembly of owners; and (3) the modules of contribution by 
which each owner will contribute to common expenses.28 Table 5.6 shows the various 
points at which a majority is necessary, and votes will count in terms of the percentages 
or shares held by owners. The categories were constructed to allow comparison with 
Ecuadorian law. In Colombia, no matter what kind of change is envisioned, the voting 
rules are the same: in order to approve a rule change, agreement must be reached by 
70% of the ownership shares. This is not the same as 70% of the owners. However, 
in affordable housing projects, since all dwellings tend to be of the same size, the 
effect of this rule is similar to the practice of using the number of owners, as in other 
condominium buildings. 
28 Law 657, 2001, Chapter VII, about property shares or alícuotas from art. 25 to art. 28.
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COLOMBIA VOTES IN PROPERTY SHARES 
Quorum in assembly meeting 51% 
Approval of a budget, and monthly fees, or extraordinary fees 70%
Reconstruction of the building (when the damage is over 75%) 70%
Reforms to the declaration documents 70%
Removal of non-essential common good 70%
Decisions to include individual meters for utility bills 70%
Change of use of a particular domain good 70%
Liquidation and dissolution of horizontal property 70%
TABLE 5.6 Majority rule required in assembly meetings in Colombia
Regulatory legal environment 
Maintenance fees are generally collected on a monthly basis. Art. 30 of the law 
prescribes what to do when a co-owner gets behind. First, interest can be added to the 
outstanding balance and charged monthly until the owner makes the payment. Part of 
the protocol to sanction non-payers is to post a list with the names of those in arrears 
in places where it can be seen by all co-owners.
When a co-owner is in debt, the person who represents the juridical person of the 
horizontal property can start due process to demand payment. Art. 48 says that 
under a competent judge, the juridical person representing the horizontal property 
can file suit. All the necessary documents to prove the case must be submitted, 
including the minutes of the assembly meeting at which powers were given to the legal 
representative of the horizontal property. The law recommends using the executive 
process instead of trying other conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Art. 49 regulates how the property manager, the accountant, and individual owners can 
appeal the general assembly’s decisions if these do not comply with the law or with the 
internal regulations of the horizontal property. 
Art. 58 to 62 regulate what to do when owners do not follow other rules. This part of the 
law pertains to those rules that are not related to the maintenance fee or other non-
money-related obligations, such as attending the assembly meeting, or operational 
rules regarding the use of common areas. Other non-monetary rules include those 
about the hours when loud music is allowed at gatherings and parties, about keeping 
pets inside the apartments, and about the preservation of architectural features of the 
facades or the structure. 
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Every horizontal property regulation can stipulate its own sanctions for these non-
monetary obligations, although the scope of such sanctions is restricted by the law. 
Sanctions can take three forms: (1) posting a notice naming those who have broken 
a rule; (2) setting fines for every breach; and (3) restricting the use of non-essential 
common goods, such as recreational zones, but never essential ones like the elevator 
or stairways. Sanctions have to be specified in the internal regulations and approved in 
the assembly meeting. 
To sum up, the Colombian Horizontal Property Law has clearly defined three legal 
environments, each encompassing a particular regulatory objective. The facilitative, 
constitutive, and regulatory environments take into account both the external actors 
that are involved during the housing provision process, including the key position of the 
initial owner, and the internal actors such as the co-owners. 
§  5.4.2 Structure of law in Ecuador (1960) 
In 1960, with a conservative government in power,29 the Ecuadorian president 
issued an executive decree to adopt the horizontal property regime. According to the 
‘exposition of motives’30 for the decree, the condominium regime is meant to address 
the need to regulate the property of flats or apartments. The need arose because the 
Civil Code only dedicated a few articles to this form of property. Also, the motivation 
says that the Civil Code did not provide enough scope to allow more businesses of 
this nature to develop. The first proposal was submitted to Congress in 1954, without 
passing the second debate for definitive adoption. It was not until 1960 that both the 
national housing institutions (BEV & JNV) and the national pension funds institute 
(later, in 1970, the IESS, Ecuadorian Institute for Social Security) asked the president 
to officially adopt the horizontal property regime in order to resolve the emerging 
housing need (Personal interview, Sixto Duran Ballen, 2011). 
The motivation goes on to say that the law is necessary to address the emerging 
quantitative and qualitative housing deficit. This implies that the country needed a 
legal framework suitable for the promotion of more affordable housing for ownership. 
The horizontal property law’s ‘exposition of motives’ mentions the urgency of putting 
29 The president was Camilo Ponce Enriquez, founder of the conservative party PSC (Partido Social Cristiano).
30 Exposition of motives, Horizontal property law, 1960. Decree Emergency Law No. 08, Official Registry no. 1069.
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the necessary regulations in place, in order to make transactions with future co-owners 
and to protect the investment of the pension funds that were already building housing 
for their associated workers.31 
The Law of 1960 contains 25 articles, but these were not codified until almost forty 
years later, in 1999.32 Codification was mandated by article 11 of the 1960’s law to 
create a standard regulatory body ‘to specify reciprocal rights and duties of co-owners’. 
The standard regulatory law was adopted in 1999 as the General Regulatory Law of 
Horizontal Property (GRLH-1999) with the objective of ‘establishing principles and 
norms’ that will command all goods in condominium or horizontal property. According 
to article 11 of the law (1960), if the condominium organization does not create an 
internal regulatory body, the GRLH-199933 will apply. The regulatory law contains 65 
articles. Therefore, there are two legal documents to consider: one that constitutes 
and facilitates processes to declare that a building consists of horizontal property; and 
another that regulates the horizontal property regime, specifying both individual and 
collective rights and setting forth the roles to be performed by the association of owners 
and their representatives. Both legal documents together make a body of regulations 
comparable to the Colombian horizontal property law. 
The Ecuadorian law was amended recently, in September 2011. Representatives of 
commercial condominiums, in conjunction with real estate construction companies, 
lobbied the national assembly to amend some of the articles of the law of 1960. 
Specifically, these groups asked for (1) the modification or elimination of the veto 
power of one single owner when repairs to the building are necessary; (2) the 
interpretation regarding the form of association in relationship to tax obligations; 
and (3) the assurance of due process for collecting unpaid common expenses. These 
amendments were adopted as part of the reform of the horizontal property regime. 
Changes to the law were made with the purpose of clarifying institutional environments 
regulating constitutional co-ownership rights such as voting powers and to introduce 
sanctions that were missing in the original law. 
31 Emergency Decree March 15, 1960, Horizontal property law, R.O.
32 The first regulatory body was adopted by Executive Decree 1708, August 5th, 1998, Official Registry 378, during 
the Presidency of Jamil Mahuad. This decree was revoked by another Executive Decree issued by the same Pres-
ident in 1999: Executive Decree 1229, August 27th, arguing that previous norms do not comply with current 
needs (exposition of motives included in the law).
33 Name in Spanish is REGLAMENTO GENERAL DE LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD HORIZONTAL
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Facilitative legal environment
The facilitative legal environment in the Ecuadorian condominium regime consists 
of four categories that are the same as under Colombian law. These are (1) objectives 
and principles; (2) procedures for exchange of property; (3) definition of individual and 
common goods; and (4) procedures for conflict resolution. 
1. Objectives and principles 
The Ecuadorian law (1960) does not include general objectives and principles such 
as peace or due process as it is included in the Colombian Law. The Ecuadorian 
context in the 1960s was different. Fifty years ago, when the condominium was a 
new phenomenon, the law needed to explain to agents and institutions under what 
conditions land and buildings can be declared horizontal property and how that regime 
should work. 
At the beginning of the text, article 1 of the law specifies that: 
Property in the form of an apartment, a single-family one-story dwelling, or a 
group of houses, when they are independent with an access from the street or 
other communal spaces, can be property of different owners. 
This passage is a clear reference to Ecuador’s Civil Code.34 The law mentions the 
individual title deed as the document that will state how the property will be identified 
in terms of its location in the building. Moreover, the law clarifies that ‘ground floor’ is 
different from the first floor, as the ground floor corresponds to areas located at street 
level. Basically, these initial articles clarify the physical arrangement of the property, 
providing an almost self-evident description of the physical property. 
Although the 1960 law did not include any general principles, the General Regulatory 
Law of Ecuador (GRLHP, 1999) filled this gap. It mentions the principle of solidarity 
between co-owners and other occupants. Solidarity is encouraged among owners and 
tenants and other occupants by making them responsible for responding to possible 
34 Ecuador, Civil Code, Art. 895 in Eguiguren (2008).
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damages and violations to the law regarding issues of condominium administration 
and maintenance.35  
Whether in the primary text or in a separate regulation, both the Colombian and 
Ecuadorian laws included some general principles and definitions of the property 
regime. These passages are crucial to the production of condominium housing as they 
are addressed to the agents and institutions of the housing system as a whole. The 
intended audience includes initial and future owners, occupants, and other actors with 
a stake in horizontal property, since general principles need to be read and enforced by 
the various agents along the trajectory of the provision of housing. 
2. Procedures for the exchange of property
The Ecuadorian horizontal property law does not explicitly regulate the time frame 
when the housing developer will meet with the owners holding property rights in 
common, unlike Colombian law which requires that step when co-ownership reaches 
51%. Nevertheless, the law establishes some facilitative processes. Furthermore, it 
makes clear that after the construction of the building is completed, documents such 
as the plans of the building identifying which land and spaces are held in common and 
which are exclusive should be registered with the property registrar and the cadaster.36 
This facilitative environment is designed with the developer in mind. It ensures the 
existence of information and records of the building to support the future exercise of 
individual and collective property rights. In the case of Ecuador, the law’s facilitative 
environment ensures that the condominium has been properly declared, a process that 
involves four agents: the social housing developer, the property registry, the cadaster, 
and the building license department. 
The same initial principles apply at this stage in housing provision. However, the 
articles defining and explaining the physical property over which owners can exercise 
their rights and duties are both facilitative and regulatory environments, dealing with 
the rights and duties tied to the physical collective property. The notion of individual 
and common goods is explained within the facilitative environment with respect to 
the consumption stage, but it is specified during subsequent steps leading up to the 
production stage, particularly the steps of architectural design and the drafting of 
declaratory documents. 
35 Ecuador, 1999. General Regulatory Law of Horizontal Property, Art. 3.
36 Ecuador, Law of Horizontal Property, 1960-2011. Art. 10
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3. Individual and common goods
Ecuador: individual common goods, general common goods, and exclusive goods:37 
Each owner, while being the exclusive owner of the flat or commercial space,38 is also a 
co-owner (condómino) of goods designed for common use.39 When the law was revised 
in 2011, it clarified the definition of ‘common goods’ for cases when the dwellings are 
designed as a complex of different residential blocks and when the understanding of the 
common areas is ambiguous. The law explains that ‘general common goods’ correspond 
to every good that is useful to all co-owners, also allowing for the use of the exclusive 
goods. There are also ‘individual common goods’, which are goods that correspond to 
common areas assigned in the declaration or by an assembly meeting to owners of each 
tower. 
This comparison of the two laws helps to refine some basic concepts underpinning the 
definitions of individual and common goods in the condominium regime. What the 
law leaves unsaid is that the main ‘common good’ is the plot of land. The urban and 
architectural design of the project mentions ‘individual or private domain goods’ such as 
the interior of the housing unit. If the unit has a garden or terrace for private use and with 
exclusive access, the garden area will be a ‘common good of private domain’. Common 
and individual domain areas are all quantified in square meters and converted into 
shares. These numbers are useful for calculating the final price of the housing units and to 
constitute the table of participation quotas of the declaration document. 
4. Procedures for conflict resolution
In Ecuador, the law of 1960 makes no institutional arrangement for conflict resolution 
such as the council for co-residency (concejo de conviviencia) in Colombia. However, the 
General Regulatory Law of 1999 states that to resolve any controversy among co-owners 
and users (tenants), the parties can be called to take part in a short verbal conciliatory 
process under the direction of any administrative body of the horizontal property regime.40 
Issues raised by co-owners and the controversies between them can also be addressed 
under the law of mediation and arbitration, according to the horizontal property law. 
37 In Spanish: bienes comunes individuales, bienes comunes generales, bienes exclusivos
38 The condominium law applies to both residential and commercial properties.
39 Art. 2
40 Ecuador 1999, General Regulatory Law of Horizontal Property, Art. 63.
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Constitutive legal environment
The constitutive legal environment of the condominium regime consists of those parts 
of the law that allow or mandate the constitution of the following formal institutions 
and organizations. These are (1) bylaws; (2) assembly of owners; (3) juridical person; 
and (4) voting rules. 
1. Condominium bylaws 
Basically, the bylaws in condominium comprise a set of documents that together 
become part of the internal constitution or statute of the condominium. This 
broader set is called the declaration of horizontal property (declaratoria de propiedad 
horizontal). Art. 10 of the law says that once the building in horizontal property is 
finished, the plans explaining ‘with clarity’ both common areas and spaces of exclusive 
property will be recorded in a notarial document and later registered in the cadaster. 
One copy of the plans will be recorded in the property registry and another in the 
cadaster. The article does not mention whether a copy should stay with the future co-
owners. 
Together with the plans, a set of internal regulations are written by the developer, 
and these should be registered with the property registry office too. Art. 12 of the law 
prescribes the content of the internal regulations: 
Rules for management and conservation of common goods, functions that 
correspond to the assembly of co-owners, rights and obligations and form of 
election of the property manager, allocation of management fees among co-
owners, and everything that impinges upon the interests of co-owners and of 
maintenance and conservation of the building. (art. 12)
The internal regulations are registered initially by the developer. Later, when the 
assembly of owners has assumed the powers of collective ownership, the internal 
regulatory documents can be modified when a two-thirds majority of the property 
owners approves the changes at an assembly meeting. 
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2. Assembly of co-owners 
The law in Ecuador mentions the assembly of co-owners in art. 12, cited above as the 
principal body with the obligation to adopt the rules and capable of changing some 
rules too. The law of 1960 explains that owners constitute an association that will be in 
charge of the administration of the common goods, referring to the General Regulatory 
document (GRLHP) as the main guidance for the association of owners’ activities. 
In 1999, the GRLHP included the chapter on governance bodies and renamed the 
association of owners as the assembly of co-owners. Unlike Colombia’s law, in Ecuador 
the law stipulates that owners have the right to vote in assembly if their administration 
fees are paid.41 
In the regulatory documents of 1999, art. 20 in chapter V on the rights and obligations 
of co-owners states that owners have the obligation to attend the assembly meeting 
and can use their freedom of speech through the right to vote, ask questions, or use any 
other powers given to co-owners as specified in the law. 
3. Juridical person 
In Ecuador the process of creating the records to certify the existence of horizontal 
property is similar to the rules in Colombia, but the inscription takes place in the 
property registry office, not at a municipal planning or cadaster department. The 
property registry office requires more than a copy of the declaration process. It also 
requires the new regulatory document that has been revised and approved by the 
assembly meeting. The person designated as the property manager, either paid or not 
paid, represents the juridical person. The minutes of the assembly meeting, which are 
signed by co-owners when the decision has been approved, is a binding document that 
will accompany the documents that need to be registered in the property registry office.  
4. Voting rules 
Voting rules are specified in separate articles in the law and within the internal 
regulatory law. Different rules may apply, depending on which rule is being enacted or 
changed. Table 5.7 summarizes the different voting rules depending on the issue for 
which approval is sought.
41 General Regulatory Law of Horizontal Property (1999) Art. 39
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COLOMBIA % SHARES 
Quorum 51%
Approval of a budget and common expenses 51% 
Approval of a budget for extraordinary fees 2/3 of owners
Modification of facades and other elements of the common goods 75%
To remodel and make improvements inside the private unit without affecting the 
structure of the building 
60%
Dissolution is not allowed while the buildings still exists -
TABLE 5.7 Majority rule required in assembly meetings in Ecuador 
Regulatory legal environment 
One of the main obligations of co-owners is to pay for management and maintenance 
activities on the common property. The amount of the fee is approved in the 
assembly meeting according to a maintenance budget and then divided according 
to participation quotas. This decision, which is also recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting, is legally binding (titulo ejecutivo). 
1. Sanctions 
Article 13 of the law of 1960 is one of those articles that had been modified in 2011. 
The amendment makes it clear that the decision of the assembly meeting can be 
enforced by law and that, if necessary, the co-owner can be sued if he or she is behind 
in payments. The law prescribes that the decision to sue can be enforced when the 
owner is behind by two or more payments. 
Regarding other rules on the use of the common property, art. 12 of the regulatory 
law of 1999 prohibits various uses of common spaces. For instance, it is not allowed 
to hang objects or clothing from the facades, to obstruct walkways, to install 
machines that make noise, or to use the apartment in a way that is not specified in 
the regulations. In total, the article contains twelve rules. In addition, the assembly of 
owners can impose rules for the management, preservation, and maintenance of the 
goods constituted in horizontal property, setting these forth in their internal regulatory 
documents. Unfortunately, the law does not mention how to enforce or sanction 
owners if they do not comply.  
Article 19 treats sanctions, but only mentions the rule regarding what to do when an 
owner is behind in payments. 
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2. Accountability 
It is the role of the president of the board or the property manager (if they are different 
persons) to oversee fulfillment of the obligations. Article 60 of the regulatory law of 
1999 describes the responsibility of the property manager, assigning him/her (under 
point h) the responsibility to sanction owners that do not follow the rules or do not 
comply with the decisions made in the assembly meeting regarding the use of the 
common property. The fines thereby collected will be deposited in the common reserve 
fund of the horizontal property. 
§  5.4.3 Comparison 
A facilitative legal environment is a legal context that includes “passive procedural 
vehicles and forums that organizations may mobilize to resolve disputes, to structure 
their relations with other organizations, to govern their employees, to influence the 
behavior of regulatory agencies, and to gather information” (Edelman & Stryker, 
2005). The horizontal property law creates a facilitative environment when it: 
 – explains objectives and principles designed to influence behavior, under which the 
regime will be governed; 
 – includes passive procedural rules for the exchange of property; 
 – defines individual and common goods over which owners have rights and duties; and 
 – establishes procedures for conflict resolution. 
Comparing these two laws from the perspective of Ostrom’s, it can be said that the 
objective of the facilitative environment of both Colombia´s and Ecuador´s laws, is to 
define the boundaries for common property resource governance and management. 
The facilitative environment is set forth in the law intended to be read by the initial 
owner and by owners giving thereby treating both parties as co-owners. Additionally, 
other agents are mentioned under the heading of the facilitative environment, 
including municipal agents issuing construction licenses, the cadaster, and the 
property registrar. 
Under the definition of individual and common goods, the Columbian and Ecuadorian 
laws use different terminology but refer to the same concepts. However, the Colombian 
law makes one additional distinction that actually proves useful for determining 
sanctions in the regulatory environment. The Colombian law distinguishes between 
non-essential and essential goods. For example, a non-essential good is a garden area 
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or the common room for assembly meeting. An essential good is the elevator or the 
stairs, or the walkway to access to the individual property. This distinction is not made 
in the Ecuadorian law. 
Other important differences concern the rules for the exchange of property. The 
Colombian law clearly prescribes the moment when it is compulsory for the initial 
owner to install provisional property management. Furthermore, when 51% of units 
are sold, the initial owner has to call an assembly meeting and constitute the other 
important institutions of the horizontal property regime. These kinds of rules regarding 
provisional property management and calling an assembly meeting are not included in 
the Ecuadorian law. 
The constitutive legal environment corresponds to sections of the horizontal property 
law that will shape the institutions of the property regime by organizing roles and 
governance. The main principles have to be defined and the physical areas have to be 
described by the facilitative environment documents. The law subsequently establishes 
specific rules to constitute formal institutions such as the horizontal property 
documents or bylaws, the purchase agreement, and the individual title deed. The law 
requires the constitution of institutional arrangements as well as of formal institutions 
for the provision of housing. 
First, during the production process, the declaration is drafted, including land 
measurement details, architectural and engineering drawings, and the regulatory 
document containing the participation quotas or value shares (alícuotas) in relation 
to the total number of square meters in the structure. Second, during the exchange 
processes and after the declaration of the regime has been registered with the 
property registry, it is possible to draft purchase agreements that later will become 
individual property titles, at which time mortgage deeds will be issued. The declaration 
of the property regime also includes the bylaws of the new owners’ association in 
condominium. 
The declaration document under which property is divided into a condominium is 
drafted by the housing development agents, or the initial owners as these agents are 
known under Colombian law. This document includes the drawings and engineering 
details of the building, differentiating between individual and common property 
elements. Rights and responsibilities of individual and exclusive use of the property 
are part of a constitutive and regulatory environment of the law and are specified in 
this document. In Colombia this document is called the regulatory document while 
in Ecuador it is called the declaration of horizontal property. Both include the internal 
regulations under which the condominium will be governed. It is also an obligatory 
document to be able to start sales. 
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Various articles of the law require distinguishing individual from collective goods, both 
at an early stage in the design and plans and later on in the declaration documents. 
This information forms the basis for calculating value shares or property quotas . These 
shares are the means by which votes are distributed among owners in condominium 
governance. In Bogota and Quito, the voting arrangements are usually based on 
participation quotas as a way to express individual rights in collective property matters. 
Voting rules in Colombia are the same no matter what the decision is about. At least 
75% of the quotas42 have to concur in order to reach a decision. In Ecuador, the voting 
rules change depending on the issue being decided on, as shown in Table 5.7 above. 
Regulatory Legal Environment
This legal environment is the document that sets the sanctions and enforcement 
procedures. Laws create a regulatory environment “invoking societal authority over various 
aspects of organizational life” (Edelman & Suchman, 1997: 483). To understand the 
regulatory environment of the horizontal property law, it is necessary to turn to examples 
of compliance, or to see the law in action. However, for this part of the analysis, both laws 
were examined in terms of their regulatory powers that can or cannot sanction or oversee 
compliance with maintenance and governance arrangements. 
Both laws contain rules to sanction situations such as non-payment or non-participation 
by the owner. All rules on sanctions or conflict resolution apply once the owners are living 
in the condominium. They do not apply during production; for example, under Colombian 
law, there are no sanctions if the initial owner fails to establish the provisional property 
management or if it fails to call the first assembly meeting. 
Under both laws the sanctions can escalate. For example, in Colombia the council of co-
residency (concejo de coviviencia) will intervene before the conflict goes to the property 
manager, the president, or to court. Although it is not regulated, something similar 
for conflict resolution is included in the Ecuadorian law to solve conflicts before it goes 
to court. Both legal frameworks presume that non-compliance with agreements can 
be addressed through conflict resolution mechanisms before imposing fines or other 
economic or legal sanctions. 
42 The table of participation quotas must be submitted in order to get approval for the project’s construction 
license from the municipality. For example, if a building has a total of 1000m2 of floorspace, and a standard 
affordable dwelling has 50m2, the owner has individual rights in an assembly meeting that carry a weight of 
0.05 in votes; similarly, the total costs of maintenance are divided by this share of ownership.
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§  5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the horizontal property law was analyzed as the main formal 
institution of the condominium regime. Even though other rules apply to the system 
of condominium housing provision, for instance subsidy regulations and municipal 
license norms, the horizontal property law is the body of regulatory documents 
that prescribes who can be involved as agents in the common property that will be 
constituted, self-governed, and maintained. 
The research question investigated in this chapter concerns which agents and 
institutions are regulated by the law, how the law is structured, and which similarities 
and differences exist between the laws of Colombia and Ecuador. The material 
presented above has demonstrated that, in general, both countries clearly define the 
position of the different actors involved. For example both horizontal property laws 
define the role, rights, and obligations of owners as individuals and as co-owners. 
Some differences were observed between the laws. It was found that the Colombian 
law regulates the moment when the assembly of owners should be first constituted, 
thereby inaugurating the main self-governance institutional arrangement. Placing 
these observations in Ostrom’s framework, the common property resource in Colombia 
has a collective-choice rule nested into a constitutional one, a very important condition 
for creating the governing body of the condominium. In Ecuador, in contrast, the 
collective-choice rule for constituting the first governing body is not defined, thereby 
leaving ambiguity about the process when the condominiums are new. For old ones, 
however, there is a collective-choice rule that owners can use to call an assembly 
meeting if necessary. 
The condominium is an interesting example of a common good. Since it is produced 
by developers, the rules are not constituted or written by those who are going to 
govern and use the building or housing complex. In that sense, Ostrom’s principles 
have proved useful but only to some extent, since they do not take into account the 
complexity involved in the housing provision process. The principles of a common 
property resource in Ostrom´s perspective, assume that the rules are designed by those 
who are going to implement them. Although rules are not drafted by the ´users´ of 
the resource, the IAD framework as presented earlier (in chapter 2) includes the rules 
as these apply to some of the three variables influencing the outcomes of an action-
situation. In this case, the main variable is the law of horizontal property. 
In terms of structure, and in accordance with condominium regimes elsewhere in 
the world, the two horizontal property laws compared here are similar. As expected, 
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both countries regulate the general aspects: individual property rights; the common 
property resource; governance and management. However, when observing the law 
through the housing provision states, the Colombian law recognizes collective property 
transfer, a process that is not covered by rules in the Ecuadorian law. 
Bringing Ostrom´s (1990) framework to bear on this comparison, similarities come 
into view regarding the governing norms. In particular, the two laws are similar 
with regard to the collective-choice rules and the obligations to use the internal 
regulations as the main constitutional body that can be modified according to the 
agreements made in an assembly meeting. But there are also differences. Voting rules 
are straightforward in Colombia, where 70% of the participation quotas is needed 
for a simple majority in every instance. In Ecuador, in contrast, the voting rules vary 
depending on the rule or action to be adopted. The effect of these differences warrants 
further examination in other analyses, but in the present investigation it may indirectly 
influence some of the variables, as will be shown in the next chapters. 
Regarding sanctions, the Colombian law does not impose any ‘graduated sanction’ on 
the initial owner if he/she fails to transfer the property, or if the regulatory document 
submitted to the property registry contains mistakes. 
In both countries the bylaws of condominium, the most important rules in play, are 
drafted without participation or approval of the co-owners. That issue has already 
been noted by Blandy et al. (2010) as a critical moment in the condominium 
property regime. 
To conclude this chapter about the horizontal property law, it remains to say that these 
rules were written for the actors, either external or internal, within the condominium 
regime. Embedding the comparative analysis in Ostrom´s self-governance framework 
it has made it possible to identify the various environments and actors involved. 
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Part III
The next two chapters deal with governance, considering how actors perceive the 
maintenance problems and how the formal rules are actually followed. In accordance 
with Ostrom´s framework, this research is based on the assumption that informal 
institutions or solutions will be developed by the actors involved, who thereby change 
the rules that have been established or reinterpret the law. 
Chapter 6 presents the qualitative results of the focus groups that were attended by 
professionals and actors from public organizations. The analysis expands on how they 
perceive the problems encountered in the housing policy network due to deterioration 
and their own roles in that process. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of a survey conducted among a sample of low- and 
middle-income condominium owners. The aim was twofold: to understand their 
perception of the maintenance problems; and to find out whether they followed self-
organization strategies in the condominium regime or developed new rules ones, either 
formal or informal. 
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6 Professionals in provision of 
affordable condominiums
§  6.1 Introduction 
Ostrom´s work on the governance of common resources demonstrates that theories 
of collective action are useful to study certain variables but not the whole system. Her 
argument is that theories of collective action do not take into account “the process 
of accretion of institutional capital” (Ostrom, 1990:190). Therefore, policy analysis 
draws attention to how the group of actors, both internal and external, experience 
incremental learning in a process of self-organization. As Ostrom found, inadequate 
attention has been given to “how the activities and policies of external political 
regimes can affect the level and type of self-organization to achieve collective benefits” 
(Ostrom, 1990:190). Any theory of self-organization and self-governance must 
therefore take into account the strategies of external actors when explaining behavior 
and outcomes. 
This chapter builds upon Ostrom´s theoretical groundwork in policy analysis to 
examine the behavior of the external actors in the affordable housing policy network 
of Bogota and Quito. Specifically, these are the professionals involved in this particular 
housing sector. The policy networks to which they belong are in charge of producing 
condominiums for low- and middle-income families. In light of the comparative 
analysis of the legal environment in the previous chapter, it is clear which external 
actors are recognized in the property law. Nonetheless, some other actors are not 
regulated by the law, even though they participate in the network and have to follow 
the rules too. Unregulated actors, such as social managers, have a direct relationship 
with the condominiums and thereby have a direct bearing on the incremental learning 
about condominium rules and self-organization. 
Professionals in the policy network are considered external actors because they are not 
co-owners. Instead, they interact through either collective-choice rules or operational 
rules, both of which are important to the governance of low-income condominiums. 
The exception is the housing developer, who is both external and internal, depending 
on the phase of housing provision in which he/she is positioned. As long as the 
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developer is still selling the units, that company or individual is a co-owner and has to 
follow the same rules as the co-owners. 
Four research questions will be addressed in this chapter: 
1 How is the policy network composed and what are its characteristics? 
2 How do professionals perceive deterioration processes in condominiums? And how do 
they deal with deterioration? Do they take recourse to the property law? 
3 What are the similarities and differences between the policy networks in Bogota and 
Quito?
4 Does the network approach help explain collective action in the policy network? 
Exploratory interviews were held with key external actors in both Bogota and Quito. The 
responses helped to identify who belongs to the network, and the identified individuals 
were invited to take part in the focus groups. Focus groups were planned and held in 
both Quito and Bogota in the fall of 2012. The selected individuals were invited to 
spend one morning with other people who were involved in housing provision. For 
consistency, the group interviews, questions, and methodology were the same in both 
research settings. The focus group methodology used for these sessions was explained 
in a previous chapter (section 3.4). The group interviews revolved around two activities. 
The objective of the first one was to observe the composition and characteristics of the 
network. The second one was intended to observe how actors perceive the causes of 
and solutions for deterioration of the common property. 
Section 6.2 reviews the literature on network governance. Section 6.3 responds to the 
chapter’s first and third research questions by comparing the members of the policy 
network in Bogota and Quito and identifying the similarities and differences between 
the two networks. These comparisons are based on the interviews and focus groups, 
and some passages from the narratives are presented as evidence. 
Section 6.4 addresses the other aspect of the first question, namely the characteristics 
of the networks in Bogota and Quito. The discussion is based on the network 
perspective and data collected in the first activity of the focus groups held in both cities.
Section 6.5 responds to the second research question by describing how actors 
perceive the deterioration path of dwellings built for low-income households. During 
the focus groups, the participants were presented with a case in the form of a vignette. 
They were then asked a series of questions in order to find out when they thought 
deterioration problems were likely to begin. 
TOC
 173 Professionals in provision of affordable condominiums
The chapter closes by drawing some conclusions and responding to the fourth 
question. These concern the role of the different actors, how they perceived the 
problems, and which solutions they see for Quito and Bogota. 
§  6.2 Literature on network governance 
The rise of the network society prompted the emergence of the network governance 
perspective. From that perspective, government plays neither a hierarchical nor a 
centralized role in the implementation of public policy (Bortel, van, 2016). A network 
perspective is useful for understanding governance that is connected to a specific 
field of public policy in which the actors may be public, semi-public, or private. A 
‘policy network’ consists of actors in their institutional and organization contexts. 
The networks have the capacity to collaborate, and that capacity will influence the 
outcomes of policy implementation (Bueren, van & ten Heuvelhof, 2005; Bortel, 
van & Elsinga, 2007; Kickert et al., 1997). This was a novel perspective when it 
emerged in the 1990s, since it connected the analysis of public policy processes 
with the fields of political science and organizational theory. Investigators started 
looking at “the distribution of power and dependencies, organizational features 
and interorganizational relations” (Kickert et al., 1997:1). It has since been used to 
understand policy networks like those operating in areas such as agriculture, social 
security, health, and housing (Kickert et al., 1997:2). 
This perspective lends itself to integration into Ostrom’s framework. Like Ostrom, 
other scholars working on networks also seek to understand institutional change, 
particularly how actors adapt institutions to specific situations to achieve policy goals. 
If problems arise in the policy network, and it can be made more effective or efficient, 
then the question is how to improve the situation by managing and steering the 
network. Ostrom (1990) and Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997) recognized that 
existing networks have self-regulatory practices that are “based on knowledge of local 
circumstances, and shared rules and perceptions” (Kickert et al. 1997:51). Therefore, 
in order to improve the outcomes, the internal practices and social capital within the 
networks should be acknowledged, without imposing unnecessary new rules to replace 
existing ones. 
Whether public or private, every party has its own interests and goals (Rhodes, 1997). 
Relationships in a policy network environment are based on the interdependence 
of resources; the actors need to cooperate with each other in order to access these 
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resources and achieve particular policy goals (Bruijn, de & ten Heuvelhof, 2000; 
Bortel, van, 2009). Interdependence among actors is induced by “the fragmentation 
of resources, such as funding, expertise, land and democratic legitimation, and links 
with local communities” (Bortel, van, 2016: 58). Interdependent relationships are “not 
necessarily based on equity, between public, private and civil society actors” (Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007:587). Asymmetry in interdependent relationships should be taken into 
account in a policy network analysis. It should be recognized that not all actors have 
equal power; for example, not all of them are able to change rules or processes, to bear 
information, or hold financial resources. 
Power, from a network perspective, is linked to the resources that an actor possesses. It 
can create asymmetry in relationships based on resource dependence, but it is not the 
only factor influencing the interactions in the network. An actor’s norms and meaning 
structures can also influence how the members of the network behave and cooperate 
(Klijn, 1997). Moreover, a network perspective assumes that relationships between 
organizations can affect the behavior of other individual actors (Bortel, van, 2009; 
Mullins & Rhodes, 2007). Ultimately, a governance network perspective analyzes “the 
relation patterns between actors, their interdependencies and the way these patterns 
and interdependencies influence the policy process” (Klijn, 1997:30). 
It has been argued that “actors have their own definition of the world that surrounds 
them, which consists in their definition of the problem, their image of other actors in 
the policy network, the nature of their dependence upon others and vice versa, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of working together” (Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997:79). 
The characteristics of actors change according to their position in the network, taking 
into account an actor’s position as a public or a private organization. For example, the 
role of the housing company of the Municipality of Quito sometimes resembles that of 
a private developer when it acts as both a private and a public entity. 
Diversity within networks warrants due consideration. As Ostrom (1990) sees it, the 
number of actors involved will not necessarily influence cooperation. However, this 
does not mean that the more actors, the better; it is advisable to include only those who 
are strictly necessary to the particular policy field. However, diversity means complexity, 
which has a bearing on attempts to influence or steer behavior of actors in a policy 
network. Multiformity requires other skills than those used in traditional management 
settings; instead, it requires management at a distance, taking into account “the 
multiformity of the network and the actors who operate within it” (Kickert et al., 
1997:54).
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The closed nature of networks can also present challenges to policy network 
management. The concept of closedness comes from systems theory; a closed network 
does not react to external input as more open ones will do. Thus, a closed network 
will process input in its own way, recognizing that complex social systems are self-
regulating (Kickert et al., 1997:55). Given these characteristics, there is going to be 
uncertainty about whether the network or a group of actors within it react, or not, to 
steering signals from the network management. The advantage of closedness lies in 
the high levels of social capital. As Ostrom and policy network scholars note, closedness 
is an important characteristic, imbuing networks with a capacity for self-management 
which can be adjusted or steered using minimal coercion or resources. 
§  6.3 Composition of the low-income condominium policy network 
Professionals in the external network are agents of condominium governance. 
They can be either individuals or organizations. Some were already mentioned in 
chapter 4, when analyzing the housing market and the subsidy policy for low-income 
homeownership. In both Colombia and Ecuador, the design and implementation 
of housing policy have changed from a hierarchical towards a horizontal structure, 
whereby the role of government has become somewhat dispersed. Participation of 
both public and private organizations is now needed to achieve national housing policy 
goals. 
The analysis of the property law in both countries allowed us to identify which actors 
are directly mentioned in and regulated by the horizontal property law. Some of them 
are external to the condominium housing arrangements, while others are internal, 
having rights and obligations to govern and maintain the common property. These 
analyses, together with information from the semi-structured interviews, helped us 
to construct the list of actors in the policy network. In Table 6.1, the external actors for 
each city are listed and classified as public or private actors. 
In general, the policy networks of Bogota and Quito have similar configurations. At 
least, they are composed of the same kind of actors: public actors like the ministry, 
municipal departments, the property registry, and public savings funds that also act 
as mortgage lenders. However, there is a public actor in Quito that does not exist as a 
public actor in Bogota: the public social manager. And among the private actors, there 
is one important actor in Bogota that does not exist in Quito: the property manager. 
Although there are property managers in the housing market in Quito, seldom does 
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one find an affordable housing project with a property manager. There is also another 
actor in Bogota, the Family Welfare Funds (Cajas de Compensación), which are the non-
profit private entities through which government facilitates the subsidy policy. This role 
was already identified in chapter 4 as a difference between Bogota and Quito related to 
how the subsidy policy works in Bogota.
The comparison and the socio-legal analysis of the property law bring two actors into 
the foreground. Both are external to the policy network but their work is directly related 
to the internal governance of condominiums. These are the property managers and the 
social managers. 
COLOMBIA BOGOTA QUITO
Public
Ministry Ministry
Municipality Municipality 
Cadaster Cadaster
Property registry Property registry 
National Savings Fund (FNA) Social security institute (IESS-BIESS)*
Municipal housing company
Social managers of ministry or municipal housing company 
Private
Developers Developers
Lenders Lenders
Property managers N/A***
Notaries Notaries
Social managers Social managers
Family welfare funds** N/A
Insurance companies N/A***
Security companies N/A***
TABLE 6.1 Actors involved in the policy network in Bogota and Quito 
* It is also a public bank.
** In Spanish cajas de compensación familiar. More about these is explained in Chapter 4.
*** Not common in affordable condominium projects, but exist in the market.
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§  6.3.1 Social management (gestión social) 
The research in both Bogota and Quito identified social managers that are involved 
in the governance of low-income condominiums. They are not regulated by the law, 
nor do they fall under policy regulations. Social managers can be private or public 
organizations, they may be working for the ministry, the municipality, or with the 
developer. Here the term ‘social manager’ is used to express their role in facilitating the 
process of community building, which entails a general understanding of the internal 
governance arrangements of the condominium.43 
Social managers are positions that have emerged in both cities. These actors assume 
facilitating and mediating roles in the provision of affordable housing and the 
enforcement of condominium regulations. It is not clear whether they pursue any sort 
of altruistic aims, such as trying to help low-income families, or have a professional 
relationship aligned with the developers’ goals. Either way, they strive to attain the 
more general goals of affordable housing policy. 
The people working as social managers are social workers, social psychologists, 
sociologists, or economists. They have developed methodologies to facilitate 
interaction between professionals and homeowners during the transaction process. In 
practice, what they do is to assist with community building, particularly by identifying 
leaders that can support the construction of social capital.44 
During the focus group sessions and interviews, these actors expressed concern 
about how little the owners seem to know about the horizontal property regime. They 
agree with the property managers that the lack of knowledge and information on 
condominium governance and management can cause some nuisance, affecting the 
decision-making process that forms the basis for maintaining the property. Social 
managers in Bogota and Quito agree that their role in the network is unique. They 
are the only actors with enough training and the necessary social skills to transmit 
information and to help build social capital among residents as these co-owners take 
over the governance and management responsibilities. 
43 In Bogota, people use terms like “gestión social” (social management); in Quito, “acompañamiento social” 
(social mentoring). 
44 The social manager mentioned the social capital of the community as an indicator of the work they do. Bogota, 
Focus Group 2, November, 2012.
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The role of the social manager is temporary, being confined to the first months while 
people are moving into the units. Not all affordable housing developers in Bogota, 
and certainly not all in Quito, hire social managers to help with the governance 
arrangements during the property exchange processes. Their participation and the 
work they do in both cities is informal and not regulated by any norm or law related 
to housing policy. Therefore, their participation is not compulsory; rather, their 
emergence is an outgrowth of governance arrangements. 
To their mind, good indicators of successful work with the community would include 
(1) less conflict among residents, (2) a functioning board, and (3) less default on 
the agreed maintenance fee. One indication of success in Bogota is the presence of 
a property manager performing proper maintenance. In general these indicators 
are measured only a few weeks after these actors finish their workshops with the 
community. Developers in Bogota, notably two big housing development companies,45 
contract out property management or even have their own social management 
department on which leaders of the housing complexes can call for assistance. 
Constructora Bolivar of Colombia confers a Bolivar Award for condominiums in 
recognition of good performance to any of the low-income condominiums built by 
them. The award recognizes their success with internal organization and compliance 
regarding maintenance of the common property.46 Constructora Bolivar also has a 
property manager´s association, through which they can continue providing training 
skills for people that will participate in that capacity. This association also provides 
technical assistance for property managers. As the company explains it, this is part 
of their social contract with society, which is tied to building affordable housing. 
They ensure sustainability of finance and management, care for the environment, 
and engagement with the community. These kinds of strategies are inspired by the 
private sector and can lead to support in the long term for low-income condominiums; 
whereas these strategies are applied in Bogota, they are not followed by developers 
in Quito. 
Considering the role and position of these actors, both in Bogota and Quito, some 
differences and similarities may be relevant to the performance of the governance 
of the condominium. In both cases, there are not many social managers; basically, 
social managers specialized in condominium issues are pioneers. In Bogota, which 
has a more liberal tradition, social managers are private entrepreneurs that work for 
the developer. In Quito, on the other hand, there is greater diversity among the actors 
45 Like Amarillo and Constructora Bolivar
46 http://premiobolivar.com/
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that play roles as social entrepreneurs. The few that have emerged in Quito in recent 
history have been private non-profits. Over the past two years, both the municipality 
and the ministry have established their own departments to perform the role of social 
managers. This highlights a difference in the approach when compared with Bogota’s 
private-sector strategies. The incorporation of actors with social skills into policy teams 
suggests that the other actors are aware of a problem. It is also a sign that they believe 
the social manager’s presence will influence how owners assume their role in the 
governance of the condominium. 
The fact that in Quito social management is hired or incentivized by the public sector 
demonstrates a concern with the policy outcomes. The discourse about the role of 
social managers is couched in the language used by some Latin American scholars in 
housing research who argue for what is called the ‘social construction of habitat’. That 
concept denotes a constructivist approach to housing, an approach widely pursued in 
Ecuador by actors that favor social housing policies. 
In Colombia, in contrast, it is the developers that promote social management. In 
Bogota, these actors are also concerned with how communities manage and maintain 
their buildings. Even more importantly, they care about their success as developers 
and their reputation among low-income housing consumers. Since Bogota has more 
affordable housing developers than Quito, competition among them is stiffer in 
Bogota; therefore the actors in the housing development process try hard to win more 
clients for their projects. 
The interview with a social entrepreneur in Bogota revealed the need to hold 
informational sessions with the project managers of the development companies 
(Graña and Amarilo): 
[original version]
L: Entonces nos dimos cuenta de una cuestión bien importante y es que los 
técnicos, por naturaleza no son sociales, los técnicos son generadores de 
conflictos con el cliente, porque ellos son asi. 
R: Son los que generan conflicto?
L: Si, entonces nosotros dijimos entonces lo primero que hay que hacer 
es conciencia social en el personal técnico de obra para que entiendan, 
que lo que están haciendo es importante y que va a afectar la vida de seres 
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humanos. Entonces nosotros generamos todo un tema de capacitaciones, 
Graña inmediatamente se la creyó. Amarilo, lo hicimos hace poco, pero Graña 
inmediatamente dijo, esto hay que hacer con todo el equipo técnico, y lo hicieron 
con toda la empresa, dictarles unas conferencias, unas capacitaciones para que 
ellos entendieran, que era lo que hacia gestión social, y porque lo hacia y para que 
lo hacia. Desde ahí tenemos muchos hinchas en los mismos gerentes de proyecto. 
La ignorancia no es solo en nuestras comunidades, la ignorancia también es 
nuestra, las constructoras, del equipo que esta haciendo parte, los desarrolladores 
del proyecto 
[translation]
L: So, we noticed a very important aspect, that is that technicians, by nature, are 
not social, technicians are conflict generators with the clients, because they are 
like that. 
R: They are the ones that generate conflict?
L: Yes, then we said the first thing to do is create social consciousness within the 
technical workers involved in the building process so that they can understand 
that what they are doing is very important and that it will affect the life of 
human beings. Then we generated, a little while ago, a series of lectures, Graña 
immediately bought into the idea. Amarilo, we did it a while ago, but Graña 
immediately said, we need to do this with all the technical team, and they did with 
all the company, giving lectures, and training to make them understand what that 
social management does and why we do it. Since them we have many fans of the 
project managers. Ignorance is not only found in our communities, ignorance is 
also our own, the builder’s, the team that is part of the project development. 
Since the social management role is not regulated by policy norms, different strategies 
have been developed in Bogota and Quito. Each company can take a different approach 
to the work they do with the community of co-owners. Table 6.2 includes the list of 
social managers in Bogota and Quito and shows their relationship to the affordable 
housing projects that were studied. In Bogota, they are all part of the private sector, 
whereas in Quito they are both public and private. 
In Bogota private initiatives include corporations, horizontal property training schools, 
and social movements such as the Nodo de Propiedad Horizontal de Bogota. Their 
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participation in the policy network is sometimes by invitation from developers and 
sometimes by way of their involvement in social housing movements. 
In Quito, on the other hand, both the municipality and the ministry put social workers 
in charge of social management. Most of their interventions concern rules and 
manners for co-residence and the rights and obligations of co-owners. Whereas in 
Quito there is no formal course in which both owners and future leaders can receive 
training in governance and management in horizontal property, that opportunity does 
exist in Bogota. 
SOCIAL MANAGER BOGOTA QUITO
Public N/A ++
Private +++ +++
Characteristics Corporation,                        
Independent training school, 
Developer’s department.
Foundation,                     
Women´s association,      
Municipal department.
Contracted by Developers Developers,                           
Public departments
TABLE 6.2 Social management organizations, Bogota and Quito. (author, based on fieldwork)
Some of these social managers have more than ten years of experience; this is true 
of the Responder corporation in Bogota and the Bien Estar foundation in Quito. They 
have each developed their own methods through the years, regularly evaluating their 
performance to improve the outcomes and their strategies. They both work on co-
residence rules, help to identify leaders in the community, and then support decision-
making to make the first internal regulations, the co-residence agreement, and help 
establish the first board of homeowners. They both engage with the communities step 
by step while sharing information about the rights and obligations, opportunities, 
and difficulties about living in horizontal property. Maintenance of the buildings is 
delegated to the property manager, while the expenses or costs need to be assumed by 
all in a cooperative manner.47  
47 In 2013 together with Fundación Bien Estar we organized a meeting in Quito where leaders of Fundación Re-
sponder, Fundación Bien Estar and Social Management of the Housing Ministry were able to discuss and share 
methods for and approaches to the work they do.
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§  6.3.2 Property Manager
Another key actor directly linked to the maintenance of the condominium is the 
property manager. In low-income condominiums, this role is not generally performed 
by a large management company. Instead, the association of homeowners employs an 
individual who earns a basic monthly salary; alternatively, this person can be hired by 
the developer during the phases of exchange of property. The property manager does 
not have a definite position as an actor in the external or internal networks. The laws 
of horizontal property are prescriptive in this sense; therefore, the final result is an 
outcome of the processes of governance and decision-making, whether at the external 
or internal level. The networks of Bogota and Quito differ quite significantly in this 
respect. 
By law, in Bogota, having a property manager is obligatory. This actor should be hired by 
the developer during construction, and the developer should keep this employee on a 
provisional contract until the exchange of common property is finished. 
The property manager then becomes an external actor that responds to the interests 
and goals of the developer. When the assembly of owners is constituted, owners can 
decide to hire a new property manager, which by law becomes the representative of 
the legal entity of the condominium. The property manager is an actor in the internal 
network, and as such he/she can respond to the interests of the homeowners when 
problems arise with the developer. As a property manager who participated in the focus 
group in Bogota expressed:
"There is something that we have not been taking into account in this discussion, 
let’s say during production, well, it is time to ‘give a stick’ to [put pressure on] the 
developers (“dar palo al constructor”) so that they can take this into account and 
look for solutions, because at the end of the day, when problems of deterioration 
caused by bad construction or bad materials occur, they are the ones that have to 
respond. Some problems are only evident when people use the dwelling. So there 
are problems with the guarantee: with the request process and compliance as the 
responsibility of the developer.”48 
48 Horizontal property manager of a low-income condominium. Focus group 3, Bogota, November, 2012 [record-
ing min.1:04’15’’]
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In Quito, on the other hand, a provisional property manager is not compulsory. By law, 
however, the board of homeowners, acting upon the assembly’s decision, can hire an 
external property manager or, if they cannot afford one, can delegate management 
responsibilities to the president of the assembly of homeowners. Accordingly, the 
position of the property manager falls under the governance arrangements between 
co-owners and the developer.
The position of the property manager, whether internal or external, will influence the 
perspective of other actors involved in the network as well. Moreover, it will influence 
the maintenance of the common property. Some property managers do not want to 
work with low-income condominiums because they know that people cannot afford the 
expense, or because there is no board of homeowners capable of enacting the formal 
procedures to hire them.49 As expressed by the same property manager in the focus 
group in Bogota: 
"There is another aspect of the problems that the owners and residents have, 
which is about the profiling of the customers, so that somebody has to see that the 
monthly mortgage payment, plus the maintenance fee has an approximate value 
of x is something that they can afford. And even though by the laws of consumers 
the builder’s sales office has to be transparent about these costs."50  
The property manager is an actor that stands between the owners’ interests and the 
developer’s position. In the course of their job, property managers are directly affected 
by affordability problems and the lack of information about the property regime. 
Property managers in Bogota organize different activities to raise funds in other, more 
creative ways. They may hold parties or raffles to collect money to cover, for example, 
the costs of improving or renovating floors or the tiles in common areas.  
In Colombia, even though the law requires a property manager, some low-income 
condominiums cannot afford one. The obligatory role of the property manager has 
been an incentive to create learning centers where individuals can train and become 
49 Conversations with property managers of low-income condominiums in Bogota, June, 2011, September
50 Horizontal property manager of a low-income condominium. Focus group 3, Bogota, November, 2012 [record-
ing min.1:12’10’’]
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professionals in condominium property management. In Ecuador, in contrast, property 
management by an external actor is not obligatory. The president of the board can 
assume that role as an internal actor if the condominium has established a board of 
homeowners and kept it running through the years. 
§  6.4 Characteristics of the policy network 
Using information from semi-structured interviews and focus groups, this section 
compares three characteristics of the network: multiformity, interdependence, and 
closedness. 
§  6.4.1 Multiformity 
Multiformity, in the network perspective, lies inside an organization, guiding its core 
values and goals (Kickert et al., 1997). The present research has identified several 
differences in values and goals between Bogota and Quito. In terms of goals, the actors 
from Bogota and Quito that have corresponding roles, it is interesting to observe 
some differences between their values; those differences have actually influenced the 
behavior and therefore the characteristics of the network. 
Values
Actors’ values comprise one of the dimensions that can illustrate the multiformity 
of a network. Different values make the network characteristics more complex, and 
if differences do not complement each other they can lead to conflict. Differences 
in values are evident from the actors´ lines of reasoning, which influence how they 
perceive other actors’ behavior in the network. For example, a complex relationship in 
which values diverge sometimes grows between the developer and the property registry 
officer, as seen in both Bogota and Quito. Ultimately, the role of the property registry 
is to guarantee that the formal processes related to the ownership regime and housing 
policy are carried out correctly and that the outcomes are recorded in the title deed 
in compliance with established rules. Interviews showed the importance of honesty 
and accuracy for a robust property registry, yet these may conflict with the values of 
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some developers who prefer efficiency and, for the sake of expediency, might register 
condominiums with documents that include mistakes.51
As one official from the property registry in Bogota put it: 
"…to definitely receive the subsidy is when they [developers] come through my 
office. If the title is not registered, even though the subsidy has been approved, 
and even though the title is written and complies with general requisites, with 
the savings and all that is ok, but if it doesn’t comply with the legal requisites 
they don’t give the subsidy, until they receive my signature. And then they can 
get the ‘certificate of freedom for property transactions’[‘certificado de libertad 
y tradicion’] stating that they [dwellings] comply with all requisites of the law of 
social interest housing or housing of priority interest."52  
The perception of the developers regarding the position of the property registry is 
generally ambivalent. The property registry has the power to stop the process until all 
documents are correct, referring to documents of the individual purchaser and those of 
the condominium. The differences in values influence another network characteristic, 
namely closedness, as expressed in the veto power of the property registry office, which 
will be discussed further in a following section. Developers need to carefully consider 
this phase in their project management in order to ensure their expected outcomes. 
They need to stick to values such as accuracy, responsibility, and honesty regarding the 
technical work they perform. 
In other cases, the values may differ but cooperation may still be possible. In Bogota 
values such as social responsibility in the work they perform made some developers 
absorb the costs of hiring social managers to facilitate community building. At the 
same time, that action facilitated the closing of sales, which in turn is good for the 
developers’ main goal. Social responsibility was one of the values mentioned in Bogota, 
along with the quality of housing provided for all of the income groups they serve. 
51 Interviews with stakeholders of property registry offices, in both Bogota and Quito, mentioned difficulties with 
developers regarding compliance. When specific information about the properties is not correct, the process is 
delayed until the developer can re-submit the documentation for further registration. Of course, not all develop-
ers make mistakes.
52 Property Registrar, Focus group 4, Bogota, November, 2013.
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Competition with other affordable housing developers makes the developers value 
the quality of the housing complexes; that is unlike the situation in Quito, where the 
developers did not mention quality. 
In Quito, the values of the developers, such as their technical responsibility in the 
provision process and their conviction of the need to provide affordable housing, 
kept them in the network. They stayed in that network, even though it was difficult to 
continue operating in that market. The reason for this difficulty was the lack of trust 
in the subsidy housing program. This is another value that developers in Quito hold 
dear; they want stability and continuation of the subsidy policy in order to plan their 
investments and housing developments. However, developers have lost faith in the 
housing program due to the changes that are made to its policy mechanisms every time 
there is a new official in charge at the housing ministry. 
Goals
Looking at the public and private actors in both networks, one discerns common 
ground in their goals. Table 6.3 presents a list of actors and their goals, as derived from 
their remarks during the semi-structured interviews, when asked about their role in 
the network and their main goal as an organization. Let us start with a comparison of 
the roles and goals of the housing ministry in both countries. Colombia’s goal of raising 
the number of homeowners is more clearly articulated than that of Ecuador. In the 
Ecuadorian national plan, the goal of achieving adequate housing for all is stated from 
a human rights perspective. Therefore, if Colombia’s focus is on subsidy policy, its goal 
is to allocate as much money as possible to building for owner-occupancy. The goal of 
allocating a certain number of subsidies for low-income homeownership is difficult 
to achieve in both cities. A subsidy is not considered ‘allocated’ until the owner has 
completed the purchase process and has received the unit from the housing developer 
or from the organization in charge of selling the units. 
When looking at the diversity of organizations and actors involved, it appears that each 
one has different goals; while one wants to allocate and close mortgages, others want 
well managed communities. The situation is similar in Bogota and Quito. Despite 
their differences, the networks of Bogota and Quito produce affordable housing. The 
organizations have been working together for more than two decades, so they know 
how to manage their differences. For example, because Ecuadorian developers do not 
have much faith in the subsidy policy, they become very active as soon as policies seem 
about to change. They get involved in the policy process to ensure that the subsidy 
policy remains in force, ensuring a strategy to achieve adequate housing.
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Even though organizations have different values, they are prone to collaborate due to 
other factors such as interdependence. As for Ecuadorian developers, they depend on 
the housing ministry to keep their business going; otherwise, dwellings would not be so 
affordable to low- and middle-income families.
BOGOTA ORGANIZATION GOALS QUITO ORGANIZATION GOALS
Public
Ministry More homeowners Ministry Subsidy allocation for 
homeownership
Municipality Achieve provision of affordable 
housing in the city
Municipality Achieve provision for affordable 
housing in the city
Cadaster Updated information of land and 
properties
Cadaster Updated information of land 
and properties
Property registry Record correct information in 
titles
Property registry Record correct information in 
titles
National Savings 
Fund (FNA)
Good savings and percentage of 
mortgages financially closed
Social security institute (IESS-
BIESS)
Issue mortgages 
financially closed
N/A Municipal housing company Produced and sold percentage 
of affordable dwellings
N/A Social managers of ministry or 
municipal housing company 
Sustainable communities
Private
Developers Dwelling sales, profit Developers Sold dwellings, profit
Lenders No defaults mortgages, percent-
age of closed ones
Lenders No defaults mortgages, per-
centage of closed ones
Property managers Earnings based on co-owners’ 
maintenance fee payment 
culture 
N/A
Notaries Earnings due to high number of 
sold dwellings
Notaries Earnings due to high number of 
sold dwellings
Social managers Well-managed communities Social managers Well-managed communities
Family welfare funds Subsidy allocation N/A
Insurance companies Building insurances Insurance companies
Securtiy companies Contracts with co-owners Security companies 
TABLE 6.3 Actors´ goals in policy network in Bogota and Quito 
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§  6.4.2 Interdependence
Interdependence is an important factor. It shows the relative position of each actor in 
the network, considering the resources they use to achieve their goals. The distribution 
of resources across all of the players demonstrates the level of interdependence among 
them, especially when one actor needs the resource that another actor possesses or 
manages. For instance, the provision of housing is contingent upon the allocation of 
subsidies in the form of a down payment for low-income housing. That is a subsidy 
given by the government through different organizations in Bogota and by the ministry 
itself in Quito. The provision process is also highly dependent on municipalities’ norms 
and regulations for land and housing development, particularly on their capacity to 
provide cheap land with basic services, in order to develop housing for the poor. 
A strong dependence on the municipality’s norms and regulations emerged as the 
main resource dependence that everyone in the focus groups mentioned.53 Strong 
dependence was also mentioned with regard to the availability of cheap, developed 
land. For instance, one participant in Bogota framed dependence in this way: 
"First you need land; otherwise you cannot give titles of units that are built in the air."54
Table 6.4 names the actors and the main resources they use to achieve their goal. 
The chart only includes data that was collected during the focus groups. Therefore, an 
abbreviation in the table denotes ‘not present’ (np) for the actors did not in attendance 
at the focus groups held in Bogota. The fact that actors such as the ministry and 
cadaster did not attend the meeting is most likely a sign that they do not see a role for 
themselves in the network. Apparently they did not have any interest in participating 
with the other actors in the network. 
53 During the focus groups, the participants were asked to assume that subsidies and land are a resource that in 
fact exits, an assumption that was posited to avoid never-ending discussions about the presence or absence of 
these two key resources for housing policy. The important question concerns who has these resources and what 
their relationships are with other actors.
54 Focus group, table 1, Quito, October, 2013.
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BOGOTA ORGANIZATION RESOURCES QUITO ORGANIZATION RESOURCES
Public
Ministry N/P* Ministry Subsidies as affordable housing 
incentives
Municipality 
(several departments)
Land management, subsidies, 
human resources, norms, design, 
projects, urban planning, differ-
ent forms of associations
Municipality Planning and license depart-
ments, norms and manage-
ment, procedure norms, 
ordinances.
Metrovivienda Land management and 
development
Public housing company Municipal norms, private 
finance, housing program, land, 
technical human resources, 
municipal budget, manage-
ment capacity
Cadaster N/P Cadaster Information, ordinances for 
property registry and appraisal
Property registry Laws, subsidy policy, horizontal 
property law
Property registry Horizontal property law, 
domain historical data, tools to 
guarantee legality of property 
transactions
National Savings 
Fund**
Savings, subsidies, developers 
with green stamp, land
Social security institute Annual budget for investment, 
Mortgages 
Social managers Condominium communities
Private
Developers Materials, building capacity, 
economic resources, subsidies, 
loans, knowledge, information
Developers Private finance, technical 
knowledge, human resource, 
national subsidies, social ac-
companiment, efficient housing 
construction, experience 
Lenders N/P Lenders  Knowledge and experience in 
housing finance and develop-
ment, support for affordable 
housing developments, loans 
for builders and buyers
Property managers Management, training, normas, 
owners, maintenance fees, train-
ing and education capacity 
Property managers N/A
Notaries N/P Notaries Norms, and instruments 
for titling 
Social managers Community, horizontal property 
law 
Social managers Comprehensive product for 
community management 
Family welfare funds Subsidies, housing policy, hous-
ing supply
N/A
TABLE 6.4 Actors’ resources in policy network in Bogota and Quito  
Source: Focus group, activity 1
* Not present in focus group.
** Public lending (FNA).
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The other key resource that makes two actors interdependent is financing, both for the 
future low-income owner and for the developer. As one actor in Bogota put it, no matter 
what they do, the process of provision only goes part of the way toward satisfying their 
needs if other actors in the network do not collaborate with them:
"There are units for which we cannot finish the sales process because it is not 
possible to do a financial closing or because the subsidy is delayed, the financial 
entities also delay the transfer of money or because the municipal services 
departments do not give the certificate of utilities availability, so all this is an 
indicator. We can produce, but if the other entities do not support the process of 
sales then we are stuck halfway, with the costs of the effort."55   
The goal of the subsidy is to ensure that the amount, together with a small sum 
in savings and a small loan, will be enough for the beneficiary to afford a low-cost 
dwelling. Affordability problems among low-income people can kick in at this point in 
the process and would therefore affect the network as a whole. This linkage illustrates 
the interdependence that arises among future owners and the lending organization, 
the notary, and the property registry, a relationship that ultimately affects cooperation 
among all actors in the policy network and how they achieve their interests.
The actors that mentioned experiencing direct interdependence with low-income 
owners were the property managers and the social managers. They referred to low-
income owners as ‘beneficiaries’, ‘the community’, or ‘the owners’. The actors in these 
two management positions saw the owners as a kind of general resource for achieving 
their goals, implying that they perceived owners as a collective and not as individual 
households. 
The position of the ministry in the network resembles its position in the vertical 
structure of government. That may be inferred from how strongly the external 
actors in Quito perceived their relationship with the ministry, a relationship based 
on the subsidy resources that the government provides. This interdependence is 
not asynchronous, because the relationship during implementation of policy is not 
temporary. The ministry, the developer, the municipality, and the owners will be 
55 Developer, from Bogota. Focus group, table 3, November, 2013.
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engaged in the process for several years, at least until all the dwellings have been built 
and sold. The situation is different in Bogota. The Colombian ministry has less presence 
in the network than it does in Quito. The institutional design of the policy and the role 
of the Family Welfare Fund make the network of Bogota more horizontal than that of 
Quito regarding the role of the housing ministry.  
Looking more closely at interdependencies, it appears that some actors think the 
interdependence with regulations and norms and the registration of condominium 
properties is complex. Norms and regulations refer principally to (1) the housing law 
that regulates the subsidy allocation process, (2) city spatial plans, (3) building codes, 
and (4) horizontal property law. Actors in the focus groups perceived the regulations 
as complex because they tend to change according to political conditions.56 From a 
network perspective, a lack of stable regulations can lead to problems when the effect 
of regulations is to establish unstable arenas and patterns of interaction, thereby 
affecting the outcomes of the governance network. Those actors that establish and 
manage processes related to normative and regulatory resources have a very strong 
position in the network. These strong actors are the ministry, the municipality (building 
permit department, cadaster), and the property registry. 
Actors such as the building permit department, the cadaster, and the property registry 
have a difficult role. They have to make sure that every project and every dwelling is in 
compliance with the legal procedures of securing homeownership.57 These processes 
generally take time and are often referred to by the developers as the most critical 
moments in the development of housing. Successful interaction with these three 
departments will mean that negotiation with lenders (mortgage money transferred) 
and with the ministry (subsidy) will allow the financial process to be completed. 
The research for this thesis revealed an interdependence between these departments 
and the social manager. That interdependence is perceived as strong because the 
actors can serve as mediators; they recognize problems and difficulties in governance or 
even delays in housing provision. In Quito, the municipal housing department, which 
56 In practice, it is only the city's spatial plans and the housing law that change frequently, as these are suscep-
tible to planning processes and political decisions. The housing law that regulates the subsidy is perceived as 
changeable because it is contingent on national goals, development plans, and spatial plans, all of which tend 
to change according to local political dynamics. Changes in policy norms create changes at the procedural level, 
thereby complicating the provision process; actors then need some time to adapt to new institutional changes.
57 The municipality of Bogota has a department in charge of the control of housing developers to avoid fraud for 
consumers. Developers need to register the project information with this department in order to get authoriza-
tion to sell housing units. In Quito, there is no department that resembles this role.
TOC
 192 Affordable Condominium Housing
acts as a public developer in the network, has a team of social workers. In September 
2012, the ministry of housing (MIDUVI) installed a new department with the task of 
managing the social process for community organization. Some private developers 
have also incorporated the collaboration with social managers into the provision 
process.58 The position of this actor in Quito is not yet clear in terms of the network 
described in the previous sections. 
The role of the social manager in Bogota is accompanied by the role of the provisional 
property manager, as required of the developer by the property law. According to the 
law on horizontal property, the developer is obliged to employ a provisional property 
manager until 51% of the units have been sold. At that point, the law requires the 
developer to organize the first assembly meeting in order to transfer the powers of 
governance and maintenance of the property to the new community. Interdependence 
with the developer throughout this process is critical because, until all sales are 
finished, the developer is also a co-owner in the condominium. While still trying to 
finish up the sales, the developer will be concerned about maintenance. In that light, 
the developer may turn to marketing strategies that are generally used to attract buyers 
and create an environment of confidence with an eye to future projects. 
This is the period of time in which interdependence between owners and developer 
is vulnerable to conflicts. The presence of the developer inside the ownership regime 
creates the perfect environment for a free-rider culture among new owners. That is 
because the developer is still covering most of maintenance costs and responsibilities. 
Meanwhile, the developer is not sharing information or the power of decision-making 
with the new owners.59 The interdependence established by the developer as owner 
is a disincentive for advancing the self-government process. The interaction changes 
when the social manager is present because owners then have direct access to an 
actor who can mediate on interdependence issues with the developer. Even though in 
Bogota a property manager is required by law, few developers have incorporated the 
assistance of social managers until the community is ready to take responsibility. Some 
developers, in both Bogota and Quito, prefer to engage teams with social expertise in 
condominium organization to facilitate successful financial and social conditions for 
closing of the project. So doing would ensure their return on investment and complete 
58 Municipal Public Housing Corporation (Empresa Publica Metropolitana de Vivienda), interview and visit to 
Ciudad Bicentenario housing development with Alexandra Jaramillo, Quito, Sept, 2012. Mutualista Pichincha 
housing development, and Bien Estar Foundation. MIDUVI, new department of 'gestion social' (social manage-
ment).
59 While the developer finishes the sales process, post-sales problems with the construction of the property start to 
appear, and the developer is responsible for fixing those problems.
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the project on time, as planned. The social managers, being hired by the developer, are 
in a difficult position both inside and outside the condominium governance levels. They 
depend on the developer´s resources as well as on the owners’ participation for the 
work they do.60 Consider, for example, what is still going on in Ciudad Verde, the urban 
development project from which one of the condominiums for the survey was chosen. 
There, the private developer is still in charge of the maintenance of some areas. So the 
developer hired a social management corporation to help maintain the organization of 
the many housing blocks that are built. In the end these costs accrue to the developer. 
LOW-INCOME OWNER
HOUSING 
MINISTRY
LENDER
PROPERTY MANAGER
OWNERS’ASSOCIATION
SOCIAL
MANAGER PROPERTY REGISTRY
BUILDING PERMIT DPT.
CADASTRE
NOTARY
DEVELOPER MUNICIPALITY
FIGURE 6.1 Actors and interdependency (source: Focus groups results, empirical research, 2012)   
Figure 6.1 is a diagram of the interdependent relationships among all of the actors 
who participated in the focus groups in both cities.61 At the top are the two main actors 
in housing policy: the end-beneficiary of the subsidy; and the low-income owners, 
60 Their work involves a series of workshops and activities with owners as informative meetings but also commu-
nity building. During these workshops, social entrepreneurs identify leaders in the community that can assume 
roles on the board of homeowners.
61 Social managers appear in a dotted box because their presence is exceptional; only a few social entrepreneurs 
were found. Considering the system as a whole, the norm is that there is no social entrepreneur. 
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who are directly connected to the policies of the housing ministry since they form the 
target group. The developer, the municipality, and the lender appear at the second 
level; they are related to the actors above and below them. Other actors such as the 
social manager and the property manager are critical to the relationship with the lender 
and developers. Finally, the owner´s association is the collective actor that closes the 
circle of interdependent relationships in this network. Once it has been constituted, 
the association finishes the development phase and takes over the governance and 
management responsibilities. The position of the social manager is different and its 
box is therefore drawn with dotted lines suggesting porous boundaries. Although he/
she is the only actor that is not regulated by the law, the social manager is nevertheless 
part of the policy network. 
§  6.4.3 Closedness
Actors in this policy network of affordable housing under a condominium regime 
respond to certain steering policies, especially the ministry’s rules for subsidy 
allocation. When they do not respond to steering policies, or other interventions, it can 
be said that the actor demonstrates a closedness characteristic within the network (De 
Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2012). 
However, the process for developing housing in coordination with a set of actors that 
will use the subsidy is not specified in detail and is thus left to governance dynamics. In 
this context, from a network perspective, some actors will be less responsive to steering 
policies than others. Also, some actors have veto power within the network, meaning that 
their level of autonomy allows them to choose whether or not to participate in policy the 
network, or even to stop the process until there is compliance with their own rules. 
Differences in how actors respond to steering policies reflect each actor’s frame of 
reference, which is built on the core values of its organization. Some closedness to the 
steering signals of policy is necessary. In the dynamic political context of Colombia and 
Ecuador, in which national policies for subsidy allocation adhere to political trends, 
some level of closedness is beneficial, as it ensures continuity in the provision of 
housing thanks to the autonomy of certain players. 
Closedness as expressed by the property registry, that was also perceived by the 
developer on the part of the registry is also necessary to some extent. If the dwellings 
are to be owned, the property registrar will be a key actor, ensuring the legality of the 
process and assuring that the documentation is complete. 
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It is relevant to point out some closedness characteristics of the developer. These 
vary, depending on whether the developer is a private enterprise or whether it is 
the municipality acting in that capacity. The developer’s position is strong, but also 
vulnerable. If developers’ financial interests are not assured, they will not enter the 
policy network, putting the ministry in a difficult position with respect to achieving 
policy goals. 
Closedness on the part of the developer can provoke conflict. Once the property rights 
have already been established as collective ownership, the owners can become more 
active and exercise their self-governance powers. However, this is not convenient for 
the developer until the project is completely finished. Closedness of the developer is 
mediated by the temporary property manager or by the social manager, if there is one. 
In cases where there is neither a property manager nor a social manager, some owners 
have taken on leadership roles. Based on their recently acquired property rights, they 
can mediate with the developer to make the co-owners’ voice heard. 
§  6.4.4 Conclusion about characteristics of the network
Network characteristics such as multiformity (of goals and values), interdependence, 
and closedness give information about the behavior of actors and their positions in 
a process that requires collaboration in order to achieve the goals of each one. In this 
analysis, the property manager and the social manager stand out as those actors 
that had contacts with families in both cities. Other actors, such as the municipal 
departments and developers reaffirmed their interdependent role, demonstrating that 
they are part of a network. 
Actors from both cities mentioned that during the policy implementation process they 
relied on stable municipal rules for housing development and that finance actors were 
crucial to achieving their goals. In this regard, there were no differences between the 
networks of Bogota and Quito. 
A difference was found between the cities regarding the role of the cadaster. In Bogota, 
this actor did not attend the focus group sessions, implying a lack of interest in getting 
to know or in participating with other actors in the network. The opposite occurred in 
Quito, where the role of the cadaster is critical to housing development. 
In summary, the system of housing policy implementation in both Bogota and 
Quito can be described and analyzed in terms of network theory since it is clearly 
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not a hierarchical structure anymore. In general, the actors acknowledge the need to 
collaborate, since they see their own position in terms of interdependent relationships. 
§  6.5 Perception of maintenance problems 
The second activity during the focus groups sessions in Bogota and Quito included 
discussion of a vignette. The participants were presented with the scenario of an 
affordable housing complex, built by a private developer, which starts to deteriorate 
as soon as people move in. The same hypothetical case was used in both cities. It was 
presented in Spanish, so the version below is the translation.
VIGNETTE
Hypothetical case presented (with pictures): 
A housing developer is ready to build an affordable housing project. After two years 
the dwellings are built and about 120 families will start moving into the housing 
complex. These dwellings are in a closed housing complex arrangement, and 
families are now supposed to take responsibility for maintenance of the complex. 
One owner will say, “I didn´t know I have to pay this fee, no one told me, I already 
pay the bank.” 
Two more years pass and the housing development project starts to show signs of a 
lack of maintenance and deterioration. Some parts of the common property need 
finishing and the community is not doing much to change that. 
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Participants of the focus groups were asked two broad questions: 
1 What went wrong, what causes deterioration?; and 
2 What can be done to solve the problem?
The methodology called for active participation. This entailed writing ideas on cards 
and then placing these on a flip-over board. Participants were asked to draw a line on 
the paper-board to represent the timeline of housing provision, dividing it into the 
three phases of production, transaction, and consumption (see picture). The timeline 
of housing provision was used to guide actors to think of responses and situations that 
occur in each phase. Each focus group had a paper-board to work on and to affix the 
cards on which they responded to the questions regarding the case presented in the 
vignette (see chapter 3 for more detail). 
The responses reveal how the actors perceived the deterioration path presented in the 
vignette. The following sections analyze the responses in relation to each of the three 
phases of housing provision and draw comparisons between the perceptions in Bogota 
and Quito. 
1  
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2  
3  
FIGURE 6.2 Focus group – Quito (Photo credit: R.E.Donoso)
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§  6.5.1 Perceptions of problems in Bogota and Quito 
Perceptions within the policy network in Bogota suggest that most of the problems 
during the production phase are related to inadequate coverage of the housing policy. 
As one of the actors wrote: "The problem appears during consumption but the origin 
could have been the design or management that did not take into account the social 
aspect. All because of failures in policy design." Table 6.5 below summarizes the 
responses related to the production phase. In Bogota, a problem that was mentioned 
in all focus groups was the misinterpretation of the economic capacity of the buyers. 
The estimates did not take maintenance costs into account. That comment led to a 
discussion of problems related to the design and the poor materials used in housing 
construction. 
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN PRODUCTION PHASE RECURRENCE OF RESPONSE 
IN FOCUS GROUP
Maintenance costs not considered in economic capacity of buyers +++++
Design of dwellings, lack of finishes, poor materials ++++
Social configuration of communities +++
Lack of coordination ++
Insufficient information given to buyers +
TABLE 6.5 Bogota  - problems identified in production phase 
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN PRODUCTION PHASE RECURRENCE OF RESPONSE 
IN FOCUS GROUP
Bad quality of construction and building standards +++
Incomplete information about horizontal property +++
Delays with construction process +
Lack of community organization before moving in +
TABLE 6.6 Quito - problems identified in production phase 
In Quito, three of the focus groups mentioned the bad quality of construction and the 
building standards as the origins of the deterioration process, thus tracing its origin 
back to the production phase of housing provision. On this topic their perceptions 
correspond to those of their counterparts in Bogota, where bad quality of standardized 
construction and poor materials were mentioned as part of the cause of deterioration. 
Another perceived problem in Quito which was recurrently mentioned in the focus 
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groups is the lack of complete information about the horizontal property law. The 
future homeowners or beneficiaries of the housing policy are insufficiently informed. 
In Quito the law of horizontal property was mentioned from the very beginning as 
an important resource during the production phase. Table 6.6 shows which types 
of problems were identified and the degree to which each response recurred in the 
focus groups. 
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN EXCHANGE PHASE RECURRENCE OF RESPONSE 
IN FOCUS GROUP
Lack of information about maintenance costs +++
Lack of social management in the process ++
Lack of information about property law  ++
TABLE 6.7 Bogota - problems identified in exchange phase
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN EXCHANGE PHASE RECURRENCE OF RESPONSE 
IN FOCUS GROUP
Internal regulations were not written with the community, lack of com-
munity organization
+++++
Lack of information about the law, rights and obligations +++
Developers’ lack of compliance with offered quality of buildings ++
Complexity with horizontal property law regulations ++
Delays in exchange processes +
Buyers do not like the condominium regime +
Poor construction quality +
TABLE 6.8 Quito - problems identified in exchange phase
Other problems were identified that occurred during the exchange and consumption 
phases of housing provision. Regarding the exchange phase, the participants in 
Bogota identified a ‘lack of information’ about property law and maintenance costs 
as problematic factors that influence deterioration processes, as shown in Table 6.7. 
It is interesting that unlike the actors in Quito, who mentioned a lack of information 
about the law during the production phase, the actors in Bogota raised a more specific 
point regarding the exchange phase, namely the need to explain the legal obligations 
in detail. The necessary knowledge about maintenance costs can include the specific 
costs involved in certain complexes. Since not all affordable housing complexes are the 
same, each will require tailor-made planning and management for maintenance. 
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In Quito, the number of problems identified regarding the exchange phase was 
considerable. Again, the lack of information about the owner’s rights and obligations 
was mentioned. However, it was very interesting that the actors mentioned one of the 
formal rules in condominium, namely internal regulation. They were concerned about 
the lack of participation of the owners in this phase, which they saw as problematic or 
even as a cause of deterioration. Other problems identified during the focus groups 
in Quito are related to the formal procedures for development, notably the need to 
register a horizontal property project in the cadaster and in the property registry before 
sales can start. Table 6.8 shows the problems perceived to have originated during the 
exchange phase. 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 list the more recurrent comments regarding problems that caused 
deterioration and are related to the consumption phase of the hypothetical case. In 
Bogota, actors mentioned the high level of household mobility, tying it to occupancy 
by tenants who do not have sense of ownership, as something problematic and related 
to deterioration. Renters were considered problematic by actors in that focus group; 
however, this comment appears only in this one table as it did not come up in the other 
phases. The same applies to the concern about the builder´s construction guarantee, 
which the owners find difficult to use when materials or construction problems show 
up in the building. The actor mentioned that this problem was evident from experience. 
Even though it was not a recurrent comment in other focus groups, it is interesting to 
take note of the responsibility of an external actor (builder) for an internal governance 
problem. 
The importance of management practice and economic resources for maintenance 
were the most recurrent comments regarding the consumption phase. The first 
comment, on management, expresses the perception that property managers can be 
either external or internal to the community. In Bogota, this role is obligatory and it is 
a paid job. However this comment may be related to a lack of economic resources for 
maintenance, which was also a recurrent comment in Bogota. 
In Quito, problems causing deterioration were attributed to weak community 
organization and a lack of leadership. Another cause was perceived as the culture of 
individual living, implying different habits than collective ones, which can be related 
to the lack of respect for collective norms, rights, and obligations in condominium. 
Other comments were less recurrent: problems with economic capacity; the quality 
of construction, which includes materials that are difficult to maintain; and even 
informality, as when a co-owner pursues renovation or makes extensions in the 
building without due process (approval in assembly of owners). 
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PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN CONSUMPTION PHASE RECURRENCE OF RESPONSE 
IN FOCUS GROUP
Bad management +++++
Insufficient economic resources for maintenance +++
Lack of appropriation of common property as owners ++
Insufficient information ++
Failure with builder’s guarantees +
Renters do not have sense of ownership +
Lack of social cohesion among co-owners +
TABLE 6.9 Bogota - problems identified in consumption phase 
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED IN CONSUMPTION PHASE RECURRENCE OF RESPONSE 
IN FOCUS GROUP
Weak community organization, lack of leadership +++
Lack of respect for norms, rights and obligations +++
Cultural background of individual living, different habits +++
Insufficient responsibility of condominium owners ++
Lack of maintenance, defaults on maintenance fee ++
Law is not adjusted to reality ++
Lack of maintenance by the property manager +
Insufficient economic capacity +
Building materials, environment more difficult to maintain +
Lack of municipal control +
Changes to building, informality +
TABLE 6.10 Quito - problems identified in consumption phase
§  6.5.2 Solutions 
The focus groups also considered possible solutions for deterioration in low-income 
condominiums. As with the questions discussed above, the participants were asked to 
write up proposed solutions on cards and place them on the housing provision timeline 
that had already been drawn on the flip-over board mounted on the wall. Tables 6.11 
and 6.12 summarize the solutions that participants brought up in the discussion, both 
in Bogota and Quito. 
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PRODUCTION EXCHANGE CONSUMPTION
Planning for sustainability, all 
phases;
self-sustainable communities
+++ Training with contracts, co-res-
idents, 
common property, ownership
+++ Establish income-generating 
units inside condominiums to 
finance maintenance
+++
++ Social and juridical information ++ Lower taxes +
Different forms of ownership, 
organization and governance, 
“Juntas de acción comunal” 
++ Established methodology to work 
with communities, maintenance 
fees
++ Use common areas 
to generate income
+
Education and training + Sensitize co-owners about the 
risk of de-valorization of their 
property
+
Public policy to regulate 
social managers
+
Involvement of all actors with future 
co-owners
+
Include maintenance in financial 
assessments
+
Maintenance of social interest 
housing projects to municipality 
+
Transparent information +
TABLE 6.11 Proposed solutions in Bogota 
In Bogota three key solutions emerged, once for each provision phase. The participants 
came up with more solutions for the production phase than for the other provision 
phases. The most recurrent one is to plan for self-sustaining communities, a solution 
that could influence the outcomes of other phases too. The second most frequently 
mentioned solution is to think in terms of other forms of organization and of tenure 
when designing housing policies. 
One of the solutions for the exchange process concerns training or preparation to 
become an owner. Specifically, training regarding the purchase contract would prepare 
the owners for co-residence, common property maintenance, and ownership by 
informing them about the rules. In regard to the consumption phase, actors in Bogota 
considered that affordable condominiums could include units or spaces that might be 
used to generate income to finance maintenance.
The list of suggested solutions for the production phase in Bogota can be useful 
when looking for ways to improve policy. Provision of full information and training 
was also considered important, and not only during the exchange process. Other 
forms of organization and ownership that would imply a change in the institutions of 
governance were also mentioned. For instance, attention was drawn to Juntas de Accion 
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Comunal, which are governance structures that have traditionally shaped the way low-
income barrios are organized. 
From a financial point of view, one solution would be to include maintenance costs 
in the financial assessment for a mortgage. That expense is apparently ignored in the 
economic analysis of the capacity to repay a mortgage, with the result that people 
cannot afford to pay any other costs, such as the monthly maintenance fee. 
Working with the community and training the owners were mentioned as solutions. 
Furthermore, the actors recognize the importance of a single methodology for working 
with communities and determining how they can deal with maintenance costs. Many 
organizations already exist in Bogota to facilitate community self-organization. As they 
see it, there is every reason to seek common ground for intervening with communities, 
evaluating previous work, and improving methods of intervention.
PRODUCTION EXCHANGE CONSUMPTION
Quality control of 
construction and materials
++++ Information about urbanization and 
building codes, law of horizontal 
property
+++ Establish internal norms and 
regulations according 
to social group
+
Establish a financial equilibrium 
point before starting a new project
+ Training of community work + Practice “good living” concept +
Initiate and implement obligatory 
social management
++ Agreements with different 
institutions to expedite sales and 
transaction process
+ Maintenance with community 
work (minga)
+
Disseminate information 
on the law of horizontal property 
+ Include maintenance fees in 
mortgage financial assessments
+ Sign co-residence agreement 
when signingn property title
+
Establish loans for condominium 
maintenance
+ Create a co-residence manual +
Establish minimum standards of 
building quality
TABLE 6.12 Proposed solutions in Quito
Among the solutions proposed by the focus groups in Quito, two in particular stand 
out. Regarding the production phase, there is a need to improve quality control for 
construction and materials in affordable housing projects. Regarding the exchange 
phase, it could be useful to share information about building codes, and the law of 
horizontal property with future low-income owners. 
There are more solutions of interest in Table 6.12. Regarding the production phase, 
two focus groups mentioned the possibility of making a social manager compulsory 
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as a means to prevent dwellings from deteriorating. And information on the law of 
horizontal property could be disseminated in the social management process. 
Several solutions were mentioned for the exchange phase. One is to include 
maintenance fees in the financial assessment of the owner’s capacity to repay the 
mortgage. Another is the possibility to establish loans for condominium maintenance. 
Regarding the construction process, one solution is to reach agreements with other 
institutions make the sales and transaction processes more efficient. 
Ways to prevent deterioration during the consumption phase include community work, 
such as self-organization and informal activities. Other solutions belong to the realm of 
formal institutions, such as a co-residence manual, or the need to include a signature, 
as a contract, attesting that one agrees to comply with the co-residence rules, when the 
owner signs the property title. 
In Bogota, the focus groups mentioned that deterioration during the exchange and 
consumption phases is related to bad management and a lack of funds. By citing ‘bad 
management’ they attribute the problem to an external actor, not to the community 
of owners. In a way, that perception is consistent with the Colombian horizontal 
property law. However, a lack of funds is a problem that the manager encounters in 
the community. The proposed solutions amount to more training for management 
and changes in norms so that communities can generate income using the common 
property resources. These solutions are therefore best understood as belonging to the 
realm of formal institutional change. 
§  6.5.3 Comparison of perceived problems and solutions 
In both Bogota and Quito, the professionals involved in housing provision recognized 
the problems regarding the deterioration process that affordable housing projects are 
confronting. They had the opportunity to formulate some solutions and discuss these 
with other professionals. From a comparative point of view, the perceptions of the 
problems that cause deterioration differ between Bogota and Quito. The divergence is 
most apparent within the phases of housing provision. Those problems are related to 
either formal institutions, such as condominium rules, or informal institutions, such as 
problems in the network or at the level of community governance. 
To begin with deterioration problems, in both Bogota and Quito these are perceived 
to be related with the policy approach. In Bogota, professionals mentioned the 
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need to take the costs associated with maintenance into account when making a 
financial analysis of a household’s capacity to purchase an affordable house. In Quito, 
professionals mentioned the problem too, but one that arose later in the process of 
housing provision, namely during the consumption phase. Secondly, professionals in 
Bogota were concerned with the low quality of construction, as were their counterparts 
in Quito. One perceived problem with the initial design of housing policy is related to 
the rules that apply to housing subsidy holders and the other to the rules that apply to 
the quality of dwellings. Solutions that were elicited during the second activity of the 
focus group were correspondingly related to these two topics. 
Other perceived problems are related to governance and the implementation of 
policy. Lack of sufficient information for homeowners was mentioned as one of the 
problems causing deterioration. Regarding the exchange process in housing provision, 
professionals in both Bogota and Quito stated that complete information should be 
provided. That would include education about the law of horizontal property, one’s 
rights, and the obligations of living under a condominium regime. At this level, there 
was convergence of opinion across the cities. A problem that was mentioned in Quito 
but not in Bogota concerns a formal rule of condominium: the internal regulation or 
the statute of the condominium property system. The lack of participation by future 
homeowners when internal regulations are being drafted is perceived as problematic. 
In accordance with housing development processes, internal regulations are written by 
the first owner who signs the declaration of the condominium regime for the land. 
In summary, maintenance problems are perceived differently when the timeline of 
policy implementation is brought into the picture. That timeline is drawn as spanning 
the provision processes: production, exchange, and consumption. The same difference 
applies to solutions. Some of these can be implemented from the beginning with a 
better drafted policy, which would include the role of social manager whose activities 
begin towards the end of the housing provision process. 
In both cities, maintenance problems were seen as starting in the very first part of 
the process. In Bogota maintenance problems were attributed to policy, but they 
were attributed to incomplete information and bad construction quality in Quito. In 
both cities, the law of horizontal property was mentioned during discussions of the 
transaction phase. In both cities the focus groups emphasized its importance when 
talking about problems due to a lack of information among co-owners about their 
rights and obligations regarding the costs and benefits of maintenance. In Bogota, one 
actor mentioned that the rules could be adapted to the socio-economic environment 
of the communities and adjusted to the specific affordable housing projects. In Quito, 
an actor said that the rules are not adapted to accommodate the reality of the projects. 
In that light, the law itself may be seen as problematic, not only because of the way 
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it is written but also because of the lack of knowledge about it and uncertainty about 
how to use it. Regarding the consumption phase, bad management in Bogota is the 
most recurrent reason that was given for deterioration. In Quito three factors were 
considered important: lack of community organization; lack of respect for norms and 
obligations; and the different habits of co-residence in multi-family buildings. An 
insufficient economic capacity was mentioned in Quito, but not as frequently as in 
Bogota.
It is therefore interesting that management was recognized in Bogota as playing a key 
role in keeping up maintenance but not recognized as such in Quito. In Quito, more 
importance was assigned to characteristics of the community.
§  6.6 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to unravel a set of interlaced perceptions: how 
professionals see their own role, what they consider to be the causes of maintenance 
problems, and what kinds of solutions they propose. To structure their responses, the 
following three research questions were formulated: 
1 How is the policy network composed and how can it be characterized? What are the 
similarities and differences between Bogota and Quito?
The policy network is complex; it has many of the characteristics described by scholars 
of governance network theories. The actors engage in interdependent relationships 
with each other; they exhibit a multiformity of values and goals; and there is closedness 
of key actors. These are characteristics that work together to explain the complexity of 
the policy network. 
The characteristics of a network need to be understood in terms of the position of 
each actor: as either public or private; and as external or internal to the co-ownership 
regime of each housing complex that is built for low-income households. The analyses 
of interdependencies in the network have shown that the developer plays a complex 
role. That role is complex not only in the sense of having both an interest in a return 
on investment and a veto power to stop building affordable housing if there is lack of 
trust in the policy system. That role is also complex in that sense that it is a dual role: 
the actor is both owner and developer during most of the provision process. This actor 
thus possesses important information, whereby it can take advantage of its closedness 
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characteristic and position to accumulate power. The characteristics of closedness 
can vary in some ways, mainly with respect to whether the developer is a private 
entrepreneur or the municipal housing department itself, as in Quito. 
Actors such as the property registrar, which is a public institution in charge of the 
legality and registration of property, hold critical information. That information is 
needed by the owners and property managers for maintaining the common property. 
The problem with the role of the property registrar offices is their closedness. They 
keep the process of registration and the condominium documents underlying it largely 
inaccessible to condominium owners.
The focus groups identified two actors as critical to network governance: the property 
manager and the social manager. In both cities the property manager can be a hired 
professional, though in practice this only occurs in Bogota. Whether this actor is 
internal or external, public or private, the property manager is involved in a series of 
interdependencies with other actors in the network. 
If the property manager is a hired external professional, its role is not the same as it 
would be when that actor is a co-owner. Also, if the property manager was hired first 
by the developer, its role is not the same as it would be if he/she had been hired by the 
board of co-owners. As governance network theory asserts, the relationships among 
actors change in response to the position they occupy. The second actor identified as 
critical by the focus groups is the social manager. A social manager is neither required 
nor regulated by the law but were invited to join the network to help facilitate sales and, 
more importantly, to disseminate information about the institutional arrangements 
of condominium. However, the scope of their role is still highly dependent on the 
developer during the provision process. They can participate if the developer invites 
them or hires them to work together. Otherwise they are not part of the process. 
2 How do professionals perceive condominium deterioration processes? And how do they 
deal with it? Do they use the property law? What are the similarities and differences 
between Bogota and Quito?
Deterioration of the affordable housing complexes has been recognized by a range 
of actors -- the developer, the lending sector, the housing ministry, the municipality, 
the property managers, and social managers -- as a problem that might have 
different origins during the housing provision process. During the focus groups, the 
deterioration process was seen to originate not only after low-income homeowners 
have moved into their new dwellings. It was also attributed to problems that had 
already arisen during the production and exchange phases. Therefore, other actors are 
implicated in the causes of deterioration processes. 
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Developers in Quito as well as in Bogota identified one of the main problems of 
deterioration as the fact that the costs and benefits of maintenance had not been 
incorporated in the policy at the time it was drafted, and the fact that maintenance had 
not been addressed in the planning stage when the construction costs were calculated. 
The actors complemented their perception of the problem with a solution: to manage 
maintenance costs and the quality of the building processes through policy. Moreover, 
they suggested including maintenance costs and responsibilities in a complete 
information package regarding common property rules. That information could then be 
shared with future low-income owners. To prepare for co-ownership in condominium, 
knowledge about costs of maintenance and regulations of the horizontal property 
regime is considered crucial. 
At the end of the provision process low-income owners have to manage their property 
by themselves. In order to accomplish this, co-owners need to know about and 
comply with the property law as well as with the rules of community organization and 
management. Even if the law does not require it, the actors have agreed to bring in 
some other actors to help with the transition: effective property management or strong 
community organization facilitated with social management. 
As pointed out earlier, professionals at the external level of governance do not perceive 
a direct relationship with the community as a whole. They only recognize their relations 
with the individual owners during the sales process and then they bring in the social 
manager to deal with the community. 
The key difference between perceptions in Bogota and Quito is manifest in the role of 
the property manager in Colombia and that of community organization in Quito. In 
both places, these roles are regulated in the law of horizontal property, which makes 
that legislation a major factor in how those roles are perceived. In Bogota, deterioration 
problems are attributed to bad management or insufficient economic capacity of the 
owners. Both causes would in turn affect the management role of the property manager 
and how that role is implemented. In the end, the perception of the role of the property 
manager comes down to a perceived lack of compliance with legal regulations on 
management and maintenance. 
In Quito, however, the role of the manager is prescribed by law but is neither as 
prominent as in Bogota nor compulsory. Thus, the group responsible for management 
and maintenance is perceived to be the community itself. That responsibility lies with 
the group. It is up to the group to take collective action and develop all the necessary 
strategies for the upkeep of their common property. There are also problems with 
leadership and social capital, in the view of the external actors. They perceive failures in 
organization as being the consequences of insufficient information about the law but 
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also of a lack of compliance with and knowledge of the condominium regime. And the 
solution they propose is to guarantee social management during the housing provision 
process so that owners will be informed about and prepared for the shared living 
arrangements and the regulations that fall under a condominium regime. 
3 How does the network approach help to explain collective action in the policy network?
The network approach first helped us to study what occurs outside the common 
property regime. As set forth in the literature reviewed in chapter 2, Ostrom asserts that 
collective action theories generally missed the chance to study how external factors 
might affect the internal common property situations of collective action. The analysis 
presented in this chapter demonstrates that by applying the network governance 
perspective to the housing system it is possible to study those external factors, which 
are actors in a complex network. So doing can help unravel many of the interdependent 
relationships that are created in the process of condominium housing provision. 
Using qualitative methods such as focus groups, with all of the actors in the network 
gathered around the table, we gave a vivid demonstration of how important it is to have 
moments to share opinions and to think in a cooperative way, thereby resolving the 
prisoner’s dilemma, to use Ostrom’s analogy. People find ways to talk about problems 
and thus to hammer out solutions by changing or adapting to the rules. This interaction 
was an important demonstration of how participants could build up their own social 
capital as a group, as the exercise allowed them to adapt and improve situations for 
themselves and for others. For instance, they could hire social managers in an effort to 
change the outcomes. They recognize that the law itself cannot produce the necessary 
social capital inside the communities of co-owners to keep up on the maintenance of 
the common property. 
This chapter started by citing Ostrom´s call for research into how “the activities and 
policies of external political regimes can affect the level and type of self-organization 
to achieve collective benefits” (Ostrom, 1990:190), and that is what has now been 
done here by observing networks in Bogota and Quito. The relationship of the external 
actors with what needs to occur later among the co-owners was described by the actors 
themselves. Network theory was used to unravel the perceptions of common property 
problems and to analyze how professionals can contribute to possible solutions by 
both respecting and adapting the given rules. The actors did not suggest modifying 
the law of horizontal property. Rather, they recommended improving the policy rules, 
a signal that some network steering is necessary. The problem with the law, in their 
view, lies in the insufficient knowledge about it, regarding both constitutional and 
operational rules.
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Knowledge of what occurs at the external level clarifies what goes on in one part of the 
condominium housing sector. The next step is to observe how it is perceived internally 
by co-owners in condominium, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
Focus group - Bogota
Photo credit: R.E.Donoso.
Focus group - Quito
Photo credit: R.E.Donoso.
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7 Maintenance arrangements 
in condominium tenure: 
The household perspective62 
According to Ostrom, there are two conditions that can help identify a dilemma of 
the commons: (1) suboptimal outcomes, and (2) institutional feasible alternatives 
(Ostrom et al., 2006:16). Under the first condition, the strategies or actions taken by 
users (or resource appropriators) -- assuming a particular set of rules, technology, and 
attributes of the community -- will lead to an outcome that is non-satisfactory or not 
efficient, in the perception of the users themselves. The second condition concerns 
possible institutional arrangements in which users of the resource can agree to 
undertake a collective action. The latter condition, institutional feasible alternatives, 
entails changing or adapting operational rules, taking into consideration the costs 
and benefits at the individual level that at the same time influence the collective 
outcome (Ostrom et al., 2006:16). If there are no suboptimal outcomes, there is 
nothing problematic about a common property resource; and if there is no alternative 
institutional arrangement that can create better outcomes for both the individuals and 
the group, there is no dilemma. 
Affordable condominium housing in Bogota and Quito fulfills both conditions, 
although the situation is specific to each housing complex. Some have deteriorated 
more than others, and institutional arrangements are continuously adapted to 
each community’s situation. For example, in order to make costs more affordable, 
maintenance work may be done on a community work day or a minga (a Quechua 
word used in Ecuadorian and Peruvian Spanish), when everyone is expected to assist 
and collaborate on work instead of contributing to a monthly maintenance fee. While 
mingas are common in Quito, households in Bogota organize bazaars or little markets 
to collect money to cover common property insurance. Both kinds of institutional 
arrangement are informal, since they are not prescribed by law, but they are often 
implemented in housing complexes owned by low-income families. 
62 The analysis of this chapter was published in the International Journal of Housing Policy, co-authored with Prof. 
Marja Elsinga. Since the theory and methods have already been covered in the previous chapters of this thesis, 
the analysis based on the multivariate model, in the form in which it was approved for the published article, is 
included here with permission of the co-authors.
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This chapter is focused on internal governance, and the questions it seeks to answer are 
the following:
1 Which factors are related to the perceived maintenance level (PML) of the common 
property? 
2 Do these factors differ between Bogota and Quito? 
To answer these two questions, a household survey was undertaken to comparatively 
analyze maintenance outcomes in Bogota and Quito. The sample of surveyed 
households (N=414) was drawn from the selected housing complexes in each city.63 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework worked out by Ostrom 
(1990) was incorporated in the questionnaire design: the variables are related to 
(1) community characteristics, (2) institutions and governance, and (3) resource 
characteristics. 
Section 7.1 introduces the chapter by applying the IAD framework to the condominium 
maintenance level, explaining how the concepts were operationalized and organized by 
blocks. Section 7.2 shows how the dependent variable of perceived maintenance level 
(PML) was calculated, as measured at the household level. Section 7.3 presents the 
variables and hypotheses as derived from Ostrom´s framework, and their relationship 
is tested at the univariate level. 
Section 7.4 then discusses the results of the first multivariate regression model 
for both Quito (7.4.1) and Bogota (7.4.2). Section 7.5 concludes the chapter by 
summarizing the results and the factors associated with PML in comparative 
perspective and by answering the chapter´s research questions. These conclusions 
pertain to conditions in the selected housing complexes of each city. However, the 
models and key findings presented here are also relevant to a comprehensive study of 
governance of condominium tenure in cities, since these are models that can be tested 
or compared to other institutional conditions.
63 More detailed information about the sampling distribution, questionnaire design, and fieldwork procedures 
were explained in the methods chapter (Chapter 3).
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§  7.1 IAD framework applied to affordable 
condominium maintenance problems
The institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) can be applied to 
understand the factors associated with a collective outcome (i.e., maintenance of the 
common property elements), although this is an individual measure. The outcome 
is studied as it is perceived by the individual heads of the households surveyed in 
the selected affordable condominiums. This measure gives us one way to diagnose 
the problem. The action-situation, namely maintenance, involves participants and 
their positions. Here, the participants are low- and middle-income households and 
their position is that of residents, either in owner-occupied or renter-occupied units. 
Ascertaining what kind of information they possess can elucidate some issues of 
interest for this analysis: for instance, whether they know their rights and obligations, 
such as the responsibility to participate in the assembly meeting of homeowners, the 
obligation to pay the maintenance fee, and a shared responsibility to maintain the 
common property.
Not every situation in a common property resource environment involves a collective 
action dilemma. It is important to distinguish between a dilemma of the commons and 
other types of situations. 
§  7.2 Dependent variable: Perceived maintenance level (PML)
To measure the performance of the condominiums we used the perceived maintenance 
level (PML) as the dependent variable. Households were asked to grade the level of 
maintenance (not maintained = 1, maintained = 2, and well maintained = 3) of a total 
of ten physical elements of the housing complexes that were common property and in 
common use. The common property elements chosen concerned the land (gardens, 
parking area, and walkways), the structure (facades, stairs, roofs, and common rooms 
for meetings), and the infrastructure (water pipes, lighting of common areas) (see 
Table 7.1). The sum of the scores (a total of 30 points) for the ten elements became the 
PML index, indicating very low perceived levels of maintenance at a minimum of 10 
points and perceptions of good levels of common property maintenance at a maximum 
of 30 points. The reliability of the different factors related to the common property 
elements was tested using principal component analysis, obtaining Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficients of .943 for Bogota and .873 for Quito. These high coefficients indicate 
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that each element’s grading was consistent. Table 7.2 includes the mean of the PML 
scores for each housing complex surveyed in Bogota and Quito. The differences within 
housing complexes were statistically significant (p < .01) in both countries. 
COMMON PROPERTY BUILDING ELEMENT 
Land
(1) Gardens
(2) Parking areas
(3) Walkways
Structure
(4) Facades
(5) Stairs
(6) Roofs
(7) Common room (for assembly meeting)
(8) Main entrance to complex
Infrastructure
(9) Water pipes
(10) Lighting in common areas
Common goods
Not included (bank account, office equipment)*
TABLE 7.1 Common property elements in Perceived Maintenance Level (PML)
* Office equipment and bank account in low-income condominiums are common in Bogota but not in Quito.
CITY & HOUSING COMPLEX CODE N MINIMUM MAXIMUM PML MEAN STD. DEV.
Bogota 200 10 30 23,6 5,6
B01 54 10 30 24,6 5,4
B02 50 16,3 30 23,5 4,3
B03 46 10 30 18,8 5,4
B04 50 17,8 30 27 3,8
Quito 214 10 30 20,7 4,8
Q01 56 10 30 19,3 4,9
Q02 52 10 30 21,5 4,8
Q03 50 11,3 27,5 19,5 3,8
Q04 56 12,9 30 22,4 4,9
TABLE 7.2 Descriptive statistics of the Perceived Maintenance Level (PML) by case study
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The survey included a control question to measure the convergent validity of the PML 
index. Perceived maintenance levels were expected to be negatively correlated with 
the costs of the work required to be done on those specific elements of the common 
property. The participants were asked about the current condition of the common 
property element and whether or not it needed maintenance, repair, or renovation. If 
the elements needed repair, this would mean that there were more costs associated 
with the maintenance score. The negative correlation coefficient in both Bogota (n 
= 200, r = -.696, p < 0.01) and Quito (n = 214, r = -.5562, p < .01) confirmed the 
hypothesis that a lower PML reflects the level of deterioration. This provides validation 
for its use as the dependent variable to measure the perceived maintenance outcome.
§  7.3 Independent variables: Elements of the action-situation 
Table 7.3 lists the topics that were included in the household survey, based on the 
work of Poteete, Ostrom, and Janssen (2010). Community characteristics concern the 
individual household’s socioeconomic conditions, the duration of stay in the housing 
complex, trust in the board of the condominium, and the amount of social capital. 
Table 7.4 shows that age and education are significantly related to PML in Bogota but 
not in Quito. Also, interest in being active on the board and trust in the board were 
significantly related to PML, both in Bogota and Quito. Finally, the extent to which the 
inhabitants identify themselves with maintenance problems plays a significant role in 
Quito.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERCEIVED MAINTENANCE LEVEL (PML)
BLOCK 1
COMMUNITY
BLOCK 2
GOVERNANCE
BLOCK 3
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Socioeconomic attributes Government organisation Size of the resource
History of use Network structure Quality of human-
constructed facility
Trust Property rights system Economic value
Social capital 
TABLE 7.3 Blocks of variables associated with the perceived maintenance outcome (based on Ostrom (2007) 
and Poteete et al. (2010) for condominium maintenance arrangements)
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COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS THIRD-TIER VARIABLES
Socioeconomic attributes Head of household gender (GENDER)
Age of head of household (H_AGE)
Head of household education level (EDU_LEV)
Household income level (INCOME_RANGES)
History of use Living time in the building or housing complex (LIV_TIME)
Tenure, or type of occupation (TENURE)
Leadership (trust) Level of interest in participating in the board (INTRST_BOARD)
Interest in assuming property management role (INTRST_MNGR)
Trust in management effectiveness (TRUST_MNGMTCOSTS)
Trust in manager (TRUST_MANAGER)
Trust in the board of homeowners association(TRUST_BOARD)
Social capital How well people know the neighbors (KNOW_NGBOR)
Collective efficacy (COMM_EFFICACY)
Identify problems with maintenance (MAINT_PROB)
TABLE 7.4 Community characteristics variables
Condominium property rights and obligations are included within the governance 
block of variables, including the rights and operational rules, as well as monitoring 
and sanctions that are regulated by the property law. Table 7.4 shows that a number 
of variables are significantly related to PML: attendance at the general meeting was 
significant in both cities, while perceived responsibility for maintenance, planning 
for maintenance, and knowledge about funds were significant in Bogota. Variables 
regarding sanctions when an owner gets behind with the maintenance fee, including 
the informal sanction of monitoring, did not have any effect on PML in either Bogota or 
Quito. 
The physical features of the housing complex, such as size and quality, were 
operationalized as the total number of housing units. The construction quality of 
the human-built resource was measured with a categorical question that graded 
the perceived quality of the common property in the built environment. The 
bivariate analyses found that only the perceived quality of the common property was 
significantly related to PML in both Bogota and Quito. However, in Quito, PML was also 
related to the size and quality of the housing units.
The univariate relationship of each variable with the perceived maintenance level 
(PML) was studied by city. The variables included in the multivariate model are only 
those that showed a univariate statistically significant effect in PML. 
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§  7.3.1 Characteristics of the community (co-owners and tenants)
With regard to household characteristics, the second-tier variables included 
socioeconomic attributes, history of use, leadership (including signs of trust), and 
social capital. Third-tier variables such as gender, age of the head of household, 
household income, and household education level were the socioeconomic 
characteristics covered in the survey. Table 7.5 presents descriptive statistics for these 
variables. 
BOGOTA QUITO
Count n=200 Percentage (%) Count n=214 Percentage (%)
Gender Male 116 58,0 131 61,2
 Female 84 42,0 83 38,8
Age 18-24 years old 6 3,0 8 3,7
25-34 years old 59 29,6 42 19,6
35-44 years old 50 25,1 47 22,0
45-54 years old 41 20,6 44 20,6
55-64 years old 21 10,6 33 15,4
65 years old of above 22 11,1 40 18,7
Education level Primary school or below 30 15,0 46 21,5
Basic secondary school 20 10,0 48 22,4
Higher secondary school 62 31,0 21 9,8
Technical degree 38 19,0 7 3,3
University degree or above 50 25,0 92 43,0
Household Income** $ 0 - 339 22 11,2 11 5,1
$ 340 - 679 62 31,0 45 21,0
$ 680 oe 1.019 37 18,5 52 24,3
$ 1.020 oe 1.359 23 11,5 40 18,7
$ 1.360 oe 1699 12 6,0 19 8,9
$ 1.700 or above 40 20,0 47 22,0
Tenure Owner occupiers 128 64,0 175 81,8
72 36,0 39 18,2
TABLE 7.5 Socio-economic characteristics of surveyed households in Bogota and Quito
*AGE and INCOME were measured as numerical variables but recoded into categorical variables n=414 
**Monthly income values from Bogota were converted into dollars (exchange rate July 2014) and inflated to Colombian consumer 
price index (December 2014) . Scale is based on Basic Income Salary which is similar in both countries when converted into dollars: 
$320 (COL) $340 (ECU).
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Tenure form identifies some elements of the history of use as an owner-occupied or 
tenant-occupied unit. In Bogota, 64% of the surveyed households are owner-occupiers 
and 36% are tenants. In Quito, 82% percent are owner-occupiers and 18% are tenants. 
Variables regarding norms and social capital concern the extent to which the heads 
of households know their neighbors, as measured on a three-point scale (not at all, 
somewhat, or well). In Bogota 24% of the households said that they do not know who 
their neighbors are, in comparison to only 11% of the households in the Quito housing 
complexes. A high share of them knows ‘some’ of their neighbors: 68% in Bogota and 
63% in Quito. Those that know all of their neighbors well make up only 8% in Bogota, 
but in Quito this response was much more common at 25% (Chi-square within cities 
sig. at p <0.01). 
In a separate question, households were asked whether or not they agree with this 
statement: In this housing complex the community easily collaborates to keep the 
complex clean. They could respond ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’. This item measured the 
perception of collective efficacy of the group, which is considered another indicator of 
social capital in the community (Kleinhans, 2007). In Bogota, 39% agreed with the 
statement while 62% disagreed. And in Quito, 44% agreed while the remaining 56% 
disagreed. 
§  7.3.2 Rules and governance 
Second-tier variables regarding governance are separated into the following groups: (1) 
government, (2) network structure, (3) property rights system, (4) operational rules, 
and (5) monitoring and sanctions (Table 7.6). 
The role of government in condominiums involves coordination between households 
and the public sector during the subsidy allocation processes. In Bogota, 44% of 
households were subsidy-holders while in Quito 50% of households had received the 
subsidy. Interdependence with external actors, as one characteristic of the network 
structure (Bortel, van & Elsinga, 2007; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007), was measured 
by asking the head of household the following: in your opinion, who is responsible 
for maintenance of the building or housing complex? This question was open-ended; 
the responses were later codified as either internal or external. A high percentage of 
households in Bogota recognize the property manager as the principal responsible 
person, while in Quito the responsibility falls under the board of homeowners. 
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Affordable condominium housing provision often includes the participation of social 
managers in the housing provision process. The variable ‘know rights’ is a way to 
operationalize the influence of social managers and to see if knowing about rights 
positively or negatively influences PML. In Bogota 58% of households said that they 
know their rights while in Quito this percentage was 64%. 
INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE THIRD-TIER VARIABLES
Government Received (or not) down-payment subsidy (GOV_SUBSIDY)
Network structure Perceived responsibility for maintenance (MAINT_RESP)
Received information about rights and obligations (KNOW_RIGHTS)
Social management (SOC_MNGMT)
Property rights system Acknowledge existence of the assembly of co-owners (ASSEMBLY)
Assistance at assembly meeting (ATT_ASSEMBLY)
Operational rules Proposed rule/change in assembly meeting (PART_ASSEMBLY) 
Planning for maintenance (MAINT_PLAN)
Knowledge about reserve funds (RSVR_FUND)
Rule about pets in the building (RULE_PETS)
Maintenance done by community work day (INFORMAL_COMM_
MAINT)
Monitoring and sanctions Sanction if delays with payment an interest is charged (SANCTION_
COURT)
If delays with payment of maintenance fee (SANCTION_INTRST)
Non-sanction, if late with payment, property manager awaits (SANC-
TION_WAIT)
Knowledge about neighbours being late with maintenance fee (MOTR_
INFORMAL)
TABLE 7.6 Institutions and governance variables 
Variables about the property rights system were used to find out if both owner and 
tenant occupants are aware that there is an assembly of owners in the housing 
complex. In Bogota 88% of households responded yes, while in Quito this percentage 
was lower at 65%. According to the rules, at least 70% of households need to be 
present at the assembly meeting in order to make decisions. The percentage of 
households that never attend the meeting is a sign of high levels of free-riding in the 
complexes. Attendance at the annual assembly of homeowners is compulsory by law. 
Households were asked how often they attend the meeting (never = 0; sometimes = 
2; always = 3). In Bogota, 38% of households said they never go to the meeting, while 
46% always do, and 17% of them attend sometimes. Attendance is higher in Quito: 
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56% of households always go, while 20% of them never go to the assembly meeting 
and 25% of households go sometimes. 
Regarding the operational rules for maintenance, the survey included questions 
about participation in the assembly meeting as well as knowledge about three issues: 
(1) the maintenance plan; (2) the rules on allowing pets in the building; and (3) the 
existence of a reserve fund. Participation in the assembly meeting means proposing 
or suggesting a change of a rule to improve maintenance. In that sense, only 25% of 
households in Bogota have participated in the assembly meeting while in Quito 49% 
of them have done so. Knowledge about the existence of a maintenance plan is not 
widespread. Only 37% of households in Bogota think there is one; similarly, in Quito 
just 34% of households of some kind of plan for maintenance. Whether or not there is 
a reserve fund for maintenance emergencies is an indicator of the presence of a plan. 
In Bogota 50% of households responded that they ‘don’t know’ whether the housing 
complex has reserve funds for maintenance emergencies. In Quito, 35% of households 
said they did not know about the reserve fund. By law, in both countries communities 
of co-owners are obligated to create this fund. 
A high proportion of households acknowledged the existence of rules or an internal 
norm regarding whether or not pets are permitted. In Bogota, 87% of households said 
‘yes’, there is a rule for pet management, and a high percentage of them (82%) agreed 
with the rule. In Quito, 80% of households recognized there is a rule about pets, and 
78% of them agreed with it.
§  7.3.3 Physical characteristics 
The unified block of variables regarding the physical characteristics recognizes that 
resource units’ characteristics cannot be physically separated from the common 
property of the land, the common structure, and the infrastructure of the building. Size, 
value, and quality are therefore three variables that can be used to operationalize the 
physical characteristics of housing in condominium (Table 7.7). 
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RESOURCE PHYSICAL CHARAC-
TERISTICS
THIRD-TIER VARIABLE
Size Number of dwellings per case (RESOURCE_SIZE)
Human-constructed facility Perceived construction quality of common property (QTY_COM_PROP)
Construction year (CASE_YBUILT)
Economic value Maintenance fee (MAINT_FEE) 
Up to date with maintenance fee (MAINT_FEE_PAID)
Satisfaction (STISF)
TABLE 7.7 Resource physical characteristics variables 
Size is operationalized using the total number of dwellings per complex (Orban, 
2006; Yau, 2014). And construction quality is operationalized using the perception 
of the residents, both owners and renters. In Bogota, 78% of households graded the 
construction quality of their unit as ‘good quality’, while in Quito this percentage was 
lower, at 55%. Perceived quality of the common property was also high in Bogota, at 
78%, while in Quito it was 62%. 
Individual maintenance fees are calculated on the basis of the total monthly cost of 
maintaining all common property parts divided by the shares (shares based on square 
meters) owned by each household. By law it should be divided using the participation 
quota of square meters owned (alicuota). In affordable housing projects, however, 
the units are generally the same size. Therefore, for the calculation of fees, the 
maintenance costs are divided equally by the number of apartments. It is agreed to 
pay the fee on a monthly basis, but it is often paid by the project at hand. For instance, 
the manager may collect money at the moment it is necessary to mow the lawn, which 
comes down to investing in maintenance on a case-by-case basis. The mean amount of 
the maintenance fee in dollars in Bogota is $28.00 while in Quito the mean is $9.00.64 
The sample included some free-riders in both cities. In Bogota, 80% of households are 
up to date with payment, compared to 65% in Quito. 
64 Data from Colombia was first converted to US dollars. Then data from Ecuador was inflated to the Colombian 
prices to make them comparable, using the Consumer Price Index for December 2014.
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Community BOGOTA QUITO
Socioeconomic attributes Gender head of household - -
Age of head of household Yes -
Education level head of household Yes -
Household income level - -
History of use Duration of stay in the housing complex - -
Housing tenure, or type of occupation - -
Leadership (trust) Level of interest in participating in the board Yes -
Interest in assuming property management role - Yes
Trust in management effectiveness - -
Trust in manager - -
Trust in the board of homeowners Yes Yes
Social capital How well people know their neighbours - -
Collective efficacy - -
Identify problems with maintenance - Yes
Governance
Government organisation Received (or not) down-payment subsidy  - -
Network structure Perceived responsibility with maintenance Yes -
Received information about rights and obligations - -
Social management - -
Property rights system Acknowledge existence of the assembly of co-owners - -
Attendance of assembly meeting Yes Yes
Operational rules Proposed rule/change in assembly meeting - -
Planning for maintenance Yes -
Knowledge about reserve funds Yes -
Rule about pets in the building - -
Maintenance done on community work day - -
Monitoring and sanctions Sanction if delays with payment of maintenance fee - -
Non-sanction, if late with payment, people wait - -
Knowledge about neighbours being behind with mainte-
nance fee 
- -
Physical features
Size Number of dwellings per case - Yes
Quality Perceived construction quality of common property Yes Yes
Perceived construction quality of units - Yes
Construction year - -
Economic value Maintenance fee - -
Up to date with maintenance fee - -
Satisfaction  - -
TABLE 7.8 Variables tested for significant bivariate relationship with PML, for Bogota and Quito separately
Tests for significance: Pearson’s correlation (numerical variables) and Anova (categorical variables), yes = significant
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§  7.4 Multivariate Regression Model for Bogota and Quito
The IAD framework was systematically applied in both cities. A multiple regression 
model using a nested approach with cluster correction was developed to achieve more 
robust variances (Williams, 2000), realizing that household perceptions might be 
correlated due to the sample design. The nested approach in STATA is a multivariate 
regression model. The variables were entered by block, following each conceptual 
element of the IAD model. For comparative purposes, rather than treating countries as 
dummy variables, we separated the data. We then developed models for each context, 
testing significant variables and observing R-square coefficients by blocks. 
§  7.4.1 Model for Bogota
From the first block of variables that operationalize community characteristics 
for Bogota, the variable that corresponds to the age of the head of the household 
had a significant influence on the PML. Younger households were more critical of 
maintenance levels than older households. 
Education level was significant when the variables of blocks 1 and 2 were entered; 
however, when block 3 variables were entered into the model, education factors lost 
their significance. This is an indication that other institutional factors were more 
relevant than education level. For example, variables measuring trust in the board 
of homeowners and interest in being part of the board were both relevant measures 
regarding the role of leaders in the community, with a highly significant effect on PML. 
As the negative coefficient demonstrates (-2.514, p = 0.041), people who have some 
interest in assuming a role on the board of homeowners perceive more problems with 
maintenance levels than those who are not interested. Therefore, these are the people 
who are willing to participate and assume the leadership role necessary to improve 
maintenance outcomes. 
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BOGOTA - LINEAR REGRESSION – NESTED 
Dependent variable: PML
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Coef t Coef t Coef t
Variables 
Community 
Age .07273 2.83* .0946 4.76* .07529 3.76*
Education -2.4320 -2.83* -2.3057 -3.15* -1.4256 -1.47
-.3090 -0.48 -.9596 -1.26 -.1941 -0.19
Trust in board 4.7611 7.21** 3.0494 17.05** 2.1821 3.99*
4.7955 4.05* 2.9316 4.90* 1.7944 6.79**
2.8464 1.67 .5918 0.80 .8635 0.83
-3.9075 -5.21* -3.3313 -4.03* -2.3511 -3.48*
-1.2556 -0.82 -1.2227 -0.76 -1.4663 -0.68
Governance
Attendance at board meetings -2.1918 -3.53* -2.3511 -3.48*
-1.8927 -4.10* -1.5946 -3.16*
Feeling responsible for maintenance -3.4718 -3.68* -2.9078 -3.16*
Maintenance plan -2.3738 -6.33** -2.3769
-11.20**
Rules for pets -1.46 -4.84* -1.8338 -3.11*
Physical characteristics
Quality common property -3.7826 -5.39*
-3.4268 -5.08*
Observations 193 Observations 193 Observations 193
R-Square 0.2037 R-Square 0.34 R-Square 0.39
Change in R- 
Square
0.1422 Change in R- 
Square
0.0540
TABLE 7.9 OLS nested model for Bogota 
Robust Std. Err adjusted for 4 clusters in HOUSING_COMPLEX
*Significant at p < .05
** Significant at p < .01
Governance variables, such as those related to the network structure (maintenance 
responsibility), were significant and negative. The PML index for people who placed 
responsibility on external actors (professionals) was -2.90 points less than the PML 
index for those who perceived maintenance to be the responsibility of the internal 
actors such as the residents. Compliance with a property rights regime was measured 
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by looking at how often people attended assembly meetings. PML in Bogota was 
negatively associated with attending assembly meetings. Households that attend 
meetings ‘sometimes’ or ‘always’ perceive lower levels of maintenance than those 
households that never attend. Going to assembly meetings probably encourages a 
better or more transparent idea of maintenance issues in a housing complex. Variables 
related to the operational rules of condominiums were significant, with negative 
coefficients. Furthermore, knowledge about a plan increases the chances of having 
higher PML. 
Finally, the variable that represents the quality of construction of the common property 
resource influenced the PML index. The relationship was negative, meaning that a 
good quality of construction was associated with less satisfaction with the current level 
of maintenance. One explanation for this could be that a good quality of construction 
makes any lack of maintenance more evident. The other physical characteristics, such 
as size, did not have any statistical influence on PML.
To summarize, community characteristic variables explain 20% of the variance in PML, 
and when variables regarding formal institutions are introduced, the explanatory power 
of PML rises by 14%. Finally, the quality of construction of common property areas 
increases the explanatory power of PML, leading to a total R-square of 0.40 in Bogota 
(Table 7.9).
§  7.4.2 Model for Quito
The first variable regarding an individual’s relationship with the condominium 
community is the level of interest in assuming the role of property manager. According 
to Ecuadorian law, this position can be filled by any co-owner of the community by 
being elected the president of the board of homeowners in an assembly meeting. 
Alternatively, if households are willing to pay for that service, the board can hire an 
external person or a company as property manager. The low-income condominiums 
surveyed in Quito did not have external property managers. The results revealed that 
PML scores change negatively when people are not interested in assuming this role. A 
high percentage of households not willing to assume a role in management is a sign of 
lack of interest in assuming leadership in relation to collective action issues.
The second community variable associated with PML was trust in the board of 
homeowners. Households in Quito have trust in their current board members, and 
when trust is high, the association with PML is positive.
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QUITO - LINEAR REGRESSION – NESTED 
Dependent variable: PML
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Coef t Coef t Coef t
Variables 
Community 
Willing to be manager -1.2983 -4.56* -1.5965 -4.60** -1.5500 -3.06*
Trust in board 3.5112 .8759* 2.9679 4.31* 2.8086 7.50**
3.9592 2.56 3.4026 2.19 2.7725 2.75*
1.6050 3.09* 1.7672 4.65* 1.4310 3.40*
Responsible for problems 3.4133 5.38** 3.5547 4.44* 3.2286 3.37*
Governance
Attendance at board meetings 2.8537 3.80* 2.5762 4.45*
1.1073 1.28 1.0099 1.83
Physical Characteristics 
Quality unit .6151 0.59
2.1956 9.74**
Quality common property 1.1550 2.81*
2.5514 1.82
Size -.7995 -1.08
-1.9766 -6.74**
Observations 212 Observations 212 Observations 212
R-Square 0.2167 R-Square 0.2543 R-Square 0.3638
Change in R- 
Square
0.0377 Change in R- 
Square
0.1094
TABLE 7.10 OLS nested model for Quito 
Robust Std. Err adjusted for 4 clusters in HOUSING_COMPLEX
*Significant at p < .05
** Significant at p < .01
Regarding governance variables, attendance at assembly meetings makes households 
more optimistic about the maintenance level. People who ‘sometimes’ go to assembly 
meetings had a PML that was 2.5 points higher than those who ‘never’ attend. Physical 
characteristics such as construction quality were significantly associated with PML. 
As expected, the better the construction quality, the higher the levels of perceived 
maintenance. The variable of size was negatively associated with PML: as the size of the 
complex increases, the PML score decreases.
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In summary, individual perceptions and community characteristics explain 22% of 
the variance in PML, a percentage that increases by four points when the governance 
variables are introduced and by ten points when the variables regarding the physical 
characteristics are included. In total, this model explains 36% of the variance in PML 
among the selected housing complexes in Quito (Table 7.10). 
§  7.5 Comparison of results 
The models presented above included variables regarding the three main conceptual 
elements of the IAD framework: (1) community; (2) governance; and (3) physical 
characteristics. Below we examine the extent to which the interaction between these 
variables and PML is similar or different in Bogota and Quito (Table 7.11). 
VARIABLES BOGOTA COEF. QUITO COEF.
Community
Socioeconomic attributes Age of head of household +
Education level -
Leadership (trust) Trust in board of homeowners + Trust in board of homeowners +
Norms and social capital Interest in participating 
in the board
-
Will to assume a property manage-
ment role
-
Concern about maintenance problems +
Governance
Network structure Maintenance responsibility -
Property rights system Attendance assembly meeting - Attendance assembly meeting +
Operational rules Maintenance plan +
Rule for pets -
Physical characteristics
Size of the resource Size by number of dwellings -
Human-constructed facility Construction quality of common 
areas 
- Construction quality common property +
Construction quality of unit +
TABLE 7.11 Comparison of variables associated with PML in Bogota and Quito 
Dependent variable: Perceived Maintenance Level (PML)
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Variables such as the age of the head of the household and education level were 
associated with small differences in PML in Bogota but were not relevant in Quito. What 
both contexts reveal is the relevance of informal institutions. For instance, Bogota and 
Quito exhibit similar levels of trust in the board of homeowners and attitudes towards 
assuming roles in the management of common property, either as part of the board 
of co-owners in Bogota or as both owner and property manager in Quito. A specific 
concern about maintenance levels was a significant variable in Quito but not in Bogota. 
The effects of this variable can be explained with reference to the governance variables, 
since in Quito concern about maintenance levels was associated with attendance at 
assembly meetings. 
The establishment of a board is obligatory and generally prescribed in condominium 
laws. However, whether or not people have trust in the board is something that cannot 
be regulated. Trust is therefore the result of informal processes or is facilitated through 
the involvement of social managers, who can help members of a community get to 
know each other and recognize trustworthy leaders. 
An understanding of the condominium structure may explain the difference in levels of 
trust. In Bogota, some members of the boards have received training in condominium 
management and community organization. In Quito, however, these kinds of training 
opportunities are not available to low-income owners, unless a social management 
entity is hired by a developer. Trust needs to be sustained over time and, therefore, it 
matters who participates in the board or in management roles. The problem is that 
participation in the board of homeowners or as a manager is not a popular activity 
among co-owners in the sample. Consequently, rotation, as one of the democratic 
principles underpinning the condominium obligations, is difficult to achieve (Yip & 
Forrest, 2002). To summarize, community characteristic variables in both Bogota and 
Quito explained about 20% to 22% of the variance in PML. 
As expected, and corresponding to one of the most important assumptions in this 
research project, there are significant differences between Bogota and Quito at the 
level of institutions and governance that are related to differences in the property law. 
Specifically, differences are seen in terms of operational rules, such as the use of the 
maintenance plan and, more importantly, the role of the external property manager, 
which is regulated in Bogota and not in Quito. Having a maintenance plan is an 
indication of some forethought regarding deterioration processes, and the significance 
of this variable with regard to PML proves its interdependence with property law 
prescriptions.
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A similarity between the two countries with respect to governance is seen in the central 
role of assembly meetings of owners. As seen in the condominium bundle of rights, all 
five rights and obligations, including voting powers, are exercised during the meetings 
of homeowners. In Bogota, attendance at meetings makes households more critical 
about their collective maintenance outcomes. In Quito, attendance at meetings gives 
people a better idea of what can be achieved and therefore has a positive association 
with PML. Households in Bogota seem to rely on a well-functioning board and are 
inclined to attend meetings when not satisfied, while in Quito the opposite occurs. 
Since there is less trust in Quito, people concerned about maintenance levels are more 
inclined to attend the meeting of owners and help to improve conditions. 
The incorporation of the physical characteristics of the resources in this particular 
analysis of condominium tenure makes Ostrom’s approach appear to be a valid 
framework to use in the development of a comprehensive institutional analysis of 
this common property resource. Construction quality was measured in terms of the 
perceptions of the owners and residents of the housing complexes. In both cities, 
the quality of construction of the common property was strongly associated with 
PML outcomes. However, the effects were different in Bogota and Quito. In Bogota, 
the relationship was negative, while in Quito it was positive. One explanation for this 
difference may be that there are higher construction standards in Bogota, a condition 
encouraging a more critical perspective on maintenance levels among households. 
The use of resource size as a measure is highly debated in the literature on collective 
action, and there is no agreement about the effect of the size of the group on collective 
outcomes. As Ostrom would have expected, there is no definite relationship between 
size and PML: the size of the housing complex had some effect in Quito but not in 
Bogota. More important than size is the multilevel structure of governance that a larger 
housing complex may develop. For example, in Bogota, the largest complex surveyed 
had an efficient decentralized system of governance that appears to work well, in light 
of the PML scores. Each housing block has an administrative committee that sends a 
representative to the main board of owners of the whole complex. The larger housing 
complexes in Bogota have higher PML scores than the smaller ones. The opposite was 
found in Quito. There, the largest complex lacked an efficient governance system, 
as it had no clear physical boundaries for management, which is in the hands of the 
general board. However, smaller complexes with more clearly defined boundaries for 
management and maintenance show higher levels of perceived maintenance. 
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§  7.6 Conclusion 
Most studies acknowledging the dilemma of property rights in condominiums analyze 
the performance of the condominium using explanatory variables such as household 
and building characteristics (Orban, 2006; Alterman, 2010; Hastings et al., 2006). Our 
study also included governance variables and applied the IAD framework to explain 
the interaction between the formal institution, such as the property law, and the self-
organization and participation of co-owners. Using this additional framework allowed 
us to compare countries and to analyze interactions between the community, the 
governance structure (enforced by the property law), and the physical features of the 
condominium. 
This design of this study proved to have some limitations. Despite being fully focused 
on the role of the law, we could not isolate the effect of the law from other factors. 
We can only infer relationships from our findings and present our reasoning on the 
relationship between the law and the variables in our survey. Moreover, the dependent 
variable was the perceived maintenance level, which may be influenced by factors other 
than the state of maintenance.
Despite these limitations, we think the outcomes can be generalized and applied 
beyond Bogota and Quito to rationalize condominium mechanisms. The combination 
of residents’ perceptions with other more formal condominium processes 
demonstrates that governance mechanisms are implied in condominium tenure, 
creating a bridge between theory and the empirical setting (Bengtsson & Hertting, 
2014). 
Theoretically, no single variable was more important than any other. Rather, in line with 
Ostrom’s framework, it was their interaction that had an impact on the perceptions 
of those involved in maintaining the common property in condominium (Ostrom, 
2005). Based on the results obtained in this study, if there is (1) trust in leaders of the 
community, (2) agreement about who is responsible for maintenance, (3) participation 
in assembly meetings, and (4) adequate physical conditions of the building that 
can be maintained, the owners are likely to have higher estimates of the benefits 
(higher PML) than those who do not trust others and do not go to the meetings. One 
variable that made a significant difference in regression analysis was the knowledge 
of a maintenance plan. A planning process can be transformed into information and 
sustain self-organization. Owners collectively need information, as well as knowledge 
about rules, to be able to manage the condominium complex institutional setting. 
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The expected result was a positive relationship between self-organization and PML 
and a higher score on perceived maintenance in Bogota than in Quito. In line with our 
hypothesis, the results demonstrate that the perceived maintenance level of the cases 
in Bogota was, on average, higher than in Quito. However, contrary to our hypothesis, 
participating in self-organization in Bogota had a negative effect on PML, while in Quito 
it had a positive effect. This differential is mirrored in the negative coefficients between 
PML and the role of the external or professional property manager, in comparison to 
the positive coefficient when the property manager comes from within the community. 
This demonstrates that although the law prescribes the presence of paid property 
management, norms and trust play a more important role when the community prefers 
self-organizing for maintenance. 
While these findings indicate that the law matters, the relationship between formal 
arrangements required by law, self-organization, and maintenance outcomes is more 
complicated than expected. What they also indicate is that the more advanced and 
formal organization in Bogota appeals in particular to those residents who are less 
satisfied with maintenance, who then tend to participate. On the other hand, it may be 
that people are less positive about the maintenance because they are more aware of 
it. It is important to further analyze this issue in order to find a good balance between 
formal arrangements in the law and the mechanism of self-organization. 
The challenge in Bogota is to maintain the formal structure while promoting greater 
involvement of the inhabitants. The situation in Quito is different due to the flexible 
legal context; residents in Quito are more active, and they actually go to the meetings 
hoping to contribute solutions. The functioning of the network structure of affordable 
housing provision can benefit from a well-managed and effective meeting of the 
owners and a board that is capable of governing their common property resource. 
Physical characteristics such as size had opposite effects in Bogota and Quito, making 
the importance of this variable debatable, which is in line with earlier work on 
governance and management of the commons (Orban, 2006). 
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8 Conclusion: The balance between 
property law and self-organization 
§  8.1 Introduction
The first question addressed in this thesis was Why are low-income homeowners in 
Bogota and Quito letting their condominiums deteriorate? Narrowing the search for an 
explanation to the institutional setting, the next question was, Is there any difference 
or similarity between Bogota and Quito, considering that each country has a different 
condominium property law? As described at the beginning of the thesis, the housing 
system approach pursued by these two countries is focused on homeownership, 
though in a particular form of tenure: homeownership in condominium. This tenure 
was then explored from several angles: What kinds of formal and informal institutions 
play a role in the condominium regime? How is this form of homeownership to 
be defined? and, given that definition, How are the problems ensuing from a 
condominium regime to be studied? The thesis has addressed key elements of the 
main research questions. These elements were treated in consecutive order, since 
findings from the first and second part of the thesis formed critical input for the 
research design and the research approach implemented in the third part of the thesis. 
Here, in this concluding chapter, the main results are summarized separately for each 
part. That overview is followed by a reflection on the benefits and limitations of the 
underlying theory and the methodology used to answer the research questions. Last, 
some remarks are devoted to the implications for housing policy and future research on 
the topic. 
To recapitulate, as explained in the introduction of this thesis, dwellings are physical 
structures and by their nature prone to deterioration, so they require maintenance. 
Therefore some level of human action is necessary to reverse or at least contain 
the process. Maintenance of a house is not only costly but also requires knowledge 
about and attention to patterns of deterioration in the materials typically found in 
each part. If it is a single-family house, this responsibility lies entirely with the low-
income household that owns it. And housing policy research has shown how difficult 
it is for a low-income family to assume those costs. The affordability of maintenance 
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raises concerns about whether low-income families are actually capable of being 
homeowners in the long run. 
The situation of low-income homeowners in condominium is somewhat different, 
however. Because their property is in part shared with others, maintenance is not an 
individual responsibility but a collective one. Institutionally and physically, owning 
a single-family house in individual property is not the same as owning a house or an 
apartment under the horizontal property or condominium regime.
The research was conducted in two Latin American urban contexts: Bogota and Quito. 
In general, housing policy in Latin America promotes homeownership. For low-income 
families, homeownership is highly subsidized, and Bogota and Quito exemplify these 
particular kinds of policies and problems. 
Dwellings for low-income households started to be provided in multi-family buildings 
during the mid-twentieth century. To that end, a modern form of property that was 
already well established in Europe was adopted in Latin America: the condominium, 
or the horizontal property regime. The South American country with the most up-to-
date law on horizontal property (re-written in 2001) is Colombia. Ecuador, in contrast, 
is one of the countries that still works with its first law, enacted in the 1960s, though 
some key amendments were introduced in 2011 and 2015. 
To shed light on the deterioration path of affordable housing, this study relied on the 
comparative housing system approach, as it embraces the institutions and governance 
of a property regime that has been produced under housing policy mandates. The 
reason to focus on institutions and governance is explained below with reference to 
Elinor Ostrom’s framework for studying common property regimes, the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework (IAD). That theoretical frame is appropriate 
because it covers formal and informal institutions, both of which play a role in 
maintaining physical elements of the common property resource. 
§  8.2 Results
The problem underlying this research is scrutinized by posing different questions 
for each stage of the research. However, an overriding hypothesis was formulated 
as a possible explanation of the observations regarding institutions. Pursuing that 
hypothesis, we could investigate whether any differences that might show up between 
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the Colombian and the Ecuadorian cases may be attributed to differences between the 
respective property laws for condominium ownership. The rationale runs as follows. 
Although self-organization is prescribed by law, it develops informally; in theory, formal 
institutions have a particular role to play in collective organization. The perceived 
maintenance outcomes would presumably be more satisfactory in Bogota than in Quito 
due to Colombia’s more structured and contemporary law. Hence the hypothesis: 
The more contemporary property law in Colombia has a positive impact on self-
organization and in turn on the perceived maintenance level.
Part 1. Theory and methods
To find evidence in support of this hypothesis it was necessary to consider which 
theories would be helpful in explaining the condominium deterioration problem. Part 
I of the thesis presented a theoretical framework in which to place the institutional 
debate on collective action and the commons within the realm covered in the 
comparative housing systems literature. Since the problem involves a common 
property regime, it was necessary to couch the middle-range institutions and 
governance framework of the comparative housing system in broader theoretical 
concepts, which Ostrom’s IAD framework provided. It is important to take the meaning 
that tenure has in a particular housing system into account when making comparative 
policy assessments, and that factor is given due consideration in this thesis. Both 
formal and informal institutions come into play when investigating the form of 
condominium tenure. 
Chapter 2 elaborates on the debate about universalistic versus particularistic 
approaches to comparative housing research, explaining the level of generalization that 
each may have when comparing policy systems. The core issues in the debate come to 
light when a middle-range approach is applied. Such an approach can bring historical, 
cultural, or other ideological arguments to bear on the convergence or divergence 
among the countries under comparison. The middle-range approach identifies 
patterns and typologies, proposing three preconditions for a comparative study of 
housing systems: commensurability (forms of tenure can be comparable), context, and 
theory. Scholars endorsing a middle-range approach call for more qualitative research 
when defining the three conditions and while developing the comparative analysis 
(Haffner, Hoekstra, Oxley & van der Heijden, 2009). 
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The challenge was to identify theories that can explain the collective action dilemmas 
of common property resources, which are dilemmas that often arise in low-income 
condominium tenure, and incorporate these theories in the comparative housing 
research approach. In a common property regime, many factors appeared to play a 
role. Therefore it was useful to apply Ostrom’s institutional framework; it provided a 
theoretical institutional backdrop against which to place both the formal and informal 
rules of the game. From that perspective, the main institutions of the tenure form 
and the physical characteristics of the resource played an important role, along with 
the influence of professionals and policy actors, in the maintenance outcomes of this 
particular property regime. This body of theory recognizes these factors as part of a 
system of actors and institutions. Therefore it was possible to apply it in conjunction 
with the comparative housing and governance network approaches. 
The reason to select and compare low-income condominiums was to understand 
how the institutions of the condominium form of tenure differ from each other. 
Specifically, the goal was to ascertain whether one law, in one context, actually makes 
a difference when it is compared to a different law in another context. The study turned 
first to the formal institutions that constitute the bundle of rights of actors involved in 
condominium ownership; for instance, attention was first drawn to the property law 
and how actors interpret and use it. Some researchers have remained at that stage and, 
following Williamson, explained the top-down approach to a collective action solution 
in terms of regulation (Olson, 1965). 
The notion that homeowners have a bundle of rights does not imply that we are 
studying selfish rational individuals; rather, we are studying residents operating within 
certain boundaries. Those boundaries may be based on trust and knowledge about 
each other (informal institutions), or they may be based on compliance with the law 
(formal institutions). Therefore it is useful to combine Ostrom’s framework with 
Williamson’s approach to governance. Both top-down and bottom-up institutional 
solutions for governance can be found in the condominium regime. The two types 
are even necessary for sustainable self-organized communities to thrive. Ostrom´s 
framework recognizes the role of collective arrangements that arise informally, such 
as trust, leadership, and learning processes within governance structures, as variables 
that might influence collective actions. This integration of formal and informal 
arrangements is important in this thesis. The study underlying it is about people’s 
homes, which are not just buildings. They are structures that are imbued with emotions 
and they afford social relations among members of the households and with neighbors. 
The statement of the problem for this research was commensurate with the mixed-
methods approach that has been applied throughout the thesis project. In chapter 
3, all methods were described and the strategies were laid out. The different levels of 
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information and actors to be studied were introduced, and two approaches, namely 
Ostrom’s framework and comparative housing systems, were integrated to allow a mix 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Part II. Formal institutions
Chapter 4 dealt with the policy for low-income homeownership. It elucidated the 
formal process of regulation by policy and decree that had created the system whereby 
professionals became involved in the provision of condominiums. The following 
questions were developed to guide the research:
How have housing policies been adopted in Colombia and Ecuador? How does the 
incentive-based policy work when producing condominiums? What are the differences 
or similarities in policy and market between Bogota and Quito?
Housing policies in both Colombia and Ecuador are framed under each country’s 
constitutional housing rights with a particular emphasis on homeownership. There 
are policies that focus on informal settlements and other policies that promote new 
construction of affordable dwellings for low-income families. National governments 
have intervened in different ways over the decades. This chapter demonstrates that 
even though government strategies have shifted towards a more systemic approach 
to housing provision, now including the private sector, there is path dependence 
in policies for owner-occupation. This trend is evident from the figures on housing 
included in the analysis of market and census data that were presented in chapter 4. 
The main idea behind the incentive-based housing program is to create a system 
of housing provision for low-income families that keeps the construction industry 
incentivized to build affordable dwellings. The goal is to have a network of both public 
and private actors to create a market of low-cost housing for low-income owner-
occupation. The effects of such a program are more evident in Bogota than in Quito. In 
Bogota it is easier to find housing developers whose portfolios include the provision of 
subsidized dwellings. 
Both the public and the private sector are able to find suitable land where they 
can build in accordance with the prevailing norms for urban development. In both 
cities, these norms are formulated to promote compact and dense development. 
Standardized forms of construction and design for multi-family or collective types 
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of housing are used by developers, who thereby take best advantage of the allowable 
density in land development. Since the apartments will be sold, architectural 
regulations and norms that apply to condominiums come into play. For instance, if 
the policy called for rental housing, the property of the plot of land could remain as 
either public or private, and this will steer who is responsible for management and 
maintenance. 
Both countries have had policies and programs to support the provision of housing 
for owner-occupation since the mid-twentieth century, and Colombia had them even 
earlier than Ecuador. The focus of the market analysis was not to examine affordability 
or quantitative deficit but to characterize the condominium housing market in these 
two capital cities. It was therefore necessary to gather cadaster data. It revealed that 
65% of the dwellings in Bogota are under the condominium regime, while in Quito 
45% of the titles in the cadaster were in condominium in 2011. 
The sections introducing the policies earlier in this thesis identified different actors as 
playing critical roles in the system. In Bogota, the role of the Welfare Family Agencies is 
pivotal within the subsidy allocation system and in housing provision as those agencies 
are builders too. Since these private institutions with a public purpose have direct 
relationships with the future homeowners, they know their target group’s housing 
demands. Therefore these Colombian agencies can organize housing provision more 
efficiently than seems possible in Quito. 
In Ecuador, the subsidy allocation system is managed by the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing in conjunction with its provincial offices. The ministry 
registers and certifies developers as affordable housing providers. Only those that are 
registered are able to build and sell affordable housing because they can receive the 
subsidies upfront, which is an incentive for developers. 
The existing data, or the absence of it, justified both the research approach set forth 
at the beginning of this thesis and the comparative analysis that was presented in 
subsequent chapters. Furthermore, the existing data also demonstrated the extent to 
which the condominium form of tenure is overlooked in the current body of housing 
analysis as well as in statistics on policy outcomes. 
Chapter 5 described and compared how the condominium laws operate in Colombia 
and Ecuador to answer the following subset of research questions: 
What and who is regulated by the horizontal property law? How does the regulatory 
system work in condominium? What are the similarities and differences between 
Colombia and Ecuador’s horizontal property laws? 
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The chapter analyzed each country’s horizontal property law as the main formal 
institution of the condominium regime. Even though there are other rules impinging 
upon the system of condominium housing provision -- such as subsidy regulations 
or municipal license norms -- the horizontal property law is the regulatory body of 
legislation that prescribes who can be involved as agents in the common property that 
will be constituted, self-governed, and maintained. 
Regarding the main differences between the laws, it was found that Colombia regulates 
the moment when the assembly of owners should be first constituted. It is also 
mandatory in Colombia for the developer or first owner to pass the self-governance 
responsibility on to the owners. To summarize the situation in Ostrom’s terms, 
the common property resource in Colombia has a collective-choice rule nested in a 
constitutional one, which is a very important condition for creating the governing body 
of the condominium. In Ecuador, although the collective-choice rule to constitute the 
first governing body is defined, there is no obligation for the first owner or developer to 
call the first assembly meeting. Thus, Ecuadorian law leaves ambiguity in this process 
when the condominiums are new. The law is different when they are old; then there is a 
collective-choice rule that owners can use to call an assembly meeting if necessary.
Part III. Informal institutions and governance
Chapter 6 studied the network and governance of the professionals involved in the 
provision of low-income condominiums. And the following research questions were 
posed:
How do professionals perceive maintenance problems? How do they deal with 
maintenance? How do they perceive the role of the law? What are the similarities and 
differences between the two countries in this regard?
Maintenance problems were recognized by the developer, the lending sector, the 
housing ministry, the municipality, property managers, and social managers. In short, 
all of the professionals involved acknowledged that communities of homeowners have 
difficulties with the maintenance of their common property. 
During the focus groups, issues were brought up regarding the causes of and solutions 
for deterioration process. These issues were treated not only as problems that originate 
once low-income homeowners have moved into their new dwellings. They also turned 
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out to be problems that already existed during the production and exchange phases of 
housing provision. Therefore, it was concluded that other actors besides the owners are 
involved in the causes of deterioration.
Developers in Quito as well as in Bogota regarded one of the main problems of 
deterioration to be the fact that condominium maintenance costs and benefits had not 
been incorporated in the policy when came into effect or when the dwelling costs and 
construction were being planned. The perception of the problem was complemented 
with a corresponding solution as stated by the actors themselves: maintenance costs 
and better quality of building processes need to be managed by policy. Moreover, 
maintenance costs and responsibilities include the incorporation of structured 
situations in which complete information regarding common property rules can be 
shared with future low-income owners. For this solution to be feasible, knowledge 
about the law and regulations of the horizontal property regime must become 
disseminated. 
Ostrom´s call for more attention to how “the activities and policies of external political 
regimes can affect the level and type of self-organization to achieve collective benefits” 
(Ostrom, 1990:190) has been followed up by studying the networks of Bogota and 
Quito. Ways in which the external actors could engage with what needs to occur later 
among the co-owners were identified by the actors themselves. The network theory 
proved a useful basis for unraveling the perceived common property problems and 
eliciting comments on how professionals contribute with possible solutions by both 
respecting and adapting to the given rules. Professionals did not suggest modifying the 
law of horizontal property; rather, they suggested improving the policy by adapting the 
rules. In short, they recognized that network steering is necessary but acknowledged 
that modifying policy is more feasible than changing the law. For the most part, 
they saw the problem with the law as a lack of knowledge about it, particularly about 
its constitutional and operational rules regarding condominium governance and 
maintenance that fall under the collective rights and obligations of the homeowners.
Chapter 7 looked at the situation from the perspective of the residents, examining 
the governance arrangements around the perceived problem of maintenance. Their 
overriding concern was whether they knew their rights and obligations regarding 
maintaining the common property. This concern led to the following research 
questions: 
Which factors are related to the perceived maintenance level (PML) of the common 
property? Do these factors differ between Bogota and Quito?
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These questions were approached using quantitative methods. A survey was designed 
to elicit how residents perceive factors related to both formal and informal institutions 
of the common property following, using the Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework (IAD). Factors in the IAD framework were divided into three groups: (1) 
characteristics of the community; (2) governance characteristics; and (3) physical 
characteristics of the resource. These factors were then tested with regard to collective 
outcomes of study such as maintenance. The perceived maintenance level was 
measured at the household level. 
We expected to find a higher score on perceived maintenance in Bogota than in 
Quito. Some of the results were in line with our hypothesis: the level of perceived 
maintenance was higher in Bogota, on average, than in Quito. However, contrary 
to our hypothesis, participating in self-organization in Bogota had a negative effect 
on PML, while in Quito it had a positive effect. That discrepancy is mirrored in the 
negative coefficients between PML and the role of the external or professional property 
manager, in comparison to the positive coefficient when the property manager comes 
from within the community. Although the law determines the presence of paid 
property management, norms and trust play a more important role in self-organized 
maintenance. 
These findings indicate that the law does matter. Nonetheless, the relationship 
between mandatory formal arrangements, self-organization, and maintenance 
outcomes turned out to be more complicated than expected. What the findings 
also indicate is that the more advanced and formal organization in Bogota appeals 
particularly to people who are less satisfied with maintenance, and these are the ones 
who tend to participate more. On the other hand, people might be less positive about 
the maintenance because they know more about it. Further analysis is warranted to 
find a good balance between formal arrangements in the law and the mechanism of 
self-organization. 
The challenge in Bogota is how to retain the formal structure while promoting greater 
involvement of the inhabitants. The situation in Quito is different due to the flexible 
legal context, which encourages the inhabitants to actually go to meetings in the hope 
of contributing solutions. The network structure of affordable housing provision could 
function better if the condominium operated under a well-managed and effective 
assembly of owners, with a board that is capable of governing their common property 
resource. Physical characteristics such as size, which had opposite effects in Bogota and 
Quito, make the importance of this variable debatable, as suggested in earlier work on 
governance and management of the commons (Orban, 2006). 
TOC
 244 Affordable Condominium Housing
Theoretically, no single variable is more important than any other one; rather it is 
their interaction that explains the perceptions of those involved in maintaining the 
common property in condominium (Ostrom, 2005). Based on the results obtained in 
this study, if there is (1) trust in leaders of the community, (2) agreement about who is 
responsible for maintenance, (3) participation in assembly meetings, and (4) adequate 
physical conditions that can be maintained, the owners are likely to have higher 
estimates of the benefits (higher PML) than inhabitants who do not trust others and 
do not go meetings. One variable that made a significant difference in the regression 
analysis was knowledge about a maintenance plan. A planning process can be 
transformed into information and sustain self-organization. Owners collectively need 
information, as well as knowledge about rules, to be able to manage the complexity 
inherent in the condominium regime. 
In summary and in response to the main hypothesis: 
1 There are important differences in the property laws and this divergence may have an 
effect on maintenance outcomes. For instance, the presence of a property manager is 
obligatory in Bogota, whereas in Quito this actor is not mandatory. Instead, the role of 
property management can be assumed by the president of the board of homeowners in 
Ecuador. 
2 The property law of Colombia states that the developers or initial owners of the land 
have the obligation to arrange for temporary property management. Moreover, after 
selling 51% of the dwellings, they should pass full management responsibility on to a 
newly formed board of homeowners. Developers in Bogota often hire social managers 
to facilitate this transition. In Quito, management responsibilities while units are still 
being sold are not regulated. Hiring of social management often occurs informally in 
Quito due to the complexity of the provision process in this tenure. Social managers 
share information about the rights and obligations of homeowners in condominium.
3 Problems of deterioration are perceived by the external policy network in both Bogota 
and Quito as issues that arise due to a lack of knowledge. According to those external 
actors, people should know more about the law as well as about the condominium 
arrangements that are necessary to keep up with maintenance on the buildings. 
However, given that the laws differ, particularly regarding property management, in 
Bogota the problem is also said to be related to ‘bad management’ and in Quito to the 
lack of strong community organization. 
In light of the evidence presented in this thesis, the hypothesis formulated above - 'The 
more contemporary property law in Colombia has a positive impact on self-organization 
and in turn on the perceived maintenance level' - has been ‘falsified’. As the research 
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demonstrates, institutions such as those regulated by the law -- for instance, the 
obligation to attend an assembly meeting of homeowners -- have a negative impact 
on self-organization in Bogota and, in turn, on the perceived maintenance level. 
Additionally, the Colombian law assigns the property manager a central role in 
maintenance. Therefore, owners take their responsibility lightly and lose interest in 
participating in the assembly of owners. 
The opposite occurs in Quito, where the rules set forth in the law for maintenance 
arrangements in low-income condominiums are more flexible. There is no obligation 
to hire a property manager, so the president of the board can assume that role. In 
this context, participation in the assembly meeting, as required by law, has a positive 
effect on the perceived maintenance level. The reason is that the co-owners are more 
involved in the decision-making and have a better idea of the maintenance situation of 
their common property. 
Nevertheless, the law is crucial to achieving better maintenance outcomes, as 
demonstrated in the Bogota cases. The legal obligation to have a property manager 
is assumed by the developer, as the first owner. Colombian law requires that the 
initial owner has to hire a provisional property management; therefore, maintenance 
arrangements are established early, before the materials actually deteriorate. By the 
time the common property is transferred to new low-income owners, the maintenance 
arrangements and costs have already been established and the fees have been set. As 
set forth in the IAD framework, when the benefits and costs are known, thereby setting 
the rules of the game, the outcomes are more satisfactory. 
The old adage ‘My home is my castle’ is not apt for condominiums, as one’s home is 
then ‘our’ castle. As cities grow and communities are built up in higher density, the 
meaning of homeownership changes. Therefore, different tools and strategies are 
needed to deal with maintenance problems. With respect to housing policy, when 
homeownership is not individual but collective, outcomes such as maintenance have 
to be incorporated in the policy evaluation. Our findings can contribute to a better 
understanding of the condominium tenure and its role with respect to maintenance 
and the risk of deterioration of common property in the context of housing policy for 
low-income homeownership. 
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§  8.3 Discussion 
This study of affordable condominium housing in two Latin American countries makes 
an original contribution to the housing policy literature, in the sense that this tenure 
form is treated here as a common property resource with particular institutional 
characteristics. In that regard, the added value of this study lies in its contribution not 
only to the housing policy literature but also to the theory and methodology of housing 
research. During the research process some limitations had to be overcome, which led 
to some adjustments in the research design. 
Theory
The added value that this thesis brings to the housing policy literature lies in the 
exposure it gives to the Latin American experience with low-income homeownership. 
Less often studied than informal self-built settlements, this policy is mostly known for 
its subsidy allocation system and not for the form of tenure involved, in this instance 
the condominium. Once it is recognized as problematic, the tenure form opens up new 
horizons for research. It can branch out into the whole area of complex governance 
structures involved in the provision of housing, an area that is for the most part 
unstudied. So far, few Latin American studies have recognized that subsidized multi-
family buildings are on a trajectory towards deterioration. Moreover, by overlooking the 
evidence that housing development is increasingly shifting toward the condominium 
form of tenure, both policy and urban design could make mistakes that will affect the 
owners of these projects. 
The arguments presented in this thesis weigh into the housing theory debate by 
recognizing that homeownership is not individual but collective when the owners are 
in condominium regime. Welfare theories of housing are often focused on individual 
benefits and outcomes. But how well do these theories fit the evidence when housing 
is in collective ownership? Even though the thesis does not go deeply into welfare 
theories, learning about Latin American housing policy for low-income homeownership 
might be an eye-opener to scholars contemplating comparative research on this topic. 
Bringing theories of collective action and governance of the commons into the arena 
of housing theory and housing markets suggests many promising avenues of research. 
Whereas property is generally understood as an individual good, the condominium 
breaks that mold: it is certainly a hybrid form of property, and moreover one that exists 
all over the world. 
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In 2009, Williamson and Ostrom were awarded the Nobel Prize jointly, as both 
emphasized the importance of institutions when studying governance. Oliver 
Williamson received the Prize for his work on the role of institutions in overcoming 
opportunism in firms that hold assets, and Elinor Ostrom received it for her work on 
institutions in the governance of common pool resources (Earl & Potts, 2011). Both 
Laureates are concerned about free-riding problems in governance when managing 
a common asset. Although they both reaffirm the role of the rational individual in 
initiating collective action to achieve common goals, they take a slightly different 
approach to the role of institutions, formal and informal. One can imagine turning 
to either of these Laureates, however, for guidance when studying the condominium 
regime, as both of these theories and approaches merge. That said, Ostrom´s 
approach is more general and does not exclude the combination of theories because 
it is interdisciplinary. As Earl and Potts (2011) argue, “this award should be seen as a 
boost for the behaviourally founded, evolutionary–institutional approach to economic 
analysis as a branch of complex system theory” (p. 2). 
Methods
If housing is not an individual but a collective good, then other methodological 
approaches are necessary. Ostrom’s framework is amenable to a study of common 
property resource institutions because it helps the researcher diagnose the problem. 
Moreover, its methodology is easily replicable in other contexts since it acknowledges 
that each context has particular practices. 
Deterioration, entailing the need for renewal of common property elements such as 
facades or even of complete buildings, is evident in many countries. The features of 
the phenomenon are similar despite diverging institutional, social, and economic 
conditions. According to the literature and the empirical knowledge on condominium 
problems, difficulties with governance and management are not confined to low-
income properties. Therefore, the same research methodology can be applied to all 
condominiums in the housing market. 
The second part of the thesis required field research using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to collect data. To study how formal and informal institutions 
work from the perspective of professionals in the building industry and policy actors, 
focus groups were held in Bogota and Quito. In that setting the problem and possible 
solutions to it were discussed. This qualitative approach was useful; it allowed 
the investigator to see how the actors in the policy network were interacting and 
discussing a topic. In the end, the topic appeared to be a common problem that they all 
recognized. 
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To study the condominium regime among low-income homeowners, it was necessary 
to design and carry out my own survey. It was administered to 414 households in 
total (Quito and Bogota) in 2014. The survey was designed with the Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework in mind. Therefore, it included questions about 
formal and informal institutions, the physical characteristics of the resource, and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the household. 
The mixed-method approach was necessary to elucidate the relationship between 
formal and informal institutions in condominium because it places actors in their 
own context. In that sense this methodological choice concurs with the middle-range 
approach that is followed in comparative housing studies. 
Risks of fieldwork
One limitation encountered during the exploratory phase of the research was the 
difficulty of contacting and gaining access to those condominiums that have the 
most serious maintenance and organization problems. At some of the buildings and 
housing complexes, no one wanted to speak with or even open the door to a researcher 
who asked how they manage the building or if they were doing anything at all about 
maintenance. Moreover, some condominiums are located in distressed areas, and it 
was not safe for a lone researcher to wander around, nor was it even safe for a group of 
young professionals to survey the residents. 
§  8.4 Future research and data collection 
The findings presented in this thesis will hopefully contribute to a better understanding 
of condominium ownership. However, both the findings and the methodology 
developed for this project may have some implications for further research as well as 
for housing policy in Latin America and beyond. 
Implications for further research 
Innovation is urgent in the way housing data is collected at both the national surveys 
and the policy monitoring and evaluation. Only with more targeted data will it be 
possible to observe conditions such as the maintenance level of common property 
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elements, the existence of a working condominium association and board, and 
compliance with other rules established by condominium laws. Quantitative data 
needs to be supported with qualitative data in order to understand the informal means 
by which co-owners keep some degree of organization in their properties. The value of 
that combination has been demonstrated by this research.
If a city has a high percentage of dwellings under the condominium regime, housing 
market analysis must take that tenure form into account. The condition of the common 
property might affect property values, as it already affects the municipal appraisal for 
property taxes. And here, ‘condition’ refers not only to deterioration but more generally 
to the existence of common property. For example, the value could reflect the existence 
of a lobby area on the premises, compared to a building that does not have a lobby. 
Research on housing markets can help define the components of prices and put a 
value on design elements, thereby providing information to complement research on 
housing preferences too. 
Deterioration of common property elements might have an effect not only on the 
building but also on the neighborhood. Conducting more research on neighborhood 
effects could shed light on condominium tenure phenomena at the urban scale. 
The collected information can be utilized not only in the realms of policy and 
academia. It can also serve professionals involved in condominium management 
and maintenance, as well as the financing sector. The sector of professional services 
to buildings is an important job market. In this regard, Bogota is a better example 
than Quito, even though both cities have a whole market of professionals that offer 
management services to condominiums. 
This research has proposed a framework within which comparative housing research 
on condominium tenure can be continued around the world. This tenure has been so 
thinly studied and rarely compared that it offers promising avenues for novel research. 
The groundwork done in the present research can surely be expanded upon, since cities 
are composed more and more of condominiums rather than single-family dwellings. 
Much can be learned from a comparison of self-organized communities to privately 
managed ones. 
Implications for housing policy
With respect to housing policy evaluation of low-income homeownership programs, 
collective outcomes such as maintenance need to be incorporated. The efforts made by 
the actors in the housing system to produce not only dwellings, but housing complexes 
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with common green areas and other facilities should be taken into account into policy 
evaluation. 
Climate change is steering housing policy in new directions. For instance, the 
renovation of the built environment is now expected to meet higher construction and 
habitability standards. This new vision will also have an impact on the condominium 
sector. There, renovation requires the same collective decision-making process as 
maintenance, since the facades, for instance, are collective elements. For that reason, 
financing mechanisms need to be expanded to include new lending products for 
condominium renovation and upkeep. 
Natural disasters pose well-known threats in Bogota and Quito. The reconstruction of a 
condominium after an earthquake requires collective all-risk insurance. The experience 
of the earthquake that occurred along the coast of Ecuador in April 2016 was a hard 
lesson for owners of beach apartments in condominium. The reconstruction of tourist 
towns is being delayed due to the lack of collective insurance that would pay for 
rebuilding. The cost of this delay weighs not only on the owners that lost their property 
but on the town as a whole. 
Cities with numerous properties in condominium, for residential or commercial 
purposes, should be obligated by government to buy all-risk insurance for their 
buildings. If collective action dilemmas prevent the purchase of that insurance, policy 
should come into play to generate sufficient mechanisms to guarantee coverage. 
Housing policy is part of a wider range of policies to make cities more resilient to 
natural disasters. 
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Appendix A List of interviewees in 
Bogota and Quito 
INTERVIEWS 
No. dd.mm.yyy Place 0h0’ Name Actor position 
01UIO11 25.03.2011 Quito 30’ Juan Manuel Najera Fundacion Bien Estar 
02UIO11 13.05.2011 Quito 50’ Juan Manuel Najera Fundacion Bien Estar 
03UIO11 25.05.2011 Quito 2h21’ Dra. Ma. Paula Romo 
Meeting at National Assembly of 
Ecuador 
Justice Commission of the National 
Assembly of Ecuador. Reforms to 
the Law of Horizontal Property 
04UIO11 28.05.2011 Quito 2h Sr. Carvajal President of Board of Co-owners 
Luluncoto Condominios
05UIO11 29.05.2011 Quito 28’ Patricio Gallegos Resident and co-owner of condo-
minium unit in San Carlos 
06UIO11 02.06.2011 Quito 44’ Jenny Ruiz Asociacion Mujeres Luchando por 
La Vida
07UIO11 21.06.2011 Quito 45’ Ec. Pablo Valencia Fundacion Bien Estar
08UIO11 22.06.2011 Quito 1h10’ Ing. Jijon Project Management Mutualista 
Pichincha 
09UIO11 27.06.2011 Quito 23’ Ing. Miguel Aguas Catastre office, 
10UIO11 28.06.2011 Quito 24’ Homeowner since 1974 San Carlos. Edf. Salinas 
11UIO11 03.07.2011 Quito 23’ Alexandra Mina Coordinadora Asociacion Mujeres 
Luchando por la Vida . Homeowner 
in Alba Azul I
12UIO11 05.07.2011 Quito 37’ Arq. Nury Bermudez Asesora de la Secreataria de Territo-
rio Habitat y Vivienda, MDMQ
13UIO11 06.07.2011 Quito Carlos Espinel Direccion de Gestion Territorial, 
MDMQ
14UIO11 07.07.2011 Quito Dr. Rodrigo Calvachi Judirical Asesor in property titling 
15UIO11 08.07.2011 Quito Ec. Diego Aulestia Gerente Banco del Estado Ecuador 
16BOG11 12.07.2011 Bogota 2h18’ Dr. German Molano School of Horizontal Property 
Management 
17BOG11 12.07.2011 Bogota Arq. Eduardo Pelaez AVP , 
18BOG11 12.07.2011 Bogota Arq. Valentina Pelaez AVP, Project Management 
19BOG11 13.07.2011 Bogota Lina Plazas AVP, Commercial area
20BOG11 13.07.2011 Bogota Hernan Dominguez FNA National Savings Fund
21BOG11 13.07.2011 Bogota 15’ Dra. Juliana Restrepo Curaduria No. 4
22BOG11 13.07.2011 Bogota 30’ Dr. Jaime Serrano Norco - inmobiliaria
>>>
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INTERVIEWS 
No. dd.mm.yyy Place 0h0’ Name Actor position 
23BOG11 14.07.2011 Bogota 39’ Delly Betin Aguas Horizontal Property Manager
24BOG11 14.07.2011 Bogota 27’ Pedro Garcia President of Condominios II
25BOG11 14.07.2011 Bogota 30’ Cristina Arizaga Cohabitation Committee, Condo-
minios II 
26BOG11 16.07.2011 Bogota 38’ Milton Rodriguez President Administration Council of 
Conjunto El Cerezo, USME. 
27BOG11 21.07.2011 Bogota 32’ Dr. Alejandro Florian Habitat for Humanity, Colombia
28BOG11 23.07.2011 Bogota 21’ Dra. Laura Salamanca Corporacion Responder 
29BOG11 24.07.2011 Bogota 2h First General Assembly of Co-Owen-
ers 
Conjunto El Cerezo, USME.
30BOG12 30.08.2012 Bogota 50’ Arq. Juan Yunda Taller de la Ciudad, Secretaría del 
Hábitat. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogota
31BOG12 30.08.2012 Bogota 35’ Mónica Aldana y Dra. Claudia Yepez Curaduría no.1
32BOG12 30.08.2012 Bogota Mónica Aldana Land and development projects
33BOG12 30.08.2012 Bogota 51’ Dra. Claudia García Amarilo, Legal Department
34BOG12 30.08.2012 Bogota 1h Juan Carlos Vargas Notary No.42
35BOG12 31.08.2012 Bogota Miguel Angel Poveda Property Manager (enc.) CUAN 
36BOG12 31.08.2012 Bogota Arq. Olga Lucia Ceballos INJAVIU, Javeriana University
37BOG12 01.09.2012 Bogota Ec. Jorge Erique Torres CENAC 
38BOG12 01.09.2012 Bogota 1h30’ Dra. Laura Salamanca Corporación Responder
Diplomado Administradores de 
Propiedad Horizontal 
39BOG12 03.09.2012 Bogotá 54’ José Antonio Reina DAVIVIENDA Puerta Grande Agency
40BOG12 03.09.2012 Bogotá 32’ Jose Andres Rios Vega Inspección Vigilancia y Control de 
Vivienda de la secretaria del Hábitat. 
Alcaldía de Bogotá 
41BOG12 03.09.2012 Bogotá 15’ Dra. Adriana Niño Inspección Vigilancia y Control de 
Vivienda de la secretaria del Hábitat. 
Alcaldía de Bogotá 
42BOG12 03.09.2012 Bogotá 15’ Arq. Gonzalo Peña Inspección Vigilancia y Control de 
Vivienda de la secretaria del Hábitat. 
Alcaldía de Bogotá 
43BOG12 Oscar Alejandro Romero Property Registry Bogota 
44BOG12 04.09.2012 Bogota German Bulla Montaña Nodo Distrital de Propiedad Hor-
izontal 
45UIO12 xx.10.2012 Arq. Ruben Paredes Asesor subsecretaria de vivienda
46UIO12 10.2012 Quito 1h8’ Arq. Sixto Duran Ballen Former President of Ecuador
47UIO12 11.2012 Quito 1h Arq. Silvana Ruiz CIUDAD
48UIO12 17.12.2012 Quito 53’ Ec. Pablo Valencia Fundación Bien Estar
>>>
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INTERVIEWS 
No. dd.mm.yyy Place 0h0’ Name Actor position 
49UIO12 09.01.2013 Quito 2h38’ MIDUVI
Fundacion Bien Estar
TUDelft
MDMQ
Corp. Responder * *Bogota
Round table: Social Management in 
affordable housing projects.
50UIO12 09.10.2012 Quito 1h10’ Felipe Bustamante Operations Manager Housing Ecua-
dorian Bank (BEV)
51UIO12 09.10.2012 Quito 17’ Jenny Ruiz Presidenta Asociación Mujeres 
Luchando por la Vida 
52UIO12 09.10.2012 Quito 17’ Arq. Belen Garcia MIDUVI Provincial office, Urban SIV
53UIO14 01.02.2014 Quito 36’ Alexandra Mina
Evelyn Garcia
Presidents of board of homeowners, 
Alba Azul I and II
54BOG14 05.02.2014 Bogota 1h3’ Dr. Victor Ibarra Asesor en Propiedad Horizontal 
55BOG14 06.02.2014 Bogota 1h18’ Dra. Claudia Yepez Curaduria No. 1
56BOG14 12.02.2014 Bogota 30’ Anyela Moreno Horizontal Property Manager, El 
Cerezo 
57BOG14 12.02.2014 Bogota 30’ Nayeri Gerencia de Información Catastral 
Bogota 
58BOG14 23.02.2014 Bogota 1h Beatriz Hincapie CUAN homeowner and long-time 
resident 
59BOG14 24.02.2014 Bogota 51’ Arq. Maria Lucia Ortega Planner and construction manager 
of Alameda del Parque 
60BOG14 25.02.2014 Bogota 37’ Maria Mercedes Maldonado Subsecreataria de Habitat y Vivien-
da. Acaldia de Bogota. 
61UIO14 05.03.2014 Quito 25’ Marianita Suarez Community management and 
homeowner in Mz.16 Solidad 
Bicentenario
61UIO14 06.03.2014 Quito 24’ Alexandra Jaramillo Social Management office, Munici-
pal Housing corporation, MDMQ
63UIO14 10.03.2014 Quito 1h12’ Arq. Eduardo Castro Eco&Arquitectos
64UIO14 29.03.2014 Quito 39’ Board of homeowners Alba Azul I
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Appendix B Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaire in Spanish, as applied in the field
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Appendix C Case studies in Bogota and Quito 
Affordable condominiums selected in Bogota, Colombia
B01- Centro Urbano Antonio Nariño (CUAN)- 1958
FIGURE APP.C.1 Urban Center Antonio Nariño (1958)(photo by author) 
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CUAN (1958) was the first high-density multi-family housing complex in the city of 
Bogota (Forero & Forero, 2009). It is the oldest of the selected cases in the research. 
Because of its physical characteristics, it has made a mark on the city and in housing 
policy. In the literature, it has received much attention as an example of modern 
housing architecture in Colombia, but little is known about how it is organized and 
managed in order to keep such a big estate in optimal condition. The construction was 
started in 1952 by the Ministry of Public Works of Colombia, but it was finished by the 
Popular Bank in 1958. The goal was to provide dwellings for low- and middle-income 
workers. This project was part of a series of housing programs for home ownership 
promoted by the state. The governmental housing organization, the Institute for 
Territorial Credit (Instituto de Credito Territorial – ICT), was involved in managing the 
selection, sales, and organization processes of the new community taking shape at 
CUAN. At that time, people who bought the units paid monthly installments directly 
to ICT. A group of social workers from ICT had been put in charge of both the selection 
process of families and the ‘induction process’ into multi-family living rights and 
obligations (Torres, 2013, personal interview). 
1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.2 Site plan Urban Center Antonio Nariño (by author) 
In 2000, a general assembly meeting of co-owners unanimously approved a project 
that asked the ministry of culture to declare CUAN an estate of cultural importance 
for the country because of its architecture.65 Having CUAN declared an estate 
65 The association achieved its goal, and under the Ministerial Resolution 0965, CUAN received designation as an Estate 
of Cultural Interest of National Character in 2001. Resolution 0965 of 2001, found in the General Archive of the District 
Planning Department of the City of Bogota. 
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with architectural and cultural values was seen as a good strategy to address the 
deterioration process of the complex. Some co-owners had already begun to build 
on and occupy common areas, and the complex was at risk of losing its architectural 
value. However, more important than the protection of both the architectural value and 
the control of the use of common elements were the discounts in taxes and services 
that CUAN co-owners could gain if it were to be declared a residential monument.66 A 
sense of pride comes to the surface in every conversation with the residents about the 
complex. The same year that CUAN was declared architectonic patrimony of the city, 
the new law of horizontal property (Law 675) was passed by the National Congress. 
Both events contributed to the ‘new era of organization’, as the president of the board 
of homeowners put it (personal interview, July 2011). In the same year, a new property 
manager was hired by the board. The new manager helped the board of owners get the 
complex into compliance with the new law of horizontal property and also worked to 
bring the association´s bank account back to health without deficits. 
The complex sits on an autonomous urban block of 14 hectares. It has 752 apartments 
distributed over eight towers or ‘blocks’, as they are called by the formal institutions 
such as the regulations, which is the statute of  CUAN’s horizontal property. Almost 
70% of the land is open space.67 Today, CUAN’s grounds are fenced and have two 
guarded entrances that provide access to pedestrians and allow cars into parking 
lots. To enter the complex, people have to show an identification card provided by the 
management office or have a specific invitation from a resident. Inside the complex 
there is a theater (659 m2), a middle school (2427 m2), and a grocery store and other 
commercial spaces (1993 m2), all of which are part of the collective ownership in 
CUAN. Some of these buildings, such as the school grounds, theater, and commercial 
spaces, are rented out by the administration office of the complex. The theater is used 
for the annual general assembly meeting of co-owners, and it was recently renovated in 
2013. 
The association of co-owners, ASOCUAN, was formed back in the 1960s through the 
initiative of a group of residents who saw the need to have co-owner representation 
in order to organize the management of the residential complex while ICT was still 
allocating apartments to new owners. The association registered a juridical person 
66 Minutes of the Ordinary Assembly Meeting of co-owners of the Urban Center Antonio Nariño (CUAN). Teatro Cadiz, 
Bogota. August 12, 2000. 
67 Including parking lots.  Gross residential density would be 49 units per hectare. Net residential density is 152 units per 
hectare. 
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later in 1977, but the position was updated and registered again in 1990.68 Today, the 
role of the juridical person is assumed by the hired property manager, according to the 
Horizontal Property Law 675 of 2001.
The management and maintenance plan and the budgets are available in the office of 
the property manager, located in the same complex, and are also accessible from their 
website. Each plan is drawn up for five years, and the latest one extended until 2015 
(At least during the period of investigation). This plan has three main components: (1) 
recuperation of the patrimonial value of the estate; (2) co-residence and community 
participation; and (3) organization of administration and finance processes.69 
Income sources are mainly the administration fee charged to each unit and rental 
income from the resident parking space (57% of income).70 The rest of the budget 
comes from other sources in the common property such as the rents from commercial 
spaces, apartments owned by the association, parking for visitors, and the lease of 
common rooms, the football field, the theater, and other common spaces (40% of 
income). In total, CUAN’s administration office manages an annual income of almost a 
million dollars. Expenses and costs of services (53%), maintenance and repairs (32%), 
salaries for personnel (4.4%), insurance, and other expenses, such as community 
events for Christmas or Mother’s Day, run about a million dollars annually. Services 
include the subcontracting of security (private guards) and cleaning companies. 
68 CUAN, 2005. Finance Report, 2005. Accessed at: www.asocuan.org, July, 2012.
69 CUAN, 2011. Quinquennial Plan 2011-2015. Accessed at: www.asocuan.org, July 2014. 
70 Budget execution report, 2012 Accessed at: Accessed at: www.asocuan.org, July 2014. 
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B02 - Alameda del Parque VIII– 2003
FIGURE APP.C.3 Alameda del Parque VIII (photo by author) 
Alameda del Parque is an extensive development consisting of multiple complexes, 
all of which were constructed by the same private developer in Bosa, Bogota. It was 
built in phases, and only one complex (Phase VIII), which was finished in 2003, was 
selected for the study. Due to the problems among community members in this 
housing complex, the builder, by recommendation of the project manager, hired 
a social manager to help with the social issues seen among the new community of 
homeowners. Some of the complexes were still in the process of sales or construction, 
so the builder invested in social management for the first time. After this experience, 
the social management corporation became an ally of the developer in facilitating 
the current and prospective owners’ understanding of the rights and obligations of 
homeowners and helping with community organization. 
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1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.4 Site plan, Alameda del Parque VIII (by author) 
For the builder, Alameda del Parque was the first affordable housing project in its 
portfolio. The goal was to develop a market-based housing complex, and the key 
product was a single-family house (row-house), which proved to be very successful 
during the sales stage. Until then, as the former project manager of the project 
mentioned, the affordable housing options in the market were only apartments, and 
the builder’s goal was to meet the demand for single-family houses. Additionally, these 
houses were developed in a condominium regime as a way to ensure some regulatory 
regime that would help conserve the ‘order’ of the complexes. 
Social managers began with a social assessment in order to design their path of 
action.71 From the assessment, they learned about some of the issues that were 
causing co-residence problems among the new homeowners. The perceived problems 
were related to issues such as lack of control and access to the common property, 
condition of green areas and playgrounds, and lack of property management. They also 
identified other social problems, such as domestic violence, youth gangs, insecurity, 
and noise, as conditions that were heightening the level of social conflict already 
present in the community.   
As community facilitators, social managers organized events so that the new neighbors 
could meet each other. They also identified individuals who could serve as leaders 
of the community and helped some of them with scholarships to receive training in 
horizontal property administration. They organized community days during which 
everyone was encouraged to fix up the little yards in front of their dwellings. Moreover, 
social managers helped the developers realize that the way they had designed the 
71 The report that I had access to is dated April 29, 2008, “ Socioeconomic Assessment and Social Management Plan,” (In 
Spanish)  prepared by CTA-Management and Development of Human Resources for Constructora Amarilo S.A.
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complexes was creating problems, too. Specifically, the boundaries of the properties 
were not clearly defined. 
The parking lot, as in many other affordable housing projects, is communal because 
parking spaces are not included in the price of an individual unit. Communal parking 
lots generate income through rents. The problem is, how should the income be 
used if it is not known who the clear owner of each parking space is? As the social 
manager and later the property administrator mentioned in interviews, the parking 
lot became a disputed space.  Reorganization of parking spaces to allow motorcycle 
and bicycle storage was necessary.  Others in the community would have preferred 
the reorganization to include more playgrounds for children. To better distinguish the 
clusters of houses and borders of the common property, the facades of the complex 
were painted different colors, which also set off smaller areas for management 
purposes.  
Currently, social managers are not present in this community. The property manager 
at the time of research was an owner of a unit in the housing complex who has 
received training in horizontal property management. Under his administration of the 
housing complex, people have started to free-ride on others. Not everyone pays the 
maintenance fee according to the management and maintenance plan. Additionally, 
some people have already built extensions on their living rooms reaching toward the 
common areas (see pictures) without following the formal procedures defined in 
the law. 
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B03- El Cerezo – 2010
FIGURE APP.C.5 El Cerezo building. (photo by author)
El Cerezo is an affordable housing project located in USME, one of the southern land 
development areas of the city of Bogota set aside to provide affordable housing. The 
developer, the owner of a centrally located piece of land in USME, subcontracted 
both the architectural design and construction of the project. The sales and the 
accompanying subsidy application processes were carried out by the developer’s sales 
department. The developer had a small sales office in one of the commercial spaces 
in  the building. During the first phase of sales, the developer paid for a security service 
and for maintenance of the building. This changed once 51% of the units had been 
sold, at which point, in accordance with the law, the initial owner (the developer) had 
to pass on responsibility for management and maintenance to the new community of 
owners by calling an assembly meeting and electing a board of co-owners.  
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1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.6 Site plan, El Cerezo (by author) 
The developer did not hire a social manager to help with the transition (in contrast 
to the Alameda del Parque case). Instead, the developer sent a letter to all current 
new owners, and a new board assumed the responsibility for the newly established 
community of homeowners. A month later the new board called the first assembly of 
owners in order to establish the fees for maintenance and to discuss the options to 
hire a property manager. As a researcher I was able to attend this meeting (July 2011), 
which was held on a Saturday afternoon and lasted about four hours. 
Some apartments and commercial spaces in the existing building were still for sale at 
the time. Therefore, the developer was still the owner of these units, which also made it 
a co-owner in the community. Although the developer was a co-owner, it did not attend 
or send a representative to the first homeowners’ meeting. The meeting was planned 
by the new board, which involved inviting someone to explain the horizontal property 
law and presenting two candidates for the role of property manager of the community. 
The first part of the meeting was dedicated to providing information about the 
condominium regime, especially the obligation to hire a property manager and security 
services and to purchase earthquake insurance for the common property. During 
the second part, the candidates for the position of property manager role introduced 
themselves and outlined their costs. The community of homeowners then voted and 
elected one of them. 
Once the new property manager had been appointed, the board members presented 
the budget for administration and maintenance of the building. All these costs, 
together with other normal expenses, would put the maintenance fee at about 60,000 
Colombian pesos. The president of the board wrote these amounts on a whiteboard. 
Attendance at the meeting was high when it started; the room was full, with people 
standing and no more chairs. By the end, partly as a sign of dissent, many people 
had left, so when 70% of all co-owners were needed to approve a budget, there 
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were not enough owners present to vote. Therefore, the budget was not approved in 
the first assembly. The board had to call a second assembly meeting. The property 
manager started out in a property with a community that was already unhappy about 
the construction quality of the building and its maintenance fees. This was how the 
organization of the community of owners got started at El Cerezo.
At the time of investigation, three years after the first assembly meeting at El Cerezo, 
common property was still organized under the supervision of a working board 
and a property manager. However, maintenance fees are high and problems with 
construction quality have led to a legal battle between the community of owners, 
with the property manager serving as their legal representative, and the developer. 
To generate income, the board leases the community meeting room for diverse 
activities and also leases the parking spaces, even though there are not enough spaces 
for all the apartments and the parking lot was designed for common use. Regarding 
security services (door guards), they decided to keep the role informal, so they hired 
two people to work as security guards. According to the current property manager, no 
security company is involved; formal contracts are too expensive and the condominium 
administration cannot afford them. 
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B04- Victoria II – Ciudad Verde – 2012 
FIGURE APP.C.7 Victoria II  building (photo by author)
Victoria II is one of the many condominium housing complexes built in Ciudad Verde 
on the periphery of Bogota. Technically, the site lies in Soacha Municipality, which 
could provide many public services. Nonetheless, for now the builder is assuming many 
of these costs in order to encourage sales in one of the biggest housing development 
projects in Colombia. The builder maintains the public spaces. Every block (manzana) 
consists of one housing complex in common property.  Victoria II, was built by the 
development company Constructora Bolivar. This builder currently has a department 
called ‘social capital’, which is in charge of social management during the provision 
phases.  
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FIGURE APP.C.8 Site plan, Victoria II (by author) 
By the time the household survey for this thesis was complete, the community of 
Victoria II, which had only been in existence for two years, had already received the 
Builder’s Prize for the best-organized condominium. The developer holds competitions 
and awards prizes to those projects that have demonstrated good management and 
maintenance paths. In this way, the developer maintains its relationship with the 
community of owners, offering advice about any management or maintenance issue. 
The current property manager of the condominium is also a co-owner in the 
community. He is a professional property manager; not only did he study 
administration but he also took other courses and trained to learn about the specifics 
of horizontal property management. As he mentioned during the interview, to manage 
a building it is necessary to know about psychology and also how to manage money. 
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Affordable condominiums selected in Quito, Ecuador
Q01 - Condominios Luluncoto- 1974
FIGURE APP.C.9 Luluncoto condominium complex (photo by author)
Luluncoto condominium  was built in 1974 by the government housing institutions 
of the time, which were BEV (Ecuadorian Housing Bank) together with JNV (National 
Housing Council). The common property in condominium comprises 480 apartments, 
TOC
 278 Affordable Condominium Housing
and it takes its name from the neighborhood in which it is located.72 The layout of the 
housing complex follows the principles advanced by the Conference for International 
Modern Architecture (CIAM) for architecture and mass housing provision. The five-
story blocks are arranged in such a way that each has ten apartments with a shared 
entrance door and stairways. Today the premises are surrounded by a wall, which was 
built through the homeowners’ efforts. The wall includes a guarded entrance to control 
access in general but more specifically the access to the parking lot. The pedestrian 
entrance that faces the principal street is currently not guarded.
1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.10 Site plan, Luluncoto condominium complex (by author) 
The parking area is communal. There are no individual parking spaces for all 480 
apartments, and parking spaces were not sold to homeowners in the 1970s. Therefore, 
much of the organizational effort is focused on institutional arrangements to share the 
use of the parking lot among those residents who own vehicles. The working board of 
homeowners designates a manager to organize the parking space and collect the rent. 
The salary of the guard for the parking lot comes out of the rental revenues. According 
to the interview with the manager at the time, there is no money left to maintain the 
parking surface and asphalt. Owner-occupiers pay a different price for a parking space 
than tenants in the complex.73 Spaces become available to others to use or rent when 
someone defaults on rent payments. 
72 Four housing blocks are legally part of the common property, but they are separated by an additional wall. These 
dwellings are owned by the workers of the aviation national army. In terms of governance and management, these 
dwellings are not considered in the analysis of Luluncoto (Q01). 
73 The price for tenants is ten dollars higher. 
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This housing complex is similar to CUAN (B01) in the sense that common property 
resources are used to generate income. The parking lot is one example. The housing 
complex also has other buildings that belong to the common property, and those are 
leased to generate income. There is a small market on the premises as well as small 
buildings with service functions located in the original entrances. From the 1970s 
until the end of the 1980s, there was a big grocery store inside (EMPROVIT), a publicly 
owned enterprise. When the store closed, the building was sold to a Christian church. 
This church is now a co-owner, together with the owners of the 480 apartments. There 
is a big community house on the common property, which is leased for parties and 
other events organized by the residents. This is also where the general assembly of 
homeowners is held every year. 
There is a board of homeowners, but the organization of Luluncoto condominiums is 
informal. No legal representative of the common property is registered in the property 
registry office, although this is mandated by the Ecuadorian horizontal property law. 
The common property does not have a bank account. Maintenance of buildings is done 
by blocks and by agreement among those apartments that share a common entrance. 
The agreement for each tower is different, with some units paying about two dollars to 
ensure cleaning of the stairways. When it is decided to repaint the facades, for example, 
a special fee is agreed upon and collected from owners in the block. Agreement per 
project is more common than planned maintenance. 
The pictures of the complex clearly show some small units on the roof terraces that 
have been built by the owners. Similar structures have also been built on the grounds 
of each tower in the backyards. These small units, called ‘minis’ by the community, can 
be either an extra bedroom for a family, a studio type of unit, or a covered laundry area. 
Both the roof terraces and the backyards are legally designated as common property. 
These common spaces were originally divided by the builder into squares using metal 
screens. Each space was then assigned to a corresponding apartment for the residents’ 
exclusive and private use. The purpose was to create individual and secure spaces to 
hang laundry. 
Over time people started to replace the screens with concrete block walls, both on the 
roof terraces and in the backyards.74 Owners apparently understood ‘exclusive and 
private use of a common area’ to mean the same as use of individual property. At some 
point, the municipality came into action, since no building permits had been issued 
to make these units legal according to city regulations. The concern was mostly about 
74 The roof terrace divisions were then divided for the apartments located on the third and fourth stories. The backyards 
of each block were divided for the same purpose for apartments on the first and second stories.
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those units built on the roof terrace because the building was designed for a certain 
load bearing structure, and those units could put the building at risk. 
These ‘minis’ serve various purposes; they can be small apartments for rent, 
apartments where grandmothers live, or laundry areas. Units built on the ground 
floor are basically now extensions of the apartments on the first and second story. 
Informally, these additions are now the norm, since general agreement has been 
reached among co-owners about their encroachment on common property areas. 
However, some apartments are now bigger because of these extensions. Moreover, 
these modifications are not included in the condominium regulations, and therefore 
they are not covered in the property titles. 
Q02- Vivienda Solidaria, CHQ – 2003
FIGURE APP.C.11 Caldas 494, Vivienda Solidaria Program, Historic Center of Quito (2012) (photo by author)
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The Vivienda Solidaria program was implemented in Quito from 1997 until 2003 
(Donoso, 2008). This small housing program was part of an urban renewal project 
to improve urban and housing conditions in the historic center. It started with ten 
single-family houses that were at the time tenements where very low-income families 
were living. The properties were bought by the municipality and transformed into 
small condominiums for low-income homeownership. For the construction and 
rehabilitation of the buildings, the tenants were rehoused in other municipally owned 
buildings. Some of them were able to come back as homeowners after receiving a 
down-payment subsidy for their mortgages. Some of the more expensive units in 
each property were sold to families that were not eligible for the subsidy. In this 
way, the program created mixed-income communities in condominium tenure. 
All homeowners had to pass a selection procedure established by the municipal 
corporation for the rehabilitation of the historic center. The main condition to become 
an owner in this project was to prove previous residency in the historic center of Quito 
(Donoso, 2008). 
For a survey of some of the households in these centrally located condominiums, I 
selected four properties. I chose those condominium complexes where I was able to 
ask the homeowners’ association for permission to enter the premises. There are some 
complexes without a working homeowners’ board, which makes it more difficult to 
distribute flyers and to survey the residents. 
1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.12 Site plan, Caldas 494. Vivienda Solidaria Program (by author) 
The properties that were converted into condominiums vary in size in terms of 
number of individual dwellings inside. The smallest has six units and the biggest has 
54. Because of the location and size of the lots, these buildings do not have parking 
garages. Renovation of historic buildings allows major transformation inside the 
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structure. The facades and the configuration around a central patio are architectural 
elements that are protected for their historical value.75 Every building has a patio 
instead of an open garden, as other condominiums generally have. Patios, however, 
require a different kind of maintenance than gardens. Therefore, even though these 
dwellings do not have a green open space, the patios become common spaces that 
require collective maintenance, as do the historic facades.   
Q03- Alba Azul I & II – 2010
FIGURE APP.C.13 Alba Azul condominium complex (2012) (photo by author)
75 The historic center of Quito was the first city center in the world to be protected by UNESCO, and it was declared a 
world heritage site in 1978. 
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1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.14 Site plan, Alba Azul condominium complex (2012) (by author). 
Alba Azul I and II are two projects built through the collaboration of many actors, 
among which are a women’s organization, a housing and research foundation, and 
a housing developer. The women’s organization applied for a housing subsidy and 
found a developer that helped it find a piece of land to build the dwellings. Since the 
organization was poor, the banking system did not give it any mortgage; therefore they 
collaborated with the housing and research foundation. The foundation had a working 
program called “Paso a Paso” (Step by Step), which provided assistance in building and 
paying for the homes. Basically, the foundation became the lender and coordinator for 
the development of the housing project. 
The leader of the women’s group was in charge of the individual subsidy applications. 
Each family applied individually, but the leader dealt with all the paperwork for 
100 families. In the meantime, the developer found the land and started to design 
the project. Future homeowners, including the women’s group, were not asked to 
comment or get involved during the design phases.  
The future homeowners attended several informative sessions that were held at the 
foundation’s office. In a sense, they started to build the community even before they 
moved into the finished dwellings. The lead person, who took charge of the work and 
subsidy application process together with the titling process, is now the president of 
the board of homeowners. She also performs the role of property manager. 
According to the president of the board of homeowners, a monthly maintenance fee 
does not work in this community. Although the board has a bank account, people do 
not deposit their maintenance fees in it. The residents would rather make contributions 
depending on the project. Sometimes they do community work but, as the leaders 
mentioned, not everyone comes to community events. For example, the lawn of the 
common gardens is mown every two or three weeks. Depending on the funds available, 
they will either hire someone to mow or the community will do it. The housing complex 
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is fairly new; although it was just finished in 2010, the pictures already show the need 
for facade maintenance.
Q04- Ciudad Bicentenario, Blocks 7, 9, and 16 – 2012 
FIGURE APP.C.15 Ciudad Bicentenario (2014) (photo by author) 
Ciudad Bicentenario is a land development project promoted by the Municipality of 
Quito. The infrastructure costs are assumed by the municipality. Different private and 
nonprofit developers and cooperatives in association with the municipality can build 
housing complexes in this area. For the survey, three blocks of the development were 
selected. Each block had a different builder, but in all cases some social management 
was involved during the housing provision process. Once Ciudad Bicentenario was 
chosen as a case, a selection was made among the housing blocks within it for the 
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survey. They were selected depending on whether access to the premises was granted 
by the board of homeowners at the time.  
According to the law of horizontal property in Ecuador, there is no obligation to hire 
an external property manager. And indeed, these housing complexes do not have 
an external property manager; the role is performed by the president of the board, 
who also acts as the legal representative of the community. Owners were invited to 
several workshops as part of the social management initiatives of the municipality 
to ensure better outcomes from the program. One of the effects is a sense of pride in 
the communities about their dwellings. Also, the existence of a bank account and the 
registration of a legal representative of the condominium gives an indication that more 
information is available and that there is greater decision-making capacity within the 
community. 
1  2  
FIGURE APP.C.16 Site plan, Block 16, Ciudad Bicentenario (by author) 
TOC
 286 Affordable Condominium Housing
TOC
 287 References
References
Acosta, M. E. (2009). La gestión de la vivienda social en el Ecuador: entre la espada y la pared Ecuador Debate, 
76, 93-106. 
Agrawal, A. (2001). Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources World Develop-
ment, 29(10), 1649-1672. 
Alterman, R. (2010). The Maintenance of Residential Towers in Condominium Tenure: A comparative Analysis 
of Two Extremes - Israel and Florida. In S. Blandy, A. Dupuis, & J. Dixon (Eds.), Multi-owned housing: law, 
power and practice (pp. 73-90). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Alzate, M. C. (2006). La estratificacion socioeconomica para el cobro de los servicios publicos domiciliarios en 
Colombia. Solidaridad o focalizacion? Retrieved from Bogota: 
Arbelaez, M. A., Camacho, C., & Fajardo, J. (2011). Low-income Housing Finance in Colombia. Retrieved from 
Washington D.C. : 
Ardilla Gomez, A. (1997). The Decentralization of the Government of Bogotá: Benefits, Problems and Possible 
Solutions (Master in City Planning), Massachusets Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/63212/37788363-MIT.pdf?sequence=2 
Assche, K. V., Beunen, R., & Duineveld, M. (2014). Evolutionary Governance Theory. An Introduction Heidelberg: 
Springer.
Axelrod, R. (1981). The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists. The American Political Science Review, 75(2), 
306-318. doi:10.2307/1961366
Balchin, P., & Stewart, J. (2001). Social housing in Latin America: Opportunities for affordabili-
ty in a region of housing need. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 16(3-4), 333-341. 
doi:10.1023/A:1012520013862
Baldwin, R. (1990). Why Rules Don’t Work. The Modern Law Review, 53(3), 321-337. 
Baldwin, R., & Cave, M. (1999). Understanding Regulation. Theory, Strategy and Practice. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Ball, M., & Harloe, M. (1992). Rethorical barriers to understanding housing provision: What the ‘provision 
thesis’is and is not Housing Studies, 7(1), 3-15. 
Ballen, S. (2009). Vivienda social en altura. Tipologias Urbanas y directrices de producción en Bogotá Bogota: 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia 
Barlow, J., & Duncan, S. (1988). The use and abuse of housing tenure. Housing Studies, 3(4), 219-231. 
doi:10.1080/02673038808720632
Bengtsson, B. (1998). Tenant’s Dilemma - On Collective Action in Housing. Housing Studies, 13(1), 99-120. 
Bengtsson, B. (2012). Game Theory. In S. J. Smith (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Housing and Home (Vol. 
2, pp. 227-231). Amsterdam: Elservier.
Bengtsson, B. (2012). Housing Politics and Political Science. In D. F. Clapham, W. A. V. Clark, & K. Gibb (Eds.), 
The SAGE Handbook of Housing. London: SAGe Publications Ltd.
Bengtsson, B., & Hertting, N. (2014). Generalization by Mechanism. Thin rationality and Ideal-type Analysis in 
Case Study Research. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 44(6), 707-732.
Bengtsson, B., & Ruonavaara, H. (2010). Introduction to the Special Issue: Path Dependence in Housing. Hous-
ing, Theory and Society, 27(3), 193-203. 
Bengtsson, B., & Ruonavaara, H. (2011). Comparative Process Tracing in Housing Studies. International Journal 
of Housing Policy, 11(4), 395-414. doi:10.1080/14616718.2011.626603
Bennett, D. S. (2011). Condominium Homeownership in the United States: Selected Annotated Bibliography of 
Legal Souces Law Library Journal, 103(2), 2011-2016. Retrieved from http://www.aallnet.org/mm/Publi-
cations/llj/LLJ-Archives/Vol-103/Spring-2011/2011-16.pdf
Black, J. (2002). Critical Reflections on Regulation. Retrieved from London: 
Blanco, A. G., Cibils, V. F., & Muñoz, A. F. (2014). Rental Housing Wanted , Policy Options for Latin America and 
the Caribbean Retrieved from Washington D.C.: 
Blandy, S., Dupuis, A., & Dixon, J. (Eds.). (2010). Multi-owned housing: law, power and practice Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited.
TOC
 288 Affordable Condominium Housing
Blandy, S., Dixon, J., & Dupuis, A. (2006). Theorising Power Relationships in Multi-owned Resi-
dential Developments: Unpacking the Bundle of Rights. Urban Studies, 43(13), 2365-2383. 
doi:10.1080/00420980600970656
Blandy, S., & Goodchild, B. (1999). From Tenure to Rights: Conceptualizing the Changing Focus of Housing Law 
in England. Housing, Theory and Society, 16(1), 31-42. doi:10.1080/14036099950150071
Blandy, S., & Hunter, C. (2012). Socio-legal Perespectives. In S. J. Smith (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of 
Housing and Home (First Edition ed., Vol. 6). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Boelhouwer, P., & van der Heijden, H. (1993a). Housing policy in seven European countries: The role of politics 
in housing. Netherlands journal of housing and the built environment, 8(4), 383-404. doi:10.1007/
bf02496562
Boelhouwer, P., & van der Heijden, H. (1993b). Methodological trends in international comparative hous-
ing research. Netherlands journal of housing and the built environment, 8(4), 371-382. doi:10.1007/
bf02496561
Brannen, J. (2005). Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches into the Research 
Process. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 8(3), 173-184. 
Bromley, R. (2003). Peru 1957–1977: How time and place influenced John Turner’s ideas on housing policy. 
Habitat International, 27(2), 271-292. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0197-3975(02)00049-8
Bueren, E. v., & Heuvelhof, E. t. (2005). Improving governance arrangements in support of sustainable cities. 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 32, 47-66. 
CAMACOL. (2012). Subsidios Plenos y La Nueva Ley de vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano. Bogota. Retrieved from 
http://camacol.co/sites/default/files/secciones_internas/Informe%20Econ%C3%B3mico-Julio-No%20
38_0.pdf
Cárdenas, J. C. (2009). Dilemas de lo colectivo: instituciones, pobreza y cooperación en el manejo local de los re-
cursos de uso común. Bogota: Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Economia, CEDE, Ediciones Uniandes.
Castles, F. G., & Ferrera, M. (1996). Home Ownership and the Welfare State: Is Southern Europe Different? 
South European Society and Politics, 1(2), 163-185. doi:10.1080/13608749608539470
Chen, S. C. Y. (2011). Common Interest Development and the Changing Roles of Government and Market in 
Planning. Urban Studies, 48(16), 3599-3612. doi:10.1177/0042098010394687
Chen, S. C. Y., & Webster, C. J. (2005). Homeowners Associations, Collective Action and the Costs of Private 
Governance. Housing Studies, 20(2), 205-220. doi:10.1080/026730303042000331736
Choe, J. (1992). The organization of urban common-property institutions: the case of apartment communities 
in Seoul. (Doctor of Philosophy ), Indiana University Bloomington.  
Chu, F.-N., Chang, C.-O., & Sing, T. F. (2012). Collective action dilemmas in condominium management. Urban 
Studies, 50(1), 128-147. 
Colombia, C. d. l. R. d. (2004). Pasado, presente y futuro de las Cajas de Compensación Familiar. Bo-
gota Retrieved from ftp://ftp.camara.gov.co/uatl/eal/041%20CAJAS%20DE%20COMPEN-
SACI%C3%83%E2%80%9CN%20FAMILIAR%20EN%20COLOMBIA.pdf.
Cribbet, J. E. (1963). Condominium, Home Ownership of Megalopolis? . Michigan Law Review, 61, 1207-1244. 
Dawes, R. M., & Messick, D. M. (2000). Social Dilemmas. International Journal of Psychology, 35(2), 111-116. 
doi:10.1080/002075900399402
Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The American Economic Review, 57(2), 347-359. 
doi:10.2307/1821637
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Ra-
tionality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. doi:10.2307/2095101
Doling, J. (1997). Comparative Housing Policy : Governement and Housig in Advanced Industrialized Countries 
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Doling, J. & Elsinga, M. (2013). Demographic change and Housing Wealth: Homeowners, Pensions and As-
set-Based Welfare in Europe. Dordrecht: Springer.
Doling, J., & Ronald, R. (2010). Home ownership and asset-based welfare. Journal of Housing and the Built 
Environment, 25(2), 165-173. 
Donoso, R. E. (2008). A Case Study of Housing Programs in the Historic Center of Quito: The Need for Planning 
Direction (1990-2007). (MSc. in Community and Regional Planning ), The University of Texas Austin.  
Donoso, R. E. & Elsinga, M. (2016). Housing in Latin America and the Caribbean In K. B. Anacker, A. Carswell, 
Sarah D. Kirby, & K. T. Tremblay. (Eds.), Introduction to Housing. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
TOC
 289 References
Earl, P. E., & Potts, J. (2011). A Nobel Prize for Governance and Institutions: Oliver Williamson and Elinor Os-
trom. Review of Political Economy, 23(1), 1-24. doi:10.1080/09538259.2011.526291
Edelman, L. & Suchman, M. (1997). The Legal Environments of Organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 
479-515. 
Elsinga, De Decker, P., Teller, N., & Toussaint, J. (Eds.). (2007). Home ownership Beyond asset and security. 
Perceptions of housing related security and insecurity in eight European countries. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Elsinga, M. (1998). The meaning of tenure under different conditions; empirical evidence from the Netherlands. 
Netherlands journal of housing and the built environment, 13(2), 137-155. doi:10.1007/bf02497226
Elsinga, M. (2005). Affordable and low-risk home ownership. In P. Boelhouwer, J. Doling, & M. Elsinga (Eds.), 
Home ownership. Getting in, getting from, getting out. Delft: IOS Press.
Elsinga, M., & Hoekstra, J. (2005). Homeownership and housing satisfaction. Journal of Housing and the Built 
Environment, 20, 401-424. 
Enserink, B., Hermans, L., Kwakkel, J., Thissen, W., Koppenjan, J., & Bots, P. (2010). Policy Analysis of Multi-Ac-
tor Systems The Hague: Uitgeverij LEMMA.
Esquivel, M. T. (2008). Conjuntos Habitacionales, imaginarios de vida colectiva. Iztapalapa, 64-65(29), 117-
143. doi:http://tesiuami.uam.mx/revistasuam/iztapalapa/viewarticle.php?id=1653
Fallow, G., & Brown, R. B. (2002). Focusing on focus groups: lessons from a research project involving a Bangla-
deshi community Qualitative Research, 2(2), 195-208. 
Ferguson, B., & Navarrete, J. (2003). New approaches to progressive housing in Latin America: A key to habitat 
programs and policy. Habitat International, 27(2), 309-323. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0197-
3975(03)00013-4
Ferguson, B., Rubinstein, J., & Vial, V. D. (1996). THE DESIGN OF DIRECT DEMAND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 
FOR HOUSING IN LATIN AMERICA. Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies, 8(2), 202-219. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-940X.1996.tb00118.x
Florian, A. (2012). El Derecho a la Vivienda. In J. F. Pinilla & M. Rengifo (Eds.), La Ciudad y el Derecho. Bogota: 
Editorial TEMIS.
Forero S., F. E., & Forero F., J. A. (2009). Vivienda Social, Modernidad e Informalidad en Bogota (1911-1982). 
Bogota: Universidad La Gran Colombia.
Galster, G. C. (1983). Empirical Evidence on Cross-Tenure Differences in Home Maintenance and Conditions. 
Land Economics, 59(1), 107-113. doi:10.2307/3145880
Galster, G. C. (1987). Homeowners and Neighborhood Reinvestment: Duke University Press.
Garcia, J. (Producer). (2014). Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos: Diferenciación con otros tratados 
[ International Human Rights Treaties: Differentiation with other treaties]. Retrieved from http://www.
derechoecuador.com/articulos/detalle/archive/doctrinas/derechoconstitucional/2014/01/23/trata-
dos-internacionales-de-derechos-humanos---diferenciacion--con-otros-tratados
Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory. Action, structure and contradiction in social anlysis. 
London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
Gilbert, A. (2004). Helping the poor through housing subsidies: lessons from Chile, Colombia and South Africa. 
Habitat International, 28, 13-40. 
Gilbert, A. (2012a). De Soto´s The Mystery of Capital: reflections on the book´s impact. International Develop-
ment Planning Review, 34(2). 
Gilbert, A. (2012b). Housing Abroad: Latin America. The Encyclopedia of Housing. SAGE Publications, Inc. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Gilbert, A. G., & Ward, P. M. (1982). Residential Movement among the Poor: The Constraints on Housing 
Choice in Latin American Cities. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 7(2), 129-149. 
doi:10.2307/622218
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative reserach New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter 
Glasse, M., & Berrisfor, S. (2015). Urban Law: A Key to Accountable Urban Government and Effective Urban Ser-
vice Delivery In J. Wouters, A. Ninio, T. doherty, & H. Cissé (Eds.), The World Banck Legal Review. Improving 
Delivery in Development: The Role of Voice, Social Contract and Accountability (Vol. 6). Washington DC: The 
World Bank 
Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a Conceptual Framework for Mixed-Method Evala-
tion Designs. Eduation Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11(3), 255-274. 
TOC
 290 Affordable Condominium Housing
Grover, R., Munro-Faure, P., & Solviev, M. (2002). Housing Tenure change in the transitional economies. In G. 
Payne (Ed.), Land, Rights & Innovation : Improving Tenure Security for the Urban Poor. London: ITDG.
Groves, R., Murie, A., & Watson, C. (2007). Housing and the new welfare state. Perspectives from East Asia and 
Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Guest, G. (2012). Describing Mixed Methods Research: An Alternative to Typologies. Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research, 20(10), 1-11. 
Haffner, M., Hoekstra, J., Oxley, M., & Heijden, H. V. D. (2010). Universalistic, Particularistic and Middle Way Ap-
proaches to Comparing the Private Rental Sector. International Journal of Housing Policy, 10(4), 357-377. 
doi:10.1080/14616718.2010.526400
Haffner, M., Hoekstra, J., Oxley, M., & Van Der Heijden, H. (2009). Bridging the Gat Between Social and Market 
Rental Housing in Six European Countries Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Hansmann, H. (1991). Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies and 
Tenure Choice. Journal of Legal Studies, 20. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248. doi:10.1126/sci-
ence.162.3859.1243
Hardin, R. (1992). The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust. Analyse and Kritik, 14, 152-176. 
Harloe, M., & Martens, M. (1984). Comparative Housing Research. Journal of Social Policy, 13(03), 255-277. 
doi:doi:10.1017/S0047279400013751
Heijden, H. V. d. (2013). West European Housing Systems in a Comparative Perspective (Vol. 46). Delft: IOS.
Held, G. (2000). Politicas de vivienda de interes social orientadas al mercado: experiencias recientes con sub-
sidios a la demanda en Chile, Costa Rica y Colombia. Retrieved from Santiago: http://repositorio.cepal.org/
bitstream/handle/11362/5304/S00050485_es.pdf?sequence=1
Hennink, M., Hutter, I., & Bailey, A. (2011). Qualitative Reserach Methods. London: SAGE.
Ho, D. C. W., & Gao, W. (2013). Collective action in apartment building management in Hong Kong. Habitat 
International, 38, 10-17. 
Hoekstra, J. (2010). Divergence in European welfare and housing systems (Vol. 38). Delft: IOS Press BV, Delft 
Univeristy Press.
Hsieh, H. R. (2009). Issues and proposed improvements regarding condominium management in Taiwan. 
Habitat International, 33, 73-80. 
Kemeny, J. (1992). Housing and social theory. London: Routledge.
Kemeny, J., & Lowe, S. (1998). Schools of Comparative Housing Research: From Convergence to Divergence. 
Housing Studies, 13(2), 161-176. doi:10.1080/02673039883380
Kickert, W. J. M., Klijn, E.-H., & F.M.Koppenjan, J. (Eds.). (1997). Managing Complex Networks : Strategies for 
the Public Sector. London: SAGE Publications.
Klaufus, C. (2010). The two ABCs of aided self-help housing in Ecuador. Habitat International, 34, 351-358. 
Kleinhans, R., & Bolt, G. (2013). More than just fear: on the intricate interplay between perceived neighborhood 
disorder, collective efficacy, and action Journal of Urban Affairs, 36(3), 420-446. 
Krueger, R. A., & Casey, M. A. (2009). Focus Groups. A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE.
Lennartz, C. (2011). Power Structures and Privatization across Integrated Rental Markets: Exploring the Cleav-
age between Typologies of Welfare Regimes and Housing Systems. Housing, Theory and Society, 28(4), 
342-359. doi:10.1080/14036096.2011.562626
Littlewood, A., & Munro, M. (1996). Explaining disrepair: Examining owner occupiers’ repair and maintenance 
behaviour. Housing Studies, 11(4), 503-525. doi:10.1080/02673039608720872
Lizarralde, G. (2015). The invisible housing. New York: Routledge.
Lowry, G. (2002). Modelling user acceptance of building management systems. Automation in Construction, 
11(6), 695-705. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0926-5805(02)00010-9
Lujanen, M. (2010). Legal challenges in ensuring regular maintenance and repairs of owner‐occu-
pied apartment blocks. International Journal of Law in the Built Environment, 2(2), 178-197. doi:-
doi:10.1108/17561451011058807
Maldonado, M. M. (2005). Es posible anticiparse a la urbanización informal? Reflexiones a partir de la Operación 
Urbanística Nuevo Usme, Bogota y del MacroProyecto Ciudadela Gonzalo Vallejo Restrepo, Pereira (Colom-
bia). Retrieved from Bogota: 
Malpass, P. (2011). Path Dependence and the Measurement of Change in Housing Policy. Housing, Theory and 
Society, 28(4), 305-319. doi:10.1080/14036096.2011.554852
TOC
 291 References
Mangin, W. (1967). Latin American squatter settlements: a problem and a solution. Latin American Research 
Review, 2(3), 65-98. 
Marcuse, P. (1972). Homeownership for Low Income Families: Financial Implications. Land Economics, 48(2), 
134-143. 
McGinnis, M. D., & Ostrom, E. (2014). Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing 
challenges. Ecology and Society, 19(2). doi:10.5751/es-06387-190230
McKenzie, E. (1994). Privatopia: Homeowners Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Meijer, F., & Smid, I. (1994). Vereniging van Eigenaren: Ervaringen en Perspectieven Retrieved from 
Mejia, M. E. (2006). Del discurso de vivienda al espacio residencial. El caso de vivienda en altura en sistema 
constructivo de cajón. . (Master ), Universidad Nacional, Medellin.  
Merwe, C. G. v. d. (2008). The Adaptation of the Institution of Apartment Ownership to Civilian Property Law 
Structures in the Mixed Jurisdictions of South Africa, Sri Lanka and Louisiana Electronic Journal of Compara-
tive Law, 12(1). Retrieved from http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-25.pdf
Merwe, C. V. D. (2015). European Condominium Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Molsalve, G. A. (2003). El Sistema de Subsidio Familiar en la Seguridad Social Colombiana. VNIVERSITAS, 106, 
455-504. 
Montoya, A. P. (2004). Vivienda Moderna en Colombia [Modern housing in Colombia] (Vol. 10). Bogota: Univer-
sidad Nacional de Colombia.
Moser, C. (1998). The asset vulnerability framework: Reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies. World 
Development, 26(1), 1-19. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(97)10015-8
Moser, C. (2009). Ordinary Families, Estraordinary Lives. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Mossel, J. H. v. (2008). The purchasing of maintenance service delivery in the Dutch social housing sector: 
optimising commodity strategies for delivering maintenance services to tenants. (Proefschrift PhD), Delft 
University of Techonology Delft.  
Nee, V. (1998). Norms and Networks in Economic and Organizational Performance. The American Economic 
Review, 88(2), 85-89. doi:10.2307/116898
Nee, V., & Ingram, P. (1998). Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure In M. C. 
Brinton & V. Nee (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Sociology Standford: Standford University Press.
North, D. (1994). Economic Performance Through Time. The American Economic Review, 83(3), 359-368. 
Olson, M. (1965). Logic of Collective Action (Ninth Print, 1982 ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Orban, A. (2006). Community action for collective goods: an interdisciplinary approach to the internal and exter-
nal solutions to collective action problems. The case of Hungarian Condominiums Budapest: Akademaiai 
Kiado 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: the evolutions of institutions for collective action Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univeristy Press.
Ostrom, E. (2003). How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action. Journal of Theoreti-
cal Politics, 15(3), 239-270. doi:10.1177/0951692803015003002
Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding Institutional Diversity Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (2006). Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 104(39), 15181-15187. doi:10.1073/pnas.0702288104
Ostrom, E. (2009a). Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. Paper 
presented at the Nobel Prize Lecture 
Ostrom, E. (2009b). Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned? In G. K. 
Ingram & Y.-H. Hong (Eds.), Property Rights and Land Policies Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
Ostrom, E. (2009c). A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Science, 
325(5939), 419-422. doi:10.1126/science.1172133
Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. The 
American Economic Review, 100(3), 641-672. doi:10.2307/27871226
Oxley, M. (2001). Meaning, science, context and confusion in comparative housing research. Journal of Housing 
and the Built Environment, 16(1), 89-106. doi:10.1023/A:1011599006494
Oxley, M., & Haffner, M. (2012). Comparative Housing Research. In S. J. Smith (Ed.), International Encyclopedia 
of Housing and Home (Vol. 1, pp. 199-209). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
TOC
 292 Affordable Condominium Housing
Paquette-Vasalli, C., & Sanchez, M. Y. (2009). Massive housing production in Mexico City: debating two policies 
Centro h, Revista de la Organización Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Centros Históricos, 3, 1390-4361. 
Retrieved from http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1151/115112536002.pdf
Park, S., & Baek, C. (2012). Fiscal instruments for sustainable maintenance of apartment housing in Ko-
rea. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(7), 4432-4444. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
rser.2012.05.012
Paz, R. D. O. d. (2014). Avaliação do Trabalho Social e dos Impactos na Vida das Famílias no Programa Minha 
Casa Minha Vida, no Município de Osasco/SP. Paper presented at the III Encontro da Associação Nacional 
de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Arquitetura e Urbanismo; Arquitetura, cidade e projeto: uma construção 
coletiva Sao Paulo. 
Pickvance, C. (2001). Four varieties of comparative analysis. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 
16(1), 7-28. doi:10.1023/A:1011533211521
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press.
Ploeger, R., Lawson, J., & Bontje, M. (2001). The methodological challenge to comparative research Jounal of 
Housing and the Built Environment, 16. 
Poteete, A. R., Janssen, M. A., & Ostrom, E. (2010). Working together: collective action, the commons, and 
multiple methods in practice. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Poteete, A. R., & Ostrom, E. (2004). Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Insti-
tutions in Forest Management. Development and Change, 35(3), 435-461. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7660.2004.00360.x
Rabenhorst, C. S., & Ignatova, S. I. (2009). Condominium Housing and Mortage Lending in Emergin Markets - 
Constraints and Opportunities. Retrieved from 
Robertson, D. (2012). Collective Ownership. In S. J. Smith (Ed.), International Ecyclopedia of Housing and Home 
(Vol. 1, pp. 181-185). Amsterdam Elsevier.
Rodriguez, A., & Sugranyes, A. (Eds.). (2005). Los con techo. Un desafío para la política de vivienda social. [ 
Those with Roofs. A Challenge for Social Housing Policy] Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Sur 
Rohan, P. J. (1967). Perfecting The Condominium as a Housing Tool: Innovation in Tort Liability and Insurance. 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 32(2), 305-318. 
Rohan, P. J. (1978). The “Model Condominium Code” a Blueprint for modernizing condominium legislation 
Columbia Law Review, 18(3), 587-608. 
Rohe, W. M., & Basolo, V. (1997). Long-Term Effects of Homeownership on the Self-Perceptions 
and Social Interaction of Low-Income Persons. Environment and Behavior, 29(6), 793-819. 
doi:10.1177/0013916597296004
Rojas, E. (2001). The Long Road to Housing Sector Reform: Lessons from the Chilean Housing Experience. Hous-
ing Studies, 16(4), 461-483. doi:10.1080/02673030120066554
Rojas, E. (Ed.) (2010). Building cities: Neighbourhood upgrading and urban quality of life. . Washington, D.C.: 
Inter-American Development Bank.
Rolnik, R. (2013). Late Neoliberalism: The Financialization of Homeownership and Housing Rights. Internation-
al Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(3), 1058-1066. doi:10.1111/1468-2427.12062
Rolnik, R., & Royer, L. d. O. (2014). O programa Minha Casa Minha Vida nas Regiões Metropolitanas de São 
Paulo e Campinas: aspectos socioespaciais e segregação Paper presented at the III Encontro da Associação 
Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Arquitetura e Urbanismo; Arquitetura, cidade e projeto: uma 
construção coletiva Sao Paulo. 
Ronald, R. (2005). Meanings of property and home ownership consumption in divergent socio-economic condi-
tions. In J. Doling & M. Elsinga (Eds.), Home ownership. Getting in, getting from, gettin out. Part II (Vol. 30). 
Delft: IOS Press.
Ronald, R. (2008). the ideology of Home Owernship: Homeownwer Societies and the Housing of Housing Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ronald, R., & Hirayama, Y. (2006). Housing Commodities, Context and Meaning: Transformations in Japan’s 
Urban Condominium Sector. Urban Studies, 43(13), 2467-2483. 
Rosen, G., & Walks, A. (2013). Rising cities: Condominium development and the private transformation of the 
metropolis. Geoforum, 49(0), 160-172. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.06.010
Ruonavaara, H. (1993). Types and forms of housing tenure: Towards solving the comparison/translation prob-
lem Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research, 10(1), 3-20. 
TOC
 293 References
Ruttan, Lore M. (2006). Sociocultural Heterogeneity and the Commons. Current Anthropology, 47(5), 843-853. 
doi:10.1086/507185
Saunders, P. (1990). A Nation of Home Owners. London: Unwin Hyman.
Scanlon, E. (1998). Low-Income Homeownership Policy as a Community Development Strategy. Journal of Com-
munity Practice, 5(1-2), 137-154. doi:10.1300/J125v05n01_09
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992). Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land 
Economics, 68(3), 249-262. doi:10.2307/3146375
Simpson, B. (2006). Social Identity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. Rationality and Society, 18(4), 443-
470. doi:10.1177/1043463106066381
Simpson, B., Willer, R., & Ridgeway, C. L. (2012). Status Hierarchies and the Organization of Collective Action. 
Sociological Theory, 30(3), 149-166. doi:10.1177/0735275112457912
Soaita, A. M. (2012). Strategies for In Situ Home Improvement in Romanian Large Housing Estates. Housing 
Studies, 27(7), 1008-1030. doi:10.1080/02673037.2012.725833
SØrensen, E., & Torfing, J. (Eds.). (2007). Theories of Democratic Network Governance. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Stephens, M. (2011). Comparative Housing Research: A ‘System-Embedded’ Approach. International Journal of 
Housing Policy, 11(4), 337-355. doi:10.1080/14616718.2011.626598
Stewart, D. W., & Shamdasani, P. N. (1990). Focus Groups: Theory and Practice. Newbury Park : Sage.
Straub, A. (2002). Strategic technical management of housing stock: lessons from Dutch housing associations. 
Building Research & Information, 30(5), 372-381. doi:10.1080/09613210210150955
Termeer, C. J. A. M., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (1997). Managing Perceptions in Networks In W. J. M. Kickert, E.-H. 
Klijn, & J. F. M. Koppenjan (Eds.), Managing Complex Networks. Strategies for the Public Sector (pp. 79-97). 
London: SAGE.
Toussaint, J. (2011). Housing wealth in retirement strategies. Towards understanding and new hypotheses (Vol. 
42). Delft: IOS Press.
UN-HABITAT. (2010). 5 Selected Topics of the Latin American Habitat (5 Temas Selectos del Hábitat Latino-
americano). Retrieved from 
UN-HABITAT. (2011). Affordable Land and Housing in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from Nairobi: 
UN-HABITAT. (2014). The Right to Adequate Housing. Retrieved from Geneva: http://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf
Van Bortel, G. (2012). Institutions and Governance Networks in Housing and Urban Regeneration. In S. J. Smith, 
M. Elsinga, L. F. O’Mahony, O. S. Eng, S. Wachter, & S. Tsenkova (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Hous-
ing and Home (Vol. 4, pp. 93-98). Oxford: Elsevier.
Van Bortel, G. (2016). Networks and Fault lines. Understanding the role of housing associations in neighbor-
hood regeneration: a network governance perspective. Delft: Delft University of Technology
Van der Heijden, H. (2013). West European Housing Systems in a Comparative Perspective (Vol. 46). Delft: IOS.
Van Weesep, J. (1984). Condominium Conversion in Amsterdam: Boon or Burden? . Urban Geography, 5(2), 
165-177. doi:10.2747/0272-3638.5.2.165
Van Weesep, J. (1987), “The creation of a new housing sector: condominiums in the United States”. Housing 
Studies 2, 122-133
Ward, P., Jiménez, E., & Virgilio, M. D. (Eds.). (2014). Housing Policy in Latin American Cities. A New Generation 
of strategies and Approaches for 2016 UN Habitat III. New York: Routledge.
Werczberger, E., & Ginsberg, Y. (1987). Maintenance of shared property in low-income condominiums. Housing 
Studies, 2(3), 192-202. 
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 38(3), 595-613. doi:doi: 10.1257/jel.38.3.595
Yau, Y. (2011). Collectivism and activism in housing management in Hong Kong. Habitat International, 35, 
327-334. 
Yau, Y. (2012). Normas, sentido de comunidad y colectivismo comunal en un contexto de edificios en altura. 
Revista INVI, 27, 17-72. 
Yau, Y. (2014). Perceived efficacies and collectivism in multi-owned housing management. Habitat Internation-
al, 43(0), 133-141. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2014.02.009
Yau, Y., & Ho, D. C. W. (2009). The effects of building managment practices on residential property prices in 
Hong Kong. Journal of Building Appraisal, 4, 157-167. doi:10.1057/jba.2008.42
TOC
 294 Affordable Condominium Housing
Yip, N. M. (2010). Management Rights in Multi-owned Properties in Hong Kong. In S. Blandy, A. Dupuis, & J. 
Dixon (Eds.), Multi-owned housing: law, power and practice (pp. 109-124). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited 
Zanetta, C. (2001). The Evolution of the World Bank’s urban lending in Latin America: from sites and services to 
municipal reform and beyond. Habitat International, 25(4), 513-533. 
TOC
 295 Curriculum vitae
Curriculum vitae
Rosa Elena Donoso Gomez was born on 25 March, 1978 in Guayaquil, Ecuador, 
and grew up mainly in the capital, Quito. She completed a professional degree in 
Architecture from Universidad San Francisco de Quito with a minor in sociology in 
2002, and received her Masters of Science in Community and Regional Planning at the 
University of Texas at Austin in 2008, with a focus on housing studies. Her professional 
experience combines both architecture and urban planning as well as academic 
research and teaching. 
Rosa Elena has worked as a consultant for municipalities on urban plans such as with 
the Comprehensive Plan for the Historic Center of Quito (2003), Santo Domingo Norte 
informal settlement in the Dominican Republic (2008), Turubamba Sur in Quito 
(2011), and Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas, Ecuador (2011). She has participated in 
different research projects such as the participatory risk and vulnerability assessment 
of an informal settlement in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, a project 
recognized by an award from the American Planning Association (2009). At the 
Instituto de la Ciudad, the municipality of Quito’s research institute, she developed 
research on territorial governance, producing research articles and a book about quality 
of life in Quito (2009). 
She has teaching experience both at undergraduate and master’s levels. At UT-Austin, 
she was a teacher assistant of the as Physical Planning class at the master’s level 
and Construction at the undergraduate level. In Quito she has taught undergraduate 
courses in Architecture School at San Francisco University (2010-2015) such as 
History and Theory of Architecture, Theories of Urban Design, and Housing and the 
City. Currently she teaches urban public policy courses at masters levels in Universidad 
Particular de Loja and Pontificia Universidad Católica de Quito. 
Rosa Elena started doctoral studies at OTB Research Institute at the Faculty of 
Architecture and the Built Environment at TU Delft, in the Housing in the Changing 
Society research group in 2011, a position funded by the Nuffic-Netherlands 
Fellowship for PhD. She is a founding member of the A+BE PhD council at BK and 
worked for two years representing PhDs at the Research Council of the Faculty of 
Architecture of TU Delft. 
In 2015 she returned to Quito, Ecuador where she worked as a housing and planning 
advisor at the Secretariat of Territory, Habitat and Housing of the Municipality of 
the Metropolitan District of Quito until the end of 2017. Currently she works at the 
TOC
 296 Affordable Condominium Housing
Ecuadorian-German cooperation program funded by GIZ, Sustainable Intermediate 
Cities, as the national advisor to construct the national applied research agenda for 
sustainable urban development, in the context of the New Urban Agenda, signed in 
Quito during Habitat III. 
TOC
Delft University of Technology,   
Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment,
OTB - Research for the Built Environment 
Affordable Condominium Housing
A comparative analysis of low-income homeownership  
in Colombia and Ecuador
As cities grow and more dense communities are built, the meaning of homeownership 
changes. In a highly urbanized future, it will be critical to know how to make high density 
housing in condominium ownership sustainable and resilient. 
A sector of social housing policies in Latin America subsidizes the provision of affordable 
housing for low and middle income homeownership. A network of professionals, both 
from private and public sector are involved in this process. In the context of Bogota, 
Colombia and Quito, Ecuador, dwellings for homeownership are built in multifamily and 
collective arrangements of land and architecture. The property system involved in these 
urban housing solutions is the condominium regime. The problem is that affordable 
condominiums, particularly those subsidized by national housing policy deteriorate over 
time. The common property elements of housing complexes or buildings are suffering 
from serious lack of maintenance.  Why are low-income homeowners not taking care of 
their properties? How can we better understand the problem of lack of maintenance of the 
affordable condominiums? 
Tenure forms are one of the most important institutions in housing policy and research. 
This comparative housing research looks at condominiums as a private common property 
resource and applies Ostrom´s institutional framework (Ostrom, 1990, 2005) to 
understand both formal and informal institutions involved in management and governance 
of the affordable condominiums. In condominium housing, owning a home of one’s own 
implies a more complex configuration of rights and obligations than just the possession 
of a single unit. The institutions of condominium housing studied in this thesis make a 
significant contribution to theory and housing policy and positions Latin American social 
housing policy in a global perspective.   
